NICARAGUA'S FOREIGN MINISTRY - PATIENCE RUNNING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MANAGUA 000520 SIPDIS STATE FOR WHA/CEN, DRL/AWH, INR/IAA E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/18/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV EAID NU SUBJECT: NICARAGUA'S FOREIGN MINISTRY - PATIENCE RUNNING OUT FOR OBAMA ADMINISTRATION Classified By: Ambassador Robert J. Callahan, Reasons 1.4 (b,d) ¶1. (C) Director General for American Affairs and Protocol Chief Orlando Gomez met with PolCouns on May 13 to review Nicaragua's participation at the Summit of the Americas (SOA),U.S.-Nicaraguan bilateral relations, and the Ortega administration's foreign policy priorities. Gomez reported that the region was losing patience with the Obama administration and expected the U.S. to move faster to change development policies, increase aid to the region and establish a path to rapidly end the "blockade" of Cuba. In light of the failure of CAFTA-DR to produce real gains in economic growth and job creation, Gomez expected that cooperation with other countries such as Venezuela, Bolivia and Iran would deepen. Gomez also predicted that anti-U.S. rhetoric from ALBA countries would continue as it was rooted in these countries' anti-imperialist and revolutionary histories. End Summary. BILATERAL RELATIONS -- RUNNING OUT OF PATIENCE -------------- - ¶2. (C) Gomez reviewed Nicaragua's long and complex relationship with the U.S. from the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) party perspective, highlighting a history of "difficult" experiences under previous U.S. administrations. Gomez claimed there was hope that "with the Democratic (party) wave" sweeping the U.S., there would be a resulting improvement in understanding towards and relations with Nicaragua. The SOA was the first opportunity for Ortega to meet directly with the new U.S. administration and to assess the opportunity for change. Gomez claimed that other nations with which Nicaragua has close relations (i.e., Bolivia and Venezuela) had already given up on any real changes in U.S. policy to the region. He claimed others, including Nicaragua, had "lessened their expectations" but felt that the region needed to give some more time to the new administration to turn things around. He cautioned, however, "that time was running out" and the Nicaraguan people were losing their patience. For example, the U.S. had failed to take sufficient steps to immediately end "the blockade" of Cuba and impatience for real action on this issue was growing. The region's consensus on this issue is clear and the U.S. needed to display a clearer intention of how it intends to change its policy on Cuba. ¶3. (C) Nonetheless, Gomez believed the SOA opened up new potential areas for dialogue. Confronting the global economic crisis, migration and climate change were areas where the U.S. and the region, including Nicaragua, could find agreement and work jointly. The U.S., however, had yet to recognize and welcome how Central America can contribute on counter-narcotics, terrorism and security, and dealing with migration issues. Instead, according to Gomez, the U.S. continues to issue reports and make critical statements that undermine cooperation and strengthen opponents of governments in the region. Gomez cited the recently released annual terrorism report, which was critical of Nicaragua's lack of cooperation on terrorism and the harboring of FARC guerrillas. Similarly, the U.S. issued statements welcoming the performance of the recent referendum in Venezuela, but then condemned the country for not cooperating on drugs. This criticism, he complained, helps only the opponents of these governments and makes bilateral relations harder. Gomez believed the U.S. needed to change its diplomacy and only raise such "controversial" issues quietly and directly. NEED TO MATCH RESOURCES TO NEEDS -------------- ¶4. (C) According to Gomez, the Ortega administration perceives "a clash" between the USG's claims to want improved relations and cooperation with the lack of sufficient resources and the failure to properly address development needs in the Central American region. U.S. resources are too limited, especially when they are spread out across the entire region and not focused on the areas of greatest need. Gomez cited counter-narcotics cooperation as the prime example. It was in the U.S. interest to help Nicaragua stop drugs from heading north, yet the U.S. provides little to help in that effort despite the claims of the Merida Initiative. The Ortega government, he asserted, is forced to divert money and resources away from social and development needs to fund Nicaraguan Police efforts to stop drugs headed to the U.S. In exchange, the U.S. gives neither enough resources to help the counter-narcotic efforts nor does it match the resources diverted from development. The U.S., he claimed, has a moral, economic and political duty to do more on this issue. DEEPENING TIES WITH ALBA COUNTRIES AND IRAN -------------- ¶5. (C) Gomez expected ties with Venezuela and Bolivia and other ALBA states to deepen in the coming years. In part, this is because free trade, particularly CAFTA-DR, did not deliver the expected results for Nicaragua and new models were needed to expand social and economic development in the country. CAFTA-DR, he claimed, has not produced results in employment and the trade has only benefited certain sectors, "making only a few rich." ALBA projects and trade, however, would create new sources of employment and generate other improvements in the productive bases of Nicaragua's economy. ALBA, however, should not be viewed as contradictory to or competitive with CAFTA-DR and U.S. trade. In Gomez's view, ALBA would help develop Nicaragua in ways that trade with the U.S. had not, while leaving space for "continued improvement" with the U.S. ¶6. (C) Gomez said the ALBA countries share a commitment to "continuing the revolutionary spirit and history within the region." The new revolutions have not been and would not be by arms but by democratic mechanisms, as demanded by the U.S. and Europe. The goal, in Nicaragua, Venezuela and elsewhere, is to transform the economic system and "democratize society." Such efforts as improving education, ending illiteracy, and helping local farmers to grow food are common elements of this transformational effort. A key component of this revolutionary effort, he claimed, was anti-imperialism in all its forms in order to demonstrate autonomy, independence and self-determination. Historically, this anti-imperialist tendency was manifested towards Spain but, especially in Nicaragua, is now directed towards the U.S. because of more recent history. For example, Gomez claimed that the U.S. had and still is backing political groups in Venezuela to shape the outcome of internal political and economic decisions to the benefit of "the oligarchy and to prevent oil resources from benefiting the people." Therefore, it was reasonable to expect ALBA countries to continue to be "hyper-critical" of the U.S. The common vision for social transformation among these countries, he claimed, promotes a common vision of the threat posed by the influence of the U.S. ¶7. (C) On Iran, Gomez asserted the right of Nicaragua to develop relations "with whomever we want" as a sovereign country. Building on the anti-imperialist theme, he railed that "we don't accept the imperialism of the U.S. to say who is good and who is bad." Nicaragua would continue to pursue deeper relations with Iran, regardless of the U.S. position. COMMENT -------------- ¶8. (C) Gomez is the third most senior official in MINREX and maintains direct communications with First Lady Rosario Murillo, the power behind the throne in Nicaragua. Over the past year, in meetings with the Embassy, travels with President Ortega, and editorials released through pro-government media, he has risen to become one of the most prominent foreign policy figures within the Ortega government. His comments, unusually frank and direct, accurately represent the skewed Sandinista world view -- claiming a moral right to demand more resources, without conditions, while at the same time denouncing the very countries that provide such aid. Senior FSLN officials fail to recognize the consequence their actions, from lack of transparency to election fraud, as well as their public rhetoric will have on donors' willingness to continue to remain engaged in Nicaragua. CALLAHAN