PHILIPPINES-JAPAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT UPDATE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 MANILA 001563 SENSITIVE SIPDIS STATE FOR EAP/MTS, EAP/EP, AND EB/TPP STATE ALSO PASS EXIM, AND OPIC STATE ALSO PASS USTR BWEISEL, KEHLERS, AND RBAE STATE ALSO PASS USAID, OPIC TREASURY FOR OASIA USDOC FOR 4430/ITA/MAC USDA/FAS/ONA E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: ETRD EINV ECON PGOV PREL RP SUBJECT: PHILIPPINES-JAPAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT UPDATE REF: 08 Manila 02419 SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED ¶1. (SBU) Summary: Since the Japan-Philippine Economic Partnership Agreement (JPEPA, the first Philippine bilateral free trade agreement) became effective in December 2008 (reftel),its impact has been more on the movement of people than goods, and significant barriers to investment in the Philippines remain. Philippine officials explain that mechanisms to implement the treaty are still being set-up. However, Japanese officials here believe that increased trade and investment will depend heavily on the Philippine political will to address non-tariff barriers, business climate and competitiveness issues, and legal barriers to greater foreign participation in the Philippine economy. Our experience with the bilateral Trade and Investment Framework Agreement confirms that pushing for reforms here can be a protracted and difficult process. End Summary. First Batch of Nurses and Caregivers Off to Japan -------------- -------------- ¶2. (U) For the Philippines, the most tangible benefit thus far since the Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement (JPEPA) was ratified and came into force on December 11, 2008 has been in the movement of natural persons, particularly in the health services sector. In May 2009, more than 280 Filipino nurses and caregivers left for Japan, the first batch of 500 health workers initially targeted under the JPEPA Implementing Agreement on the Movement of Natural Persons that the Japanese and Philippine governments signed in January 2009. These health workers are classified as "candidate" nurses and caregivers until they satisfy the required Japanese language proficiency requirements, on-the-job training, and pass the license exams which will certify them as full-fledged nurses and caregivers. Japan expects to accept one thousand Filipino health workers in the first two years of the JPEPA. Attracting Japanese Investments Hinges on Key Reforms -------------- -------------- ¶3. (U) The Philippine government expects JPEPA to boost Japanese investments in the country by providing a framework for facilitating capital flows between Japan and the Philippines and resolving trade and investment-related issues. Although Japan is one of the Philippines's largest foreign investors, foreign direct investment flows to the Philippines from Japan over the past decade accounted for barely 9% of total Japanese investments in the ASEAN region. ¶4. (SBU) Officials of the Japanese Embassy in Manila told econoffs that credit restrictions stemming from the global financial crisis are currently making it difficult for Japanese businesses to invest abroad. The officials also cited long-standing Philippine disincentives to higher levels of foreign investment -- such as the poor infrastructure, inconsistent policies, unpredictable legal system, and weak governance - which need to be addressed to boost Japanese investments here. They also predict that any initiatives to address the foreign investment restrictions stipulated in the Philippine constitution and various other laws will be politicized and subject to controversy. So Far, No Increased Trade With Japan -------------- ¶5. (U) Due to the global financial crisis, total Philippine trade with the world for the first five months of 2009 declined by 33.7% to $30 billion, with Philippine imports down by 32.9% and Philippine exports down by 34.5%. Total bilateral trade between Japan and the Philippines during the first five months of 2009 contracted by 32.4% to $4.1 billion year-on-year. Philippine exports to Japan declined by 34.5% to $2.2 billion and imports from Japan shrank by 29.9% to $1.9 billion during the same period. However, most economists, think tanks, and business groups expect the benefits of liberalizing trade with Japan will outweigh potential costs from foregone tariff revenues and damage to some protected domestic industries. ¶6. (U) Since JPEPA entered into force, tariffs on a number of Philippine agricultural products representing about 95% of agricultural exports (by value) to Japan have been eliminated (mostly fruits, vegetables, and seafoods). There will be immediate MANILA 00001563 002 OF 002 tariff elimination for Philippine coffee, beer, fertilizers, fresh or dried mangoes, and certain fermented beverages. There will be tariff elimination for some Philippine agricultural products in the fifth year, and some in the tenth year. Cane molasses, muscovado sugar, chicken meat, and pineapples, products of interest to the Philippines, will enter the Japanese market under tariff rate quotas (TRQs, where lower tariffs will apply for import volumes within the quota, and a higher tariff will apply after the quota has been reached). Certain agricultural and fishery products such as rice, raw sugar, wheat, milk, herrings, sardines, and mackerel that Japan considers sensitive were excluded from JPEPA. ¶7. (U) The two countries mutually committed to eliminate tariffs on most industrial goods within ten years from entry into force of the JPEPA, improving access to Japan as an export market as well as a supplier for inputs to the Philippine manufacturing sector (benefitting major industries such as electronics, automobiles, garments/apparel). Japan expects to benefit from the elimination of Philippine tariffs on a number of agriculture products such as fresh apples, grapes, pears and quinces; from improved access for iron and steel under TRQ arrangements; and from the phased elimination of tariffs for electrical and electronic appliances/parts, some auto/auto parts, cement, and chemicals. Although some local industries could be adversely affected, analysts here have noted that about 85% of Philippine imports from Japan were already entering the Philippines with low (zero to 5%) duties before JPEPA; and that JPEPA allowed remedies (such as safeguard mechanisms) for domestic industries severely affected by import surges. ¶8. (U) In the medium term, studies estimate that JPEPA could boost Philippine exports by up to $1.4 billion dollars annually (equivalent to about 20% of Philippine exports to Japan). The Philippine agricultural sector also stands to gain from greater access to the Japanese export market. Japan is the single biggest buyer (over 70% by value) of Philippine shrimps and prawns, and fresh fruits and vegetables (60%). Implementing Mechanisms Not Fully Established -------------- ¶9. (SBU) According to Philippine Trade Undersecretary Thomas Aquino, work on the mechanisms to implement various aspects of the treaty are ongoing, including setting-up and convening the various committees to work on the operational details. Although he expects it may take another six to twelve months for the benefits to be more apparent, he estimated that JPEPA could boost Philippine-Japan trade and investments by 10% to 20%. Challenges Ahead -------------- ¶10. (SBU) In meetings with econoffs, Japanese Embassy officials noted that although JPEPA provides a framework for dialogue, cooperation, and dispute resolution, the Philippines ultimately still needs to compete in a globalized economic environment for Japanese trade and investments. They added that in order to maximize JPEPA's envisioned benefits, the Philippines must exercise the political will to address non-tariff barriers to trade, low competitiveness rankings, and constitutional/legal restrictions to foreign investments here. Comment -------------- ¶11. (SBU) The lengthy, tedious, and controversial process that Japan went through to negotiate a free trade agreement with the Philippines (i.e., nearly seven years from inception to ratification for JPEPA),and the U.S. experience with our bilateral Trade and Investment Framework Agreement both reinforce the difficulty in concluding trade agreements with the Philippines until they take more concrete and convincing steps to demonstrate a commitment to market-oriented reforms. End Comment. KENNEY