ANTICIPATED REQUEST FOR MK 54 TORPEDO CLASSIFIED

UNCLAS MANAMA 000090 BAGHDAD FOR AMBASSADOR ERELI E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: MASS MARR PGOV BA SUBJECT: ANTICIPATED REQUEST FOR MK 54 TORPEDO CLASSIFIED BRIEF AND SUBSEQUENT ACQUISITON ¶1. (U) Summary: This country team assessment anticipates a request from the Bahrain Defense Force (BDF) to have a classified brief regarding the MK 54 Torpedo and its eventual procurement. ¶2. (U) Reason Kingdom of Bahrain may desire a classified brief for the MK 54 Torpedo: During the recent MK 46 Torpedo Program Management Review (PMR),the Bahrain Defense Force (BDF) showed strong interest in reconfiguring its current inventory of MK 46 Torpedoes to the MK 54 Torpedo. The USN is transitioning from the MK 46 to the MK 54 and it will discontinue MK 46 maintenance in 2014. The BDF stated it would therefore make sense to start planning for reconfiguring its inventory to the MK 54 Torpedo. ¶3. (U) How the MK 54 Torpedo would affect Bahrain's force structure: Release of information in the MK 54 classified brief and the eventual acquisition of the MK 54 Torpedo will not affect the number of ships or their missions, but will support the Royal Bahrain Navy's procurement process and would eventually enhance Bahrain's ability to counter maritime threats. ¶4. (U) How the MK 54 Torpedo would contribute to both the U.S. and Bahrain's defense/security goals: The eventual procurement of the MK 54 Torpedo will increase Bahrain's ability to contribute to coalition operations. ¶5. (U) Justification for the type and quantity of articles requested: The anticipated request of converting their MK 46s to MK 54s will not increase the number of torpedoes in Bahrain's inventory, and will be adequate to meet the needs of the BDF. ¶6. (U) Combatant Commander's concurrence to the introduction of a new warfighting capability to the Kingdom of Bahrain: Combatant Commander will provide assessment separately. ¶7. (U) Anticipated reaction from neighboring governments: Embassy Country Team anticipates no negative reaction from neighboring Arab states. Other Arab countries in the region plan to procure the MK 54. ¶8. (U) Assessment of Bahrain's ability to account for, safeguard, operate, maintain and support the MK 54: On January 17, 1988, the GOB signed a General Security of Military Information Agreement. In addition, the GOB hosted a favorable NDPC Security Survey in March 2000 and received a favorable CIA Risk Assessment, dated April 8, 1999. Furthermore, the GOB has a proven track record of maintaining security of sensitive programs regarding research, development and production, with no known cases of any Bahraini compromise of U.S. technology. ¶9. (U) Training required either in-country or in the United States and anticipated reactions resulting from the presence of U.S. trainers in the country: Educational courses and training exercises are routinely conducted between the BDF and U.S. military. Bahrain maintains a robust U.S. military and defense contractor presence; post anticipates no adverse reaction to U.S. trainers in Bahrain. Training regimen, whether in the U.S or in Bahrain, will be determined later. ¶10. (U) Source of financing and the economic impact of the proposed acquisition: Funds for future purchases of the MK 54 will come from the Bahraini national budget. Economic impact would be low. ¶11. (U) Human rights consideration relevant to proposed brief and eventual acquisition: There are no human rights considerations relevant to the proposed classified briefing or potential future acquisition of the MK 54 system. ¶12. (U) Plan for end-use monitoring (EUM) for sensitive and advanced warfighting technology and the OMC's plan for compliance verification: Bahrain will require continued education on the End-Use Monitoring Program, as applicable. Bahrain will comply with end-use monitoring as outlined in Chapter 8, DOD 5105-38-m, Security Assistance Management Manual, 3 October 2003, as necessary. OMC Bahrain will fulfill its responsibility and ensure compliance with end-use monitoring requirements under the Golden Sentry Program, including periodic accountability inventories, monitoring operational use and control during day-to-day military-to-military contact, when required. ¶13. (U) Conclusion: Embassy Manama Country Team recommends approval for requested classified briefing and eventual transfer of the MK 54 system to Bahrain. This assessment has been fully coordinated within the Country Team. ********************************************* ******** Visit Embassy Manama's Classified Website: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/manama/ ********************************************* ******** HENZEL