FORMER FM SIMAO DISCUSSES MADAGASCAR TALKS

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 MAPUTO 000916 NOFORN SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/13/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV MZ MA SUBJECT: FORMER FM SIMAO DISCUSSES MADAGASCAR TALKS REF: A. ANTANANARIVO 586 ¶B. ANTANANARIVO 589 ¶C. ANTANANARIVO 573 Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Todd C. Chapman, reasons 1.4(b+d) ¶1. (S) SUMMARY: Former Chissano-era Foreign Minister Leonardo Simao provided detailed feedback to the Charge on August 13 on the Madagascar Peace and Reconciliation discussions leading to the August 9 agreement in Maputo between the Malagasy "Big Four." Simao described the negotiations as difficult, stating that agreement was reached only after former President Marc Ravalomanana agreed to delay his return to Madagascar in order to allow for greater stability. Simao explained that another Maputo meeting (Maputo II) will take place within 10 days of the August 9 agreement in order to define the conditions of the 15 month transition period leading-up to elections. Simao said the August 9 agreement fails to consider the military component of instability in Madagascar, perhaps the most challenging aspect. Mauritian High Commissioner in Mozambique Georges Alain Laridon, who has a personal relationship with Ravalomanana, told the Charge that he sees things differently, and thinks that Ravalomanana will return early to Madagascar, and will likely run for office, perhaps in coalition with Ratsiraka. Laridon also directly addressed French involvement in Madagascar, specifically their support of the Rajoelina coup. Simao called on the United States and the international donor community to continue its support of Madagascar in the ensuing fragile 15 months by maintaining AGOA and resuming bilateral assistance as soon as possible in order to mitigate economic risks. END SUMMARY. -------------- SETTING THE STAGE FOR THE MAPUTO TALKS -------------- ¶2. (C) Former FM Simao, now the executive director of the Joaquim Chissano Foundation, one of former president Chissano,s closest advisors, and a key interlocutor in the SADC-led process to resolve the impasse in Madagascar, explained to the Charge on August 13 that Ravalomanana took advantage of his time in Swaziland to manipulate King Mswati into believing that the only solution for Madagascar was a SADC-sponsored military intervention in order to reinstate the deposed president. Simao pointed out that this would be in King Mswati's interest were he to also be deposed, commenting that Swaziland is "not exactly democratic." Simao said that SADC leadership immediately realized this was an untenable solution, and decided to send a group, including representatives from the African Union, SADC, the UN, the Indian Ocean Commission (IOC) and the International Francophone Organization (OIF) to Swaziland to dissuade them of this course of action. Simao spoke with former Swazi Prime Minister Dlamini, to convince him that recommending military intervention was a bad course of action considering the animosity in Madagascar against Ravalomanana, who, according to Simao, is viewed there as unpopular and corrupt. While the former Prime Minister was persuaded, Simao said that King Mswati was unconvinced. SADC then decided to upgrade its mediator, choosing former President Chissano because he was a strong SADC leader, trusted by all sides. ¶3. (C) Simao explained the timeline of events thereafter: Chissano immediately traveled to Antananarivo and met with transitional leader Andry Rajoelina, who apparently was unhappy with the SADC appointment of Chissano. However, after a long tete-a-tete Rajoelina realized that there was good chemistry between them. Chissano then traveled to the UN and met with the diplomatic community and the UN Secretary General to discuss perspectives on Madagascar and the UN's role in the talks. Chissano raised concerns about the suspension of AGOA, and the possible impact on Madagascar's economy, according to Simao. Chissano then traveled to Paris to meet with exiled former Malagasy President Didier Ratsiraka. Finally, Chissano met with Ravalomanana and convinced him that it was not realistic to expect to return to power through a military intervention. Simao noted that there were rumors that Ravalomanana was actively recruiting South African mercenaries in order to build an invasion force at the time that Chissano met with him. -------------- MAPUTO TALKS AT IMPASSE ON EXILED LEADERS MAPUTO 00000916 002 OF 003 -------------- ¶4. (C) Simao described the Maputo talks as stalled until August 8 because former President Ratsiraka demanded a return from exile, but refused amnesty saying it suggested he was at fault for being exiled. Ratsiraka eventually negotiated an annulment of his terms of exile. As a result, Ravalomanana demanded the same terms, according to Simao, who explained that Malagasy military representatives were dead-set against Ravalomanana's return, fearing that he would fund a counter coup. Simao also commented that the unnamed military aide who supported Rajoelina throughout the negotiations appeared extremely nervous and unwilling to compromise with the Ravalomanana faction; however, as the negotiations progressed he visibly relaxed. (Note: This may be because, by Simao's own admission, military issues were not discussed during the negotiations. End Note.) -------------- SUCCESSFUL COMPROMISE -------------- ¶5. (C) Simao stated that Ravalomanana successfully negotiated to have all accusations against him nullified, except for undefined "high crimes," and in return he agreed not to return to Madagascar until the international mediation team found that the security and political situation warranted it. Ravalomanana also accepted to state publicly that his militant supporters in Madagascar should disband and that he had chosen to become part of the solution and sign the charter, which he did in front of the international press. Simao indicated that this compromise was particularly sensitive and difficult because Rajoelina was paranoid about Ravalomanana's return. Since the signing, Chissano traveled to Swaziland to brief King Mswati, and on to South Africa to brief President Zuma. ¶6. (C) Mauritian High Commissioner Georges Alain Laridon told the Charge later on August 13 that Ravalomanana called Ratsiraka in Paris and convinced him to attend the Maputo meetings. He confirmed that the French Ambassador in Maputo closely watched the meetings from the corridors. Discussing the French influence, Laridon said the French backed pro-Rajoelina factions and manipulated the military because Ravalomanana had led a "frontal attack" on French business interests, and alienated their government. Laridon said the French still have a vested interest in keeping Ravalomanana out of Malagasy politics. Laridon, a personal friend of Ravalomanana, said Ravalomanana hopes to return to Madagascar and stand for election. Laridon believes that Ravalomanana will seek a coalition with an ailing Ratsiraka in order to win. (Note: Laridon said he spoke with Ratsiraka's physician who stated that he is 75 percent blind and in poor health, which is confirmed by poloff observations of a frail Ratsiraka in need of support to walk at the Maputo meetings. End Note.) Laridon's assessment is that Ravalomanana can win, especially in coalition with Ratsiraka. Turning to economics, Laridon confided that Mauritius is concerned about the economic situation in post-coup Madagascar, including Mauritian business ties, largely developed with the former regime. Laridon said that Rajoelina was forced to negotiate for fear of losing AGOA privileges, and concerns that he would not meet government payrolls in the third quarter. -------------- ROLE OF THE U.S. AND DIPLOMATIC COMMUNITY -------------- ¶7. (C) Discussing the critical 30 days following the August 9 signing, Simao commented that it was important for bilateral cooperation to resume. Simao approved strongly of U.S. diplomatic efforts in Antananarivo, both bilaterally and with the International Contact Group on Madagascar. He also commended the open and frank discussion that the International Contact Group had with Ravalomanana which contributed to international efforts to dissuade the deposed President from the military option. Simao said the charter provides evidence that efforts are being made by all parties in Madagascar to develop a legitimate government, and that this should give the United States a basis for for continuing AGOA privileges and ensuring continuity of bilateral assistance. The Charge responded only that these matters were under review and that a continuous flow of information from the mediating team to U.S. officials would be helpful in that review. In an aside, Simao said he believed the French MAPUTO 00000916 003 OF 003 Ambassador in Maputo may attempt to use delay tactics in order to derail efforts to develop the transitional government. He also commented that the French Ambassador and an unnamed representative from the Elysee were on the margins of the talks in Maputo, but were not apparently directly observing. -------------- DETAILS OF THE CHARTER -------------- ¶8. (C) Simao outlined several different commissions to be formed at future meetings, perhaps as early as next week. He expects a South African-style Truth and Reconciliation Commission will be formed quickly, and will be tasked with examining wrongs perpetuated by politicians recently and in the past. He thinks this commission will help Malagasy society understand its political problems and therefore move forward. Simao said Madagascar would use this committee to draft a new constitution, to be approved by referendum, because the current constitution is the source of many political problems. This commission also would be tasked with reforming the electoral and voter registration systems. He also explained that a second Commission on Military and Security issues will be formed at a later date; opining that the military is divided and has always been part of Madagascar's political problems. The military commission, according to Simao, will look for ways of reducing the size and power of the Malagasy military without generating instability. Simao, in another aside, commented that he believed there was significant tension in the Malagasy military between flag officers who were reaping the benefits of installing Rajoelina and resentful mid-level officers who continued to live in near-poverty conditions. ¶9. (C) While the talks last week were productive, Simao acknowledged that there are several difficult points still to resolve. At the very core of challenging issues to be discussed is the makeup of the transitional government, and who will fill the President, Deputy President, Prime Minister, and three Deputy Prime Minister positions. Simao said there is a gentlemen,s agreement that none of the principal negotiators will stand for election in 15 months, but he is uncertain whether the military will accept that Rajoelina not run. He confided an elegant solution would be to retain the constitutional provision that any candidate be 40 years of age, because Rajoelina would then have to wait. Simao thought this would be acceptable, because Rajoelina could still keep his job as Mayor of Antananarivo, and because he has a long enough future in politics that sitting out one round should not be too burdensome. -------------- -------------- COMMENT: MILITARY ISSUES UNRESOLVED, SIMAO ASKS FOR CONTINUED SUPPORT -------------- -------------- ¶10. (S/NF) Chissano and Simao are skilled and experienced diplomatic interlocutors, and Simao was especially open and frank in his assessments of the state-of-play, even emailing copies of the agreements to the embassy after meeting with the Charge. The four main Malagasy parties seem to view Maputo as a neutral venue, and appear to appreciate Chissano's efforts. Simao and Laridon emphasized the value of continued U.S. diplomatic support of Madagascar in the ensuing fragile 15 months, calling for the maintenance of AGOA agreements and the resumption of bilateral assistance as soon as possible in order to mitigate economic risks and engender greater stability. Separately, rumors continue in the Mozambican diplomatic community of French efforts to support Rajoelina as a counter to Ravalomanana. The Charge will meet with the French Ambassador to Mozambique next week. CHAPMAN