CHISSANO ON MADAGASCAR: "SITTING ON A VOLCANO"

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MAPUTO 001042 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/18/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL UNGA MA MZ SUBJECT: CHISSANO ON MADAGASCAR: "SITTING ON A VOLCANO" REF: A. ANTANANARIVO 667 ¶B. ANTANANARIVO 662 ¶C. ANTANANARIVO 659 ¶D. ANTANANARIVO 654 Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Todd Chapman for reasons 1.4 (b and d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Former Mozambican President and SADC Special Negotiator for Madagascar Joachim Chissano briefed the Charge on September 18 on his mediation efforts. Of immediate concern, he highlighted Andry Rajoelina's plans to participate in UNGA, calling for the USG to support a SADC (or possibly even an AU) effort to bar Rajoelina from speaking at UNGA by voting against TGV's submission to the Credentials Committee. Chissano claimed that Rajoelina's appearance at UNGA would give greater international recognition for TGV, buttress the HAT back in Madagascar, and make his mediation efforts more difficult. Describing the French position on Madagascar as complicated, Chissano said there were internal divides within the Elysee, meanwhile influential French businessmen were speaking directly to President Sarkozy on behalf of Rajoelina. Chissano described current Malagasy Prime Minister Roindefo as stubborn and that he needed to be moved aside to another position in the transitional government. The international mediators plan to meet in Paris on September 24 and arrive in Antananarivo on September 27. Chissano remains committed to the effort, but disheartened by Rajoelina's frequent change of heart. "He is sitting on a volcano, and he doesn,t even know it." END SUMMARY. -------------- CHISSANO WARNS ABOUT TGV'S ACCESS TO UNGA -------------- ¶2. (C) President Joachim Chissano told the Charge on September 18 that interim leader Andry Rajoelina (TGV) was attempting to go around the AU and SADC by courting the international community in search of greater legitimacy. Chissano advisor Nuno Tomas said TGV emissaries had already traveled to Asian countries, including India, Thailand, and Indonesia, to seek support. Chissano described TGV's appearance at UNGA as a publicity stunt to show Malagasies at home that the international community accepts him, and it is solely the AU and SADC which refuse to recognize him. Such a result would make Chissano's own mediation efforts more difficult, he said. ¶3. (C) Chissano called for U.S. support to bureaucratically block TGV's attempt to speak at UNGA through the Credentials �0A;Committee. If TGV is not recognized by the Credentials Committee, he will be excluded from speaking at UNGA. The situation is complicated, he said, because no one has yet stepped forward to contest TGV's credentials. Chissano is trying to reach DRC President Kabila, hoping that he, as SADC Chairman, will contest on behalf of SADC. Chissano said that the AU will not likely step forward, since Libya is both UNGA and AU President, and Colonel Khadafy does not agree with the international view that TGV came to power via coup. Nevertheless, Chissano will try to reach the AU's Jean Ping who he thought was on his way to New York. ¶4. (C) Chissano's advisor Nuno Tomas further highlighted the importance of making a political statement of non-recognition of TGV, saying that abstentions from an eventual vote about contestation of TGV's credentials would amount to tacit recognition of him by the international community and would relieve domestic pressure on the Rajoelina movement, since sanctions have not yet been felt by the general public. Chissano explained that TGV's trip to UNGA is an attempt to follow Ravalomanana's original game plan when he overthrew Ratsiraka by convincing Malagasies that the sanctions do not exist and that the international community will eventually accept him. ¶5. (C) Chissano urged U.S. support on this issue, saying that there is "still time," though he was not sure what Kabila will do. Again he urged that the U.S. must "say something," as a means of supporting the International Contact Group (ICG) and pressuring TGV to return with greater commitment to the negotiation table. -------------- CHISSANO ON THE PRIME MINISTER -------------- MAPUTO 00001042 002 OF 003 ¶6. (C) Chissano told the Charge that at the Maputo I meetings, he proposed that Roindefo vacate the Prime Minister's position so that he could run in the upcoming elections. Chissano confided that Roindefo was unsure of his chances and requested guarantees that he could continue as Prime Minister. The ICG recommended that he vacate his PM position and take a senior leadership role in the HAT, as President of the Congress for example. Chissano described Roindefo as stubborn and guessed that he must be protecting something--he's not sure what--by staying on as PM. TGV would like a guaranty that he will remain as President should he oust Roindefo, claiming to a skeptical Chissano that the PM would be replaced by an unaligned candidate not tied to any specific movement. Chissano is concerned that the other movements will not accept a candidate chosen by TGV, however independent he may seem. Ideally, Chissano would like to see an implementation of the agreed-upon consensus at Maputo I, with TGV staying on, the PM position going to the Ratsiraka movement, and Roindefo moved to another position. -------------- IS TGV A SURVIVOR? -------------- ¶7. (C) Chissano explained that "the unpredictable" TGV called him recently saying that he had several proposals he wanted to discuss but that he could not raise them on the phone. Chissano, who was frustrated with TGV's September 5 decision to unilaterally form the HAT, believes that TGV has made a subsequent decision either to push Roindefo out, or to personally bow-out of his current position in order to return and contest the elections. Chissano suggested the latter scenario to him in their first face-to-face meeting in Antananarivo. Chissano sees TGV as a survivor; pointing out that he has already shown ability to weather political storms, even though he seems to constantly be changing his mind and strategy. ¶8. (C) Chissano explained that TGV was very vocal at Maputo I, contributing to the consensus reached; however he was silenced at Maputo II, preferring to let members of his movement, whom Chissano described as &very dubious,8 speak on his behalf. This relative silence from TGV contributed to the stalemate making Ravalomanana very angry, and prompting him to boast that he could pay for the allegiance of Roindefo, thereby forcing TGV out, since "anything would be better than TGV." Chissano opined that TGV will likely seek guarantees that the Constitution will be amended to allow him to run before he considers leaving his current position. TGV told Chissano that finding an acceptable alternative would be difficult however. Unfortunately, Chissano believes that the window of opportunity for TGV to bow-out gracefully has closed, and that a now-scared TGV believes his movement will brand him as a "traitor" should he attempt to leave his position as leader. -------------- THE FRENCH POSITION -------------- ¶9. (C) Speaking about France, Chissano explained that the Elysee appeared divided in its view of TGV, however there is a group of influential French citizens living in Madagascar who are attempting to apply pressure directly on President Sarkozy to recognize TGV. As a result, the Elysee position is not very strong, though they continue to call for a transparent consensus-based HAT. Chissano believes that France is feeling the pressure from its 25,000-plus expat population in Madagascar who did not like Ravalomanana's overtures to the Anglophone world and Asia. While in Paris recently, Chissano met with some of these groups who told him "TGV cannot be removed." The Elysee continues to hold the line, however, so far refusing to support TGV. ¶10. (C) In a September 17 meeting, French DCM Gilles Petit de la Villeon was relatively closed-mouthed about the Madagascar issue, and seemed unwilling to discuss specifics as he had in the past. He confirmed that the Government of France (RF) believes the real sticking point is current Prime Minister Roindefo who TGV cannot dislodge. De la Villeon seemed less than certain that the Prime Minister has complete backing of the military which itself is not unified. He also mentioned that former President Albert Zafy proposed a solution in which the military would take on the roles of MAPUTO 00001042 003 OF 003 President, Vice President, and Prime Minister in the HAT, explaining that this idea was apparently well-liked by all camps except TGV's who refused. ¶11. (C) When asked about Chissano, de la Villeon mentioned that the ICG and Chissano himself should spend more time in Antananarivo trying to build consensus (NOTE: De la Villeon refused to even acknowledge that two Elysee members met with Chissano. END NOTE). Moving on to the early September SADC summit in Kinshasa, the French DCM was less than pleased with what happened, agreeing that SADC has very little leverage over the Madagascar situation, although he expressed relief that King Mswati's military solution appears off the table. De la Villeon explained that France sees three options: a) degeneration into war b) TGV remains and international sanctions continue or c) Roindefo leaves and the Maputo Consensus can be implemented. He commented that the likelihood of the first scenario and/or the second seems higher than the third. He also questioned whether another Maputo conference might be worthwhile, as there is significant bickering between the parties in Antananarivo who cannot decide on a venue for talks, for example. Visibly frustrated with the situation, de la Villeon closed by saying France wants to facilitate a solution based on consensus and will continue to work towards that end. -------------- ICG PLANS TO RETURN TO MADAGASCAR -------------- ¶12. (C) The ICG plans to meet in Paris on September 24 to decide on a strategy before traveling to Antananarivo on September 27. Chissano mentioned that TGV now refuses to hold additional negotiation meetings elsewhere in Africa, "since Africa, he claims, has rejected him." Chissano believes the ICG strategy will not be rigid, instead the group will simply provide an environment for discussions to take place, such that a Malagasy solution can be reached. Chissano produced a September 14 letter to him from Zafy (copy faxed to Embassy Antananarivo) detailing his frustrations with the inability of the four movements to meet on neutral territory in Antananarivo. TGV continues to demand that the President, Vice President, and Prime Minister positions remain with him, such that the Rajoelina movement maintains 14 senior positions in the HAT, civil society receives 8, and the remaining 6 positions be divided between the Ravalomanana, Ratsiraka, and Zafy movements. Chissano confirmed that much depends on whether TGV is successful at UNGA and what happens within Madagascar while TGV is away. Chissano confirmed that plans are underway for demonstrations against TGV both in Antananarivo and in France where there is a sizable Malagasy community. -------------- COMMENT: CHISSANO DISAPPOINTED IN TGV -------------- ¶13. (C) Chissano is exasperated by TGV's inability to follow the steps laid out in the Maputo Consensus. Speaking like the African elder statesman, Chissano described TGV as young, indecisive, and realizing that he is probably in over his head. He told TGV that he can have a long political future, but not if he makes big mistakes at this juncture. "He is sitting on a volcano, and he doesn,t even know it." Chissano was very clear in his request for international assistance in bringing TGV back to the negotiation table by blocking his participation and any public statements at UNGA. Chissano is prepared to return to Antananarivo and continue talks through the ICG process, even if prospects for reaching a compromise are dimming. CHAPMAN