PHILIPPINES SEEKS BETTER FOOTING FOR REENGAGEMENT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MANILA 001318 SIPDIS STATE FOR EAP/MTS E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/21/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER RP SUBJECT: PHILIPPINES SEEKS BETTER FOOTING FOR REENGAGEMENT ON PEACE PROCESS REF: A. MANILA 1049 (NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER SEEKS NEW MALAYSIAN PEACE NEGOTIATOR) ¶B. MANILA 920 (FOREIGN SECRETARY ON PEACE PROCESS ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION AND ASEAN) ¶C. MANILA 365 (NEW PEACE PROCESS ADVISER OPTIMISTIC ABOUT FUTURE TALKS WITH REBELS) Classified By: Ambassador Kristie A. Kenney, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: The Philippine government continues to commit publicly to a resumption of peace negotiations with separatist Muslim rebels in the southern Philippines, but its overtures have not elicited a clear response from the rebel group. The government views peace as "tough, but not impossible," yet is struggling to transition from military engagement to a ceasefire, as the military aggressively pursues rogue rebel commanders who have evaded capture for 10 months in central Mindanao. Foreign Affairs Undersecretary Rafael Seguis, who also heads the government's peace panel, acknowledged June 16 his government's continued dissatisfaction with the chief Malaysian peace facilitator; Philippine efforts to coax the Malaysians into selecting a new -- more neutral, iin their view -- chief facilitator have been rebuffed, delaying progress in back-channel talks. Top Philippine officials hope a ceasefire could open the door to a renewal of other peace-reinforcing mechanisms, such as the International Monitoring Team and a joint policing entity. The government continues to seek observer status in the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC),convinced that it could use that status to better respond to rebel concerns, but it left the OIC's recent Damascus meeting empty-handed. As the government mulls its options, a surge in fighting has caused more displacement of Mindanao residents, leading to a renewed focus by the government and donor countries on sanitation and food distribution at evacuation camps, where U.S. development aid continues to be directed to good effect. END SUMMARY. POSITIONING FOR PEACE TALKS -------------- ¶2. (C) Philippine Negotiating Panel Chairman Secretary Rafael Seguis averred in a June 16 meeting with A/DCM his government's commitment to peace talks "without preconditions, at any time" with separatist Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) rebels in the southern Philippines. Achieving significant progress on a peace accord would be "tough, but not impossible," he said. Short-term government efforts, he continued, were focused on obtaining a ceasefire and revitalizing the International Monitoring Team (IMT), still supported by Libya and Brunei but unable to fulfill its mission without a ceasefire and new terms of reference. A third backchannel meeting will take place June 22 in Manila between Philippine peace panel members and Malaysian peace facilitators under the leadership of Malaysian chief facilitator, Othman Abdul Razak, whom Philippine officials still regard as biased toward the interests of the MILF (ref c). While Seguis said the government is unwilling to renegotiate the territorial agreement invalidated by the Supreme Court in 2008, it now envisioned an adjusted arrangement granting the MILF six barangays in Lanao del Sur province, but also asking the rebels to relinquish claims on Palawan and the Sulu Sea's vast resources. Seguis blamed his predecessors for the earlier botched agreement, which had reportedly been rushed so that President Arroyo could take credit for the achievement in her July 28, 2008, State of the Nation Address. Seguis lamented that Philippine proposals for a new scope of discussion with the MILF had thus far elicited no response from the MILF, or even from Malaysian peace facilitators. At a separate diplomatic briefing on June 15, Seguis criticized the MILF's apparent "foot-dragging." IMT AND OTHER MECHANISMS NOT OPERATING -------------- ¶3. (C) Instituting a ceasefire and revitalizing the IMT are the government's priority, Seguis noted, but the continued fighting in Mindanao affected the functioning of these and other mechanisms established to support peace. The IMT, now confined to Cotabato City, has diminished in size to only a handful of observers from Libya and Brunei. With no ceasefire and no new terms of reference for their mandate, the monitors are idle. Seguis envisioned reinvigorating the Joint Coordinating Committee on the Cessation of Hostilities, the key ceasefire mechanism, and was looking at ways to reconvene the Ad Hoc Joint Action Group, a joint government-MILF policing and anti-terrorism entity. In the MANILA 00001318 002 OF 003 meantime, Presidential Advisor on the Peace Process Avelino Razon continues to advocate a disarmament/demobilization/reintegration program, which the MILF has outrightly declared is a non-starter. Rumors abound that Razon intends to run for Mayor of Manila in the May 2010 elections and that he will soon resign from his position, bringing his short (and largely ineffective) tenure as Peace Process Advisor to an abrupt close. SEEKING OIC MEMBERSHIP AND A NEW FACILITATOR -------------- ¶4. (C) Seguis noted the Philippines lobbied intensively for observer status with the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) at the group's May meeting in Damascus, but continued to face obstacles, as a handful of OIC member states and Mindanao's other main Muslim grouping, the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF),already an OIC observer, repelled Philippine appeals to OIC member states for their support. Observer status, Seguis believed, would give the Philippines more tools to address the development challenges faced by Mindanao's Muslims. Still, he conceded, the government was no longer seeking OIC member countries to become adjunct peace facilitators, prompted by concern about these countries' religious influence in the Philippines. Nor would the OIC -- with its dozens of members -- be an appropriate forum to settle a sovereign issue like peace in Mindanao. While Seguis admitted that the U.S., due to its level of acceptance in Mindanao, would be the best peace facilitator, the Philippines might instead seek an EU country to fill the role. Seguis suggested that, with presidential elections scheduled for May 2010, a lower profile for U.S. involvement in the peace process remains advisable as the country moves into campaign season. Indonesia would be a good alternate facilitator, but Seguis suspected that Malaysia would disapprove, given political tensions between the two countries. CONCERN ABOUT IDP SITUATION -------------- ¶5. (C) At a separate June 15 briefing for the diplomatic community and international development agencies, Seguis noted that the government remains concerned about the effects of ongoing hostilities on internally displaced persons (IDP), whose numbers in central Mindanao have risen by 50,000 since May to approximately 270,000 this month. In his early June tour of IDP camps near Cotabato City, Seguis said he observed a need for better sanitation and improved coordination between local government units and line agencies. He urged foreign donors to continue to coordinate their material and logistical support through UN offices. Earlier, at a May donors' forum attended by the USAID Mission Director, donors expressed concern about the impact of ongoing fighting on food deliveries, particularly to Muslim communities. World Food Programme (WFP) officials noted that while fighting may have impacted the timing of food deliveries, food was still being delivered unencumbered to communities through close coordination with the Philippine military, who granted WFP safe access to affected areas. Civil society groups continued to express concern about access to affected communities. One NGO operating in Mindanao received reports of discrimination against IDPs by local government officials aligned with the regional governor; officials in the town of Aleosan reportedly refused the IDPs access to a storage depot containing food and other supplies because of the IDP's alleged affiliation with the MILF. U.S. DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE PLAYS IMPORTANT ROLE -------------- --- ¶6. (C) Philippine officials and other observers unanimously agree that U.S. development assistance in Mindanao, now targeted to conflict-affected areas of central Mindanao, remains a vital ingredient in the pursuit of a peace accord and in providing relief for IDPs. In his meeting with the DCM, Seguis expressed hope that as incremental progress in the peace talks was achieved, perhaps through the reinvigoration of existing peace mechanisms, the U.S. would fund additional discreet development projects to help MILF fighters disarm and to support IDPs in camps around central Mindanao's Liguasan Marsh, the site of some of the worst fighting and an epicenter of MILF recruitment. Development assistance, Seguis continued, provided not only an obvious benefit for the people of Mindanao, but also for the image of the U.S., which, according to a December 2008 survey, enjoys high trust ratings among Mindanao residents, both Muslims and Christians. MANILA 00001318 003 OF 003 POLITICAL OBSTACLES TO TALKS -------------- ¶7. (C) Obstacles in the relationship between the Philippine government and the Malaysian facilitators appear to be contributing to the delay in restarting peace talks. According to a Malaysian Embassy political officer, the Philippines committed a diplomatic faux pas when President Arroyo dispatched National Security Advisor Norberto Gonzales to negotiate with Malaysia's recently elected Prime Minister Najib Razak (ref A). The visit annoyed Malaysian officials, and they resented the Philippines' request to find a replacement for chief facilitator Othman, which the Malaysian government considered to be an internal personnel decision. Seguis noted that a power struggle between Othman and a rival could be contributing to the Malaysians' sensitivities on peace process issues. Meanwhile, within the Philippines, Seguis noted the onset of election season poses its own challenges to the peace process. With less than one year to go before the general elections, presidential aspirants are turning their attention to other issues; Mindanao rarely figures into national discourse, and positions of some candidates toward the rebels could harden as fighting drags on. COMMENT -------------- ¶8. (C) Distinctly different factors are delaying a return to the negotiating table: an ongoing military operation to track down a rogue MILF leader; lack of organized political will on either the government or rebel side to push for a ceasefire; mistrust between the Philippines and the Malaysian peace facilitators; and the rebels' tacit disapproval of negotiating terms that do not include the territorial agreement declared unconstitutional last year. The Philippine government has publicly encouraged the MILF to "take bold steps to return to the negotiating table," and has declared itself open to negotiations "without preconditions." However, by insisting on a reduced scope for a new territorial agreement and a disarmament/demobilization/reintegration process, the government appears to have established its own de facto preconditions. The MILF leadership, splintered and factionalized, is likely unable to take bold moves on its own, meaning the government will have to make a larger concession, if only as a gesture to entice the rebels back to the negotiating table. It remains to be seen what the government is willing to offer. KENNEY