NICARAGUA: SCENE SETTER FOR USNS COMFORT VISIT

C O N F I D E N T I A L MANAGUA 000646 SIPDIS FROM AMB CALLAHAN TO COMMODORE NEGUS DEPT FOR WHA/CEN KRAAIMOORE E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/25/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL NU SUBJECT: NICARAGUA: SCENE SETTER FOR USNS COMFORT VISIT REF: A. MANAGUA 629 - H1N1 UPDATE ¶B. MANAGUA 626 - RADIO STATION JAMMING ¶C. MANAGUA 600 - CPC UPDATE ¶D. MANAGUA 599 - MCC REACTION ¶E. MANAGUA 580 - MCC CANCELATION ¶F. MANAGUA 541 - NGO MANUAL ¶G. MANAGUA 534 - NICARAGUAN ECONOMY OUTLOOK ¶H. MANAGUA 524 - TRIPARTITE WAGE AGREEMENT ¶I. MANAGUA 443 - CPC PRAYER CAMPAIGN ¶J. MANAGUA 415 - MISKITO INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT ¶K. MANAGUA 258 - CAMPAIGN AGAINST OPPOSITION ¶L. 2008 MANAUGA 1392 - MUNICIPAL ELECTION FRAUD ¶M. 2008 MANAGUA 1240 - CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM ¶N. 2007 MANAGUA 1785 - 28TH ANNIVERSARY CELEBRATION Classified By: Ambassador Robert J. Callahan for reasons 1.4 (b & d) ¶1. (C) Commodore Negus, your visit to Nicaragua on July 3 through 14 comes at an auspicious time and into a challenging political environment with a government that is suspicious and critical of the USG, even as the Nicaraguan public remains fundamentally pro-US. Troubling phenomena include: economic instability; political consolidation of party control over national and local government; and an active party-patronage system that rewards loyalty and punishes opposition. Your visit also coincides with the 30-year anniversary of the Sandinista-led victory over the Somoza dictatorship, and follows the June 10 cancellation of the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) $62 million aid program. We believe that the Nicaraguan people will welcome the visit, but that there will be pressure by government officials to create the public impression that the Sandinistas planned, programmed and orchestrated the entire COMFORT mission. We expect politically-appointed officials in the Ministry of Defense and Health to be uncooperative, while local mayors, doctors, nurses, and veterinarians will fully support the mission. -------------- MISSION CONTEXT / PERFECT TIMING? -------------- ¶2. (C) From a public diplomacy standpoint, the timing for the COMFORT visit is perfect. The ship arrives three weeks after the MCC board canceled approximately $62 million of USG assistance because of election fraud (see reftel D, E, L). Within five days of the COMFORT's departure, the ruling party, the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN),will celebrate its 30-year anniversary of defeating the Somoza dictatorship on July 19 (see reftel N). The confluence of these events allows the visit to demonstrate the continuing commitment of the US to the Nicaraguan people in a tangible way, countering GON messages of hostility. In general, Nicaraguans continue to have a very high opinion of the United States and its people. This mission will certainly reinforce that message. ¶3. (C) From a political standpoint, the timing for the visit is challenging. The FSLN once again has control over all four branches of government with the return of Daniel Ortega to the Presidency in 2007 (with only 38% of the vote) and through a "pacto" or alliance with the Constitutional Liberal Party (PLC). National control combined with the FSLN's local Citizen Power Councils (CPCs) actively restricts the ability of civil society, NGOs, the media and the opposition to exercise their civic rights (reftel B, C, F, K). The FSLN's stated goal is to further consolidate power through constitutional reform that would allow President Ortega to remain in power beyond the end of his term in 2011. Meanwhile, Nicaragua's economy is distressed - there is high unemployment from maquila closings and budget shortfalls because of donor nations cutting funds (see reftel G). Social services, including healthcare and education, are suffering from two rounds of 20% budget cuts and there are a growing number of confirmed cases of H1N1 flu virus now in the country, including one case within the US Embassy community (patient has recovered). (see reftel A). -------------- MCC CANCELATION HURTS -------------- ¶4. (C) The MCC board announced on June 10 the cancellation of approximately $62 million of USG assistance as a consequence of election fraud perpetrated by the GON during the November 2008 municipal contests (see reftel D, E, L). Government and FSLN party leaders, including Ortega himself, claim that the USG is interfering with Nicaragua's sovereignty and its internal affairs by asking them to account for the electoral fraud. The expected cancellation announcement came after six months of diplomatic efforts urging the GON to address the electoral fraud. Of the $175 million MCC Compact, approximately $110 million had already been spent or obligated. The loss of the remaining $62 million in aid is a blow economically and politically to the Ortega government, particularly since the impact will be felt acutely in the FSLN's historical base of Leon and Chinandega - areas that will be served by the COMFORT mission. Public reaction to the MCC decision generally placed the blame on the Ortega administration (see reftel D, E). -------------- 30-YEAR FSLN ANIVERSARY -------------- ¶5. (C) On July 19, five days after the COMFORT's departure from Nicaragua, the FSLN will celebrate its 30-year anniversary of defeating the Somoza dictatorship. At previous celebrations (see reftel N),Ortega hosted Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez and organized large public demonstrations. This year's event is expected to be much grander in scope. Preparations began in earnest after the November 2008 municipal elections. Lighted Christmas trees, topped with illuminated "30" cubes, remain installed in all of Managua's major traffic roundabouts (see reftel I). Also this year, the FSLN has staged dozens of party affiliation meetings, primarily for public employees, to declare that they are "militants" within the FSLN party (see reftel C). The FSLN has already held small public rallies, and there are television public service announcements and billboards about the 30-year anniversary through the country. Nonetheless, one large public rally was canceled in Masaya on June 21 because of public health fears about the spread of H1N1 flu. -------------- -------------- CONSTANT ATTACKS AGAINST NGOS, MEDIA & OPPOSITION -------------- -------------- ¶6. (C) Since entering office in 2007, Ortega has consolidated power across all levels of government. Perhaps the only remaining independent institution is the professional military. The FSLN's stated goal is constitutional reform that will either allow President Ortega to be re-elected or change the government structure into a parliamentary system (see reftel M). The FSLN already controls the four branches of the national government through a "pacto" or alliance with the PLC. Ortega announced the creation of CPCs in 2007 as a form of direct democracy independent of political affiliation; however, by the end of 2008, CPCs were overwhelmingly FSLN-controlled local organizations. One national poll showed that less than 5 percent of Nicaraguans participated in CPCs. The FSLN is actively limiting the ability of civil society, NGOs and the media to exercise their civic rights. A new NGO manual proposed by the Ministry of Government, would restrict Nicaraguans' freedom of association and influence on public policy (see reftel F). In mid-June the GON arbitrarily blocked the signal and confiscated the equipment of an opposition radio station (see reftel B). ¶7. (C) In a February speech, Ortega declared the FSLN in a permanent campaign against the political opposition (see reftel K). Opposition leader and National Assembly Deputy Eduardo Montealegre refused to appear before a judge on June 22 for politically motivated charges regarding the issuance of government bonds (CENIS) while he served in the previous administration. The FSLN has now threatened to strip Montealegre of his immunity from prosecution in the National Assembly (see septel). -------------- ECONOMY LOOKS BLEAK -------------- ¶8. (U) With a per capita income of $1,140 and poverty rate of 46%, Nicaragua is the second-poorest country in the Western Hemisphere. Official unemployment was 4.9% in 2007, but 60% of all workers earn a living in the informal sector, where underemployment is as high as 90%. The Central Bank forecasts 0.5% economic growth in 2009, but independent economists believe the economy may in fact contract by as much as 1% this year. Exports to the United States, which account for 59% of Nicaragua,s total exports, increased 45% from 2005 to 2008, but they are down 14% so far in 2009. ¶9. (U) In the wake of fraudulent municipal elections, the government has been unable to secure continued budget support provided by European donors, resulting in a significant fiscal deficit that led President Ortega to cut spending and appeal to assistance from international financial institutions and Venezuela. In 2008, Venezuela provided about $326 million in assistance, all off-budget through entities controlled by the FSLN. In 2008, Nicaraguans received $818 million in remittances from abroad, most of which came from the United States. ¶10. (U) President Ortega,s harsh rhetoric against the United States, capitalism, and free trade has had a negative effect on foreign investor attitudes and perceptions of country risk. Since President Ortega took office, Nicaragua has fallen in the World Economic Forum,s Competitive Index Ranking from 95th place in 2006 to 120th in 2008. Nonetheless, the government reports foreign investment inflows of $626 million in 2008, mostly for telecommunications infrastructure and electricity generation. However, many companies in the textile/apparel sector, including a $100 million U.S.-owned denim mill, have shuttered during the past twelve months due to falling demand for these goods in the United States. -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶11. (C) Many of the current circumstances Nicaragua faces at the arrival of the USNS COMFORT recall the last time the FSLN was in power in the 1980's: economic turmoil; overt efforts to consolidate one-party control over both the national and local government; active repression of civil society, independent media and the opposition; and an active FSLN propaganda machine to claim greater public support for the party and its agenda. Unlike the 1980's however, Nicaragua has made significant economic progress since the return of democracy in 1990, and while its political institutions are weak and easily manipulated, civil society, the Catholic Church, the media, and more serious elements of the opposition have in fact pushed back and restricted the GON,s ability to pursue its authoritarian agenda. ¶12. (C) Ortega and his party need to create the impression that they brought the COMFORT mission to Nicaragua to ameliorate the enormous negative impact of the MCC cancellation which has generally been blamed on his administration despite rhetoric to the contrary. We believe that there will be considerable pressure by the FSLN, particularly through its CPCs, to manipulate public events in order to cast the COMFORT visit as something planned, programmed, and orchestrated solely by the FSLN. We are taking all measures to minimize this. We also believe that the FSLN may try to manipulate the patient selection process for surgeries as much as possible in order to reward faithful party members in the run-up to the 30-year anniversary. We expect that senior-level FSLN-political appointees in the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Health will be hostile and generally uncooperative with the mission -- that they will create unnecessary bureaucratic obstacles to a smooth operation instead of the open cooperation COMFORT has enjoyed in other countries. In fact, GON officials told us privately that they would have preferred a visit by the COMFORT earlier in its mission to avoid the proximity to the FSLN 30-year anniversary. We also fully expect that the GON's propaganda machine will work overtime to either minimize media coverage of the mission or twist it to serve FSLN purposes. ¶13. (C) Nonetheless, the Nicaraguan people will welcome the mission. The uniformed Nicaraguan military, local mayors, and the Nicaraguan doctors, nurses, vets, and school directors will be helpful and supportive of the COMFORT mission. They want the tremendous training benefits, rehabilitation projects, and Handclasp donations, not to mention the free medical attention that the mission will bring to their communities. In brief, Nicaragua will be a challenging political environment for this USG humanitarian-military mission and there will be high stakes in the public relations struggle for the "hearts and minds" of the Nicaraguan people. -------------- CLOSING -------------- ¶14. (U) Commodore Negus, on behalf of my embassy team, we heartily welcome you and the COMFORT to Nicaragua. We pledge our full support to the successful execution of this wonderful humanitarian mission from the people of the United States to the people of Nicaragua. And I personally look forward to seeing a NWC alumnus again. CALLAHAN