NICARAGUA: REGIONAL ELECTION ALIANCES FORMED, FSLN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MANAGUA 000935 SIPDIS DEPT FOR WHA/CEN KRAAIMOORE DEPT FOR DRL MAGGIO DEPT FOR INL/IIA ARCHULETA STATE FOR USOAS STATE FOR USAID E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/20/2019 TAGS: PGOV PHUM NU SUBJECT: NICARAGUA: REGIONAL ELECTION ALIANCES FORMED, FSLN KEEPS OPPOSITION SPLIT REF: MANAGUA 859 Classified By: Ambassador Robert J. Callahan for reasons 1.4 (b & d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: On September 17, Nicaragua's Supreme Election Council (CSE) published the list of authorized political alliances for the March 7, 2010 Regional Elections in the Atlantic Coast. There will be four main political alliances and three Christian/Evangelical parties will run independently. Despite previous efforts to foster opposition unity, the main Liberal parties have registered separate alliances and the CSE permitted a fourth alliance, comprised of disgruntled opposition leaders, to run. Meanwhile the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) has assembled a formidable alliance of five political parties and eight political movements. Curious elements of the alliance registration process and September 20 PLC primaries indicate that the FSLN may be cooperating with the FSLN to ensure the opposition remains divided and facilitate an FSLN victory in a region that historically is anti-Sandinista. END SUMMARY -------------- Four Alliances -------------- ¶2. (U) On September 17, the CSE published the lists of electoral alliances for the Atlantic Coast region elections, scheduled for March 7, 2010. There are four main alliances between major political parties, and three political parties will run independent of election alliances. The first alliance, led by the FSLN, is also the largest and includes five political parties (FSLN, YATAMA, National Liberal party (PLN),Nicaraguan Resistance party (PRN),and Alternative for Change party (AC)) and eight political/social movements (Popular Conservative Alliance (APC),the Conservative Traditionalist, Raising the Republic, the Nicaraguan Democratic Resistance, Vote of Confidence, Evangelists in Convergence, Indians of the Caribbean Coast (led by former Contra turned Ortega operative Steadman Fagoth),and Catholic Action movement). The second electoral alliance is the Alliance for the Republic (APRE),which includes four political parties (APRE, Citizen Action party (PAC),the Liberal Independent party (PLI) faction led by Virgilio Godoy, and a last-minute addition of the de-registered Conservative Party). The third electoral alliance is that of the Constitutional Liberal party (PLC),which includes four political parties (PLC, the Neo-Liberal party (PALI),the Central American Unionist party (PUCA),and the Multiethnic Indigenous party (PIM)). The final electoral alliance is the Liberal Nicaraguan Alliance (ALN),and it includes three political parties (ALN, PLI faction led by Indalecio Rodriquez, and the Costal Unity Movement party (PAMUC)). The three independent political parties are the Nicaragua Christian Way party (CCN),the Christian Democratic Union party (UDC),and the Christian Unity Movement party (MUC). -------------- No Liberal Unity After all -------------- ¶3. (C) In the regional elections, the opposition is divided between two Liberal alliances, the PLC and ALN, and the third alliance, APRE, which is comprised mainly of disgruntled lesser opposition leaders from the de-registered Conservative Party and which is unlikely to draw significant public support. The division between the Liberal parties follows months of public calls for Liberal unity in the regional elections on the Atlantic Coast and earlier promising starts (ref B) at unity between former 2006 presidential candidate and current PLI leader Eduardo Montealegre and the former President and PLC leader Arnoldo Aleman. By early September, it became apparent that the two main Liberal parties would not run jointly in the 2010 elections. On September 2, Aleman told local media that the PLC would "go alone" and ruled out publicly an alliance with Montealegre. On September 4, the PLI and ALN reached an agreement to run in alliance together under the banner of the ALN, but with the PLI holding the legal representation of the alliance. As MANAGUA 00000935 002 OF 003 late as September 10, one day before the alliances had to be registered with the CSE, Aleman changed tactics and publicly offered an alliance with Montealegre in the regional elections, but on terms that would have greatly favored the PLC's candidates. Montealegre rejected the alliance, leading the PLC to publicly blame Montealegre for the Liberals' "failure" to form a PLC-PLI alliance in the regional elections. ¶4. (C) Our contacts on the Atlantic Coast told us that at the local level there was wide agreement that all of the Liberal forces should join to form one alliance, reminiscent of the UNO alliance that defeated the FSLN in the 1990 elections. Meetings between PLC, PLI/VCE, ALN, PAMUC, and even Yatama no-Sandinista leaders ensued and in Puerto Cabezas unity candidates had even been selected between the parties. However, when PLC representatives contacted national party leaders about the unity proposals, they were instructed to end all negotiations immediately. One contact, working with parties on the Atlantic Coast, lamented that local PLC party leaders, while earlier expressing their support for unity, were entirely beholden to Aleman for personal, financial and political reasons and was therefore not surprised that they pulled out of unity talks and backed Aleman's call for the PLC to "go it alone." ¶5. (C) Opposition leaders and commentators have been at a loss to explain how the CSE could register two separate factions within the same political party, PLI, to be divided between the APRE and ALN alliances. (Note: When Montealegre joined the PLI earlier this year, a rump faction, led by Virgilio Godoy and with support from Aleman, has resisted Montealegre's leadership and has filed numerous legal motions to regain control of the party. End Note.) CSE chief of staff Rodrigo Barretto told us that they registered both factions, in different alliances, so that the CSE "would not be accused of interfering in internal party affairs" and de-registering what might ultimately be the legal faction of the party. He claimed the CSE wanted to avoid a repeat of the crisis in 2008, when the CSE de-registered the Conservative Party and the leftist Sandinista Renovation Movement (MRS) and prevented them from participating in the November 2008 municipal elections. Other commentators have suggested that the third alliance will be used by the FSLN-controlled CSE to siphon off votes from the two Liberal alliances, especially in historically Liberal areas, to ensure a broader FSLN victory. ¶6. (C) The PRN, the political party originally established by ex-Contras and historically anti-Sandinista, has also further divided the opposition vote by aligning with the FSLN. The announcement, though not a surprise, was a disappointing blow to local PRN members on the Atlantic Coast. The PRN has been adrift and marginalized in recent yearsm, often serving as a catalyst for Liberal division, and more recently lent its overt support to the FSLN in defending the electoral fraud during the 2008 November elections. The party's base has been in disagreement with the Managua national leadership for years and many members have left for the ALN, PLI/VCE or PLC parties. PRN national leaders defended their decision to join with their sworn enemy in the election alliance, claiming that the real enemies to their party's continued existence are the Liberals. -------------- Another FSLN-PLC Pacto? -------------- ¶7. (C) Montealegre believes the PLC and the FSLN have renewed their "pacto" power-sharing agreement to divide up the seats in the regional elections. As evidence, he cited Aleman's announcment for the PLC to go it alone and the decision of the CSE (currently controlled by the FSLN with the support of the PLC) to register two factions of the PLI in separate alliances, ensuring that non-Aleman Liberals would be divided. Most recently, reports of widespread fraud and vote rigging in the PLC's September 20 "pimaries" reinforce the preception of collusion between the PLC and FSLN in the MANAGUA 00000935 003 OF 003 regional elections. There are growing accounts that the PLC refused to include non-Aleman PLC members on the voting rolls for the primaries while also permitting FSLN members to be recorded on the PLC rolls and to cast votes. The PLC's claims of high turnout in the primaries lends credence to the reports of FSLN participation and casts doubts about the integrity of the PLC primary process. The PLC reported on September 22 that 55,888 people voted in the primaries, approximately 14,000 more people than voted for the PLC in the 2006 regional elections. In one area, the PLC claimed three times more people voted in their internal primaries than voted in total for the same region in 2006. According to local contacts, the reported turnout is almost certainly false, but even a modest increase in turnout would have only been possible with the participation of FSLN party members. -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶8. (C) FSLN founder and current Ambassador to Peru Tomas Borge told local press in early September that "anything can happen in Nicaragua except for one thing - that the FSLN will lose power again... We will do everything to remain in power, whatever the cost." In the 2010 Atlantic Coast regional elections, the FSLN appears to doing exactly that -- whatever is necessary to ensure their victory. Through their control of the CSE, they have manipulated the electoral process (ref a) to disenfranchise voters by preventing access to cedulas (identification cards) and again on September 17 in manipulating the alliance registration process. In the formation of alliances and their collective refusal and/or inability to unite, the Liberals have made the FSLN's job all the easier. The separate Liberal alliances will likely split the opposition vote and increase the FSLN's chances to win in both the North and South regions. Even if the elections in the Atlantic Coast were free and clean, the votes will be counted by the same CSE that perpetuated the election fraud in November 2008, ensuring that the FSLN will have additional opportunities to manipulate the final count if these previous efforts fail to secure their victory. And, as happened in the November municipal elections, it appears that Aleman is once again the willing partner in the effort to subvert Nicaragua's electoral process. CALLAHAN