Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09MANAGUA308
2009-03-23 13:17:00
UNCLASSIFIED
Embassy Managua
Cable title:  

NICARAGUA: PANDEMIC AND AVIAN INFLUENZA TRIPWIRES

Tags:  AMED AMGT ASEC KSAF KSEO SENV TBIO KFLU NU 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMU #0308/01 0821317
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 231317Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3916
INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE
UNCLAS MANAGUA 000308 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR S/ES-O/CMS EPARRA

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: AMED AMGT ASEC KSAF KSEO SENV TBIO KFLU NU
SUBJECT: NICARAGUA: PANDEMIC AND AVIAN INFLUENZA TRIPWIRES
AND MISSION RESPONSE PLAN

REF: A. SECSTATE 006306

B. MANAGUA 0275

UNCLAS MANAGUA 000308

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR S/ES-O/CMS EPARRA

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: AMED AMGT ASEC KSAF KSEO SENV TBIO KFLU NU
SUBJECT: NICARAGUA: PANDEMIC AND AVIAN INFLUENZA TRIPWIRES
AND MISSION RESPONSE PLAN

REF: A. SECSTATE 006306

B. MANAGUA 0275


1. (U) Summary and Introduction: With no cases of the
virulent H5N1 Avian Influenza (AI) strain existing yet in the
Americas, the Emergency Action Committee reviewed and
approved the Mission Response Plan and Tripwires for Pandemic
and Avian Influenza. The plan recognizes Nicaragua,s
current incapacity to identify an avian or human H5N1
infection. Following is the text of the plan. End Summary
and Introduction.

Begin text:

Overview
--------------

2. (U) Nicaragua has no in-depth planning to handle Pandemic
Influenza or Avian Influenza. There is nominal surveillance
and minimal stockpiling of medical supplies, but no
stockpiles of antiviral drugs, no educational programs, and
no integrated management in place. Nicaragua,s Ministry of
Health has a written plan for Avian Influenza Pandemic
Preparedness and Response, but it has not been distributed to
hospitals at the local level and so is unlikely to be
effective. Nicaragua also does not have the capability to
identify an avian or human H5N1 infection. The symptoms of
AI are not distinguishable from other types of influenza
without the availability of specialized testing. Specimens
will need to be sent to laboratories in the United States
(the Centers for Disease Control (CDC),or the National
Veterinary Laboratory in Ames, Iowa). Nicaragua does not
have the medical resources to treat more than a handful of
patients infected with Avian or Pandemic Influenza.
Medication and equipment are severely limited. There are
only a handful of ventilators nationwide. There is no plan
to handle overflow of patients at alternate sites. Nicaragua
will not, therefore, be able to treat large numbers of
infected patients effectively, nor to accept patients with AI
or Pandemic Influenza from neighboring countries. Nicaragua
does not have the public health resources to manage mass
fatalities.


3. (U) The persistence of the H5Nl AI since its appearance in
Hong Kong in 1997 indicates that it is unlikely to disappear
from the environment. Moreover, it has evolved gradually,
increasing its lethality and broadening the range of species
that it can infect and kill. Since December 2003 there has
been sporadic and increasing animal-to-human transmission.
As of the week of March 2, 2009, the World Health
Organization (WHO) reports 409 confirmed human cases of AI
Influenza with a mortality rate of 62.6%. The majority of
cases are in children and adults under the age of 40 years
old. The highest mortality is in the 10 to 19 year old age

group. The incidence among poultry workers has been minimal,
suggesting that, at this time, AI is not easily transmitted
to humans. Human-to-human transmission has not been
documented (though it was suspected in a handful of cases).
There has never been a human epidemic with an H5 influenza
strain. Thus, people of all ages are presumed to be highly
susceptible. After widespread use of anti-influenza drugs
amantadine and rimantidine in China, the H5N1 influenza A
virus has become resistant to these drugs. The
neuroaminidase inhibitors oseltamivir (Tamiflu) and zanamivir
(Relenza) are still effective most of the time, but
resistance to Tamiflu has been documented.


4. (U) Should sustained human-to-human transmission of a
highly pathogenic H5N1 influenza begin, worldwide spread is
expected in days to weeks, despite efforts to contain the
virus by closing borders and quarantining ill persons. The
short incubation period, the spread of virus by infected
persons 2-3 days before they become ill, and the highly
infectious nature of the virus will accelerate the
development of a pandemic. The pandemic could devastate the
world like a &global tsunami.8


5. (U) There have as yet been no cases of H5N1 AI of any type
in the Americas. Other variant AI strains have been recorded
throughout the Americas in recent years, including a recently
confirmed occurrence of the low pathogenic H5N2 virus in the
Dominican Republic on December 21, 2007.


6. (U) In response to the small number of cases of documented
animal-to-human avian infection transmission, human and
animal health organizations have taken the following steps:

a. Monitoring wild and domesticated bird populations for
H5N1;

b. Analyzing genetic changes in the virus;


c. Culling affected domestic bird populations and
isolating human cases;

d. Sharply increasing the production and storage of
oseltamivir (Tamiflu) and zanamivir (Relenza);

e. Accelerating the process of vaccine production.


7. (U) In the region of Mexico and Central America, Mexico,
Panama, and El Salvador may be at greatest risk for entry of
Pandemic Influenza due to their larger populations, and human
migration and cargo traffic patterns. In Panama, daily cargo
traffic includes a large number of ships from Asia. Also,
Mexico and the countries of Central America are on the flight
path of numerous migrating birds. It is quite possible that
AI could spread from Siberia to Alaska and southward to
Western Hemispheric countries.

Assumptions
--------------


8. (U) When formulating tripwires, the following facts and
assumptions were considered:

a. The H5N1 highly pathogenic AI does not yet exist in
the Western Hemisphere.

b. H5N1 does not yet efficiently infect humans.

c. It is highly probable that Pandemic Influenza,
resulting from sustained human-to-human transmission of AI
will begin in East Asia because of the number of birds
infected there, the proximity of people to birds and,
historically, the widespread presence of a variety of
influenza viruses in that region.

d. Once sustained human-to-human transmission of a
pandemic influenza starts, it is very likely to appear in
multiple sites, and quickly spread to distant countries.
Therefore, the local decision to evacuate dependents and
non-essential personnel to the United States must occur when
sustained human-to-human transmission has been documented
anywhere in the world (most likely Asia). By the time
sustained human-to-human transmission appears in the Western
Hemisphere, with the probable closing of national frontiers
and suspension of air traffic, it will most likely be too
late for any type of evacuation other than in-site quarantine
and sheltering-in-place.

e. In view of the much greater air travel to the United
States, Pandemic Influenza is more likely to appear in the
United States before Nicaragua.

f. The presence of Pandemic Influenza in any neighboring
Central American country should be considered equivalent to
the presence of Pandemic Influenza in Managua, Nicaragua.

g. All cross border traffic by land, sea, and air will
very likely be blocked as soon a human-to-human transmission
of Pandemic Influenza is suspected in Nicaragua or its
neighboring countries.

h. Vaccine development may take four months after the
onset of a human pandemic. Distribution of the vaccine is
most likely to occur in the &first-world8 countries first,
and then, because of the likely closure of borders during a
pandemic, distribution would be prevented from reaching other
countries.

i. A human pandemic will cause a catastrophic disruption
of the host nation,s economy and security organizations.

Nicaragua Tripwires - Introduction
--------------


9. (U) The most critical tripwire is the appearance of
sustained human-to-human transmission anywhere in the world
(most likely outside of the Western Hemisphere). At this
point, U.S. Embassy Managua will have to take immediate steps
to evacuate dependents and non-essential personnel to the
United States. The appearance of human-to-human contagious
Pandemic Influenza in the Western Hemisphere and anywhere in
the Americas would be the final tripwire, requiring final
preparations for sheltering in the Embassy compound of
essential Embassy personnel, long)term quarantine, and
decisions about when to initiate prophylactic treatment with
oseltamivir (Tamiflu) and/or zanamivir (Relenza). Once a
Pandemic Influenza epidemic appears in the Western
Hemisphere, the probable closing of national frontiers and

suspension of air traffic will foreclose any other evacuation
options.


10. (U) The Emergency Action Committee (EAC),will be
required to meet each time a tripwire is crossed in order to
confirm that the criteria for that tripwire has been met and
to initiate specific actions. When each tripwire is met, the
Consular Section will need to issue a warden message to all
Americans living within Nicaragua. The EAC will need to
determine what public announcements and travel warnings
should be sent to the Department of State for approval and
final publishing on the Embassy Website and distribution
through the Consular Warden System. Advice should be
obtained from Washington about press announcements.


11. (U) The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
stockpiles a vaccine against H5N1 Avian Influenza in order to
provide some protection for critical personnel in the early
stages of a pandemic. In a pandemic, however, it is expected
to take several months to develop and produce a vaccine
matched to the new pandemic influenza strain. Once a vaccine
has been developed and deployed, the primary objective will
be to vaccinate as many as possible and as quickly as
possible. However, because of the improbability of any
developed vaccine reaching a pandemic country before
frontiers have closed, the following tripwires assume that
the pandemic begins before there is an adequate supply of
protective vaccine.

US Embassy Managua Tripwires for Pandemic Influenza
-------------- --------------


12. (U) Tripwire One: only animal-to-animal and sporadic
animal-to-human transmission (Federal Government Response
Stage 0, WHO Phase 3).

a. Stage One: no AI in the Western Hemisphere (present
situation).

i. Post shows vigilance in reviewing reports from
international monitoring groups and international news.
ii. Informational updates are provided to the Mission
from the FSHP and RMO.
iii. MED strongly recommends yearly influenza
vaccinations for all personnel (these do not protect against
AI).
iv. Personal protective equipment (PPE): gloves,
goggles, N95 masks, and reusable respirators for healthcare
workers, Tyvek suits, are stockpiled as needed for the
mission size; a stockpile of antibiotics might be considered
in order to treat secondary bacteria pneumonias that commonly
occur with influenza.
v. Tamiflu (oseltamivir) and Relenza (zanamivir)
stores are in a temperature-controlled, highly secure
environment.
vi. As appropriate, advise individuals including
American citizens, to purchase prescriptions of Tamiflu
through their insurance company pharmacy plan.
vii. Review administrative leave plans; staff should
prepare to perform as much work at home as possible should
the situation worsen.
viii. Review the Mission minimal staffing list of
personnel; review Embassy supplies of food, water,
antivirals, and other medication and equipment; review
security conditions for employees and families at residences
and in public venues; review/test emergency preparations,
communications procedures; review/update warden system and
F-77 Report.
ix. The Hospital Militar is the designated SARS
hospital and is also the designated hospital to treat victims
of Avian or Pandemic Influenza, according to SINAPRED,s
Nicaraguan National Avian Influenza Plan.
x. Consular Section continues outreach for private
American citizens (Amcits) on AI preparedness, including food
and water storage. The Embassy Internet home page features
information on Avian Influenza preparedness:
http://nicaragua.usembassy.gov/emergency services2.html.
xi. Consular, Economic and RSO sections will canvass
American companies and organizations to determine whether
they have their own contingency plans in the event of a
pandemic.
xii. Economic section will query airlines that
provide direct flights between Nicaragua and the United
States to determine if they have contingency plans in the
event of a pandemic. Of particular importance is whether
these companies would increase flights prior to an epidemic
reaching the Western Hemisphere and whether they have
received information from the host nation discussing criteria
that would halt flights if human-to-human transmission
started in the Western Hemisphere.


b. Stage Two: appearance of AI in the Western Hemisphere,
countries bordering Nicaragua

i. The EAC meets to review, revise, if necessary,
tripwires, and implement required actions.
ii. Heighten vigilance; contact host nation agencies
monitoring bird populations; contact public health services
surveying hospitals for the occurrence of human disease;
inform the host government of the Embassy,s intention to
release a statement regarding Avian and Pandemic Influenza.
iii. U.S. Embassy issues a MGT notice, announcement
in the Embassy bulletin (Tiscapa),and Consular Warden
Messages (CWM) advising avoidance of all birds and hand
washing after handling uncooked poultry products. The
Embassy adds the text of the CWM to the AI link on the
Mission,s webpage.
iv. The EAC reviews whether travel in the region
should remain unrestricted.
v. The Mission advises all employees and their
dependents to remain home if they develop respiratory illness
and fever. Health Unit personnel decide whether they need to
implement the use of personal protective equipment (PPE) and
respirators when evaluating persons with respiratory illness.
In a Consular Warden Message (CWM),Amcits are advised to
seek physician consultation should they develop respiratory
illness with fever.
vi. Consular and Embassy press officers have
available Avian and Pandemic Influenza talking points for use
in appearances on local radio and television programs, and
Internet chat rooms.
vii. Human Resources (HR) prepares travel orders for
non-essential personnel and dependents, who would very likely
be evacuated when human-to-human transmission begins.
viii. Section chiefs advise LES (FSN) employees that
they should keep their U.S. visas current. U.S. personnel
are advised to submit B referrals for nannies who might
accompany their families back to the United States.
ix. Embassy Public Affairs Section releases a
statement describing the Embassy,s increased vigilance and
offers advice about personal protective measures. The
Consular Section releases a CWM advising all Amcits of
precautions the U.S. Embassy is taking for its personnel.
x. The Consular Section considers decreasing visa
appointments to focus more resources on American Citizens
Services and decrease risk of unnecessary exposure.

c. Stage Three: documentation of animal-to-human
transmission of AI in Nicaragua.

i. The EAC meets to assess situation and initiate
actions defined by established tripwires.
ii. Both American and FSN personnel with fever and/or
respiratory illness are told to remain at home (on
administrative leave) until 10 days after recovery. American
personnel will be advised to impose the same restrictions on
their domestic employees.
iii. The Health Unit staff uses PPE and infectious
disease precautions when evaluating persons with fever and
respiratory illness. Possibly consider setting up a triage
area in the Employee Parking Lot to contain the spread of
infection.
iv. The Health Unit staff will use non-expired
influenza quick test kit to test all ill individuals with
symptoms suspicious of influenza for influenza A and B.
v. Health Unit staff monitors the human cases closely
through communication with local health providers and,
possibly, visits to the hospitals. If the victim is a
private American citizen, a Consular Officer will be assigned
to monitor the situation with the Health Unit staff, in order
to communicate with family members.
vi. The Health Unit staff in collaboration with the
RMO and State MED review use of PPE, decontamination
procedures, and conditions that require use of Tamiflu and/or
Relenza.
vii. The Embassy holds Town Hall meetings for the
Embassy community and private American citizens. The Mission
strongly advises avoiding contact with live birds and
thoroughly washing hands after handling chicken and other
previously butchered poultry in the kitchen.
viii. Consular Warden Message communicates the advice
provided at the Town Hall meeting and additional information
is placed in the Embassy,s Webpage on AI.
ix. The Public Affairs Section will assume
responsibility for &risk communication,8 creating public
messages to both the Mission community and the host nation.
x. Embassy officials should meet with school
officials to discuss tripwires for school closure.
xi. Based upon the number of reported cases, the EAC
reviews the need for voluntary departure of dependents.

xii. The EAC assesses whether travel should be
restricted in some areas of the region.
xiii. The Mission begins use of a database to
register all official and private citizen Americans infected
with AI.
xiv. The Mission will train a group of individuals to
screen visitors to the Embassy compound, using a
questionnaire, noting travel, contact with others who have
traveled to an epidemic region, contact with live poultry,
and clinical symptoms of respiratory disease and fever.
xv. The Consular Section limits visa applicants to
emergency cases only.

d. Stage Four: apparent increase in animal-to-human
transmission of AI in Nicaragua or neighboring countries.

i. The EAC meets to review information, assess
whether this new tripwire has been crossed, and initiate
additional actions.
ii. The EAC restricts travel to regions reporting
increased animal-to-human transmission of AI.
iii. The Health Unit and USAID AI working groups will
communicate frequently with officials of the WHO, CDC, and
Government of Nicaragua (GON) investigating avian and human
infections (SINAPRED and MINSA). The EAC will be provided
frequent updates, and the EAC will meet when necessary to
assess new events information.
iv. Mission personnel and their dependents will be
advised to stockpile enough food and water for at least two
weeks and keep travel documents and personal items ready for
rapid evacuation to the U.S., should it become necessary.
v. Consular Section updates warden messages and
Embassy webpage as new information appears and new decisions
are made.


13. (U) Tripwire Two: confirmed human-to-human AI cases
outside of the Western Hemisphere (Federal Government
Response Stage 2),AI affecting entire families, increased
infection among health care workers, or transmission,
anywhere in the world (WHO Phase 4 or 5, depending upon the
degree of human-to-human transmission).

a. Stage One: case clusters occurring, but not in the
Western Hemisphere.

i. The EAC, in consultation with the Operations
Center,s Crisis Management Staff (S/ES-O/CMS) and, if
applicable, the State Department Task Force, confirms that
tripwire has been crossed. The EAC meets frequently to
follow developments, review actions, and assess the
possibility that sustained human-to-human transmission has
started.
ii. The Embassy prohibits Mission personnel from
traveling to the region where AI clusters have been
discovered.
iii. Non-essential staff and dependents are advised
to prepare luggage and travel documents and to be on stand-by
for authorized departure.
iv. The Mission continues with full staffing.
v. Personnel should increase stockpiles of water and
food, in order to survive a quarantine of 12 weeks, or longer.
vi. Consular Warden Message and Embassy Webpage are
updated to reflect guidance provided to Embassy personnel.
vii. The Consular Section limits visa applicants to
emergency cases only.
viii. The Mission provides a back-up duty officer to
assist in answering phone calls and inquiries from concerned
U.S. Citizens after hours.

b. Stage Two: sustained human-to-human transmission,
resulting in Pandemic Influenza epidemic confined to regions
outside the Western Hemisphere.

i. The EAC meets frequently to analyze new
information and implement new decisions.
ii. Mission requests AUTHORIZED DEPARTURE for all
dependents and non essential personnel to return to the U.S.
iii. Increase frequency of Mission and Consular
Warden Messages to update the Mission and Amcits on Embassy
actions.
iv. The EAC reviews plans for the evaluation and
treatment of infected persons and the means of transport of
ill persons to local hospitals.
v. The Embassy prohibits travel to regions with
human- to-human transmission.
vi. Mission personnel may continue to travel within
the Western Hemisphere, with the understanding that freedom
of travel may become quickly restricted everywhere. Travel
restrictions need to be reviewed day-to-day.
vii. Consular Section re-emphasizes advice to

American citizens in country to stockpile additional water
and food in preparation for possible prolonged home
quarantine.
viii. Mission considers moving all essential Embassy
personnel into Embassy compound for the duration of the
pandemic.
ix. The Mission reviews its plans to stockpile water
and food, considering that the remaining Mission personnel
may have to move to the Embassy compound for security reasons.
x. Mission screens all individuals entering the
compound.
xi. The Consular Section continues to limit visa
applicants to emergency cases only.


14. (U) Tripwire Three: documented human-to-human
transmission of Avian or Pandemic Influenza in the Western
Hemisphere (Federal Government Response Stage 2 or 3, and WHO
Phase 5 or 6, depending upon the degree of human-to-human
transmission: significant, or efficient and sustained,).

a. Stage One: case clusters occurring in the Western
Hemisphere, in Central America, or in Nicaragua.

i. The EAC, in consultation with the Operations
Center,s Crisis Management Staff (S/ES-O/CMS) and, if
applicable, the State Department Task Force, confirms that
tripwire has been crossed. The EAC meets frequently to
follow developments, review actions, and respond quickly in
initiating new actions.
ii. The Embassy prohibits travel to countries (and
perhaps adjacent countries) except the U.S., where only the
affected states should be avoided.
iii. The Mission stops hosting public events and
advises personnel to avoid public gatherings.
iv. Consular section sends warden messages announcing
authorized departure of dependents and suggesting that
private Amcits consider returning to the US. Travel
restrictions for official personnel and the new policy of
social avoidance are also publicized.
v. Health Unit personnel set up outdoor or
alternative patient evaluation site (staff parking area).
American Employees with fever and respiratory illness are
placed into Embassy compound building designated for pandemic
victims. Persons who have returned recently from the country
with case clusters will be housed in a designated Embassy
compound building and will be required to remain in the
building for quarantine for ten (10) days. Persons that
become ill during the time of quarantine will be transferred
to the designated Embassy compound building. Persons without
symptoms after the 10 day quarantine period will be released
to the NEC building for housing purposes.
vi. The Consular section informs the State Department
that it has suspended service to persons with respiratory
illness or fever. Consular section meets with Health Unit
staff to discuss precautions in meeting with visa applicants.
vii. The Consular Section, with assistance from other
units within the Embassy, Consular Affairs (CA),and
S/ES/CMS, sets up a 24-hour telephone and email task force to
manage the deluge of inquiries coming from U.S. Citizens.
The Consular Crisis Management System is used to track
inquiries.
viii. The Marine Security Guard will be divided into
two groups, which live separately (in order to try to avoid
loss of all MSG personnel to illness simultaneously). Also
consider augmenting the security force with MILGP/DAO
personnel as needed. The Mission will ensure that controlled
and classified documents have been reduced to less than
one-hour destruction time.

b. Stage Two: sustained human-to-human Pandemic Influenza
spreads to the Western Hemisphere, including the U.S.,
Mexico, neighboring Central or South American countries, or
Nicaragua itself. (All regional and other international
travel is likely to be restricted; the host nation,s borders
will very likely be closed, medical evacuations will not be
allowed, nor is it likely that they will be possible.)

i. The EAC meets to review, revise, and initiate new
actions.
ii. Health Unit staff will provide medical care to
ill persons housed in the designated Embassy compound
building, reporting to the Consular Section, who will report
to families and others.
iii. The Consular Section closes to the public (in
consultation with CA).
iv. The Consular Section drafts a travel warning and
requests State Department approval and dissemination. The
travel warning is disseminated to the local American
community, and private Amcits are strongly advised to avoid
travel to Nicaragua. All incoming official travel is

prohibited, unless the persons are needed to investigate and
combat the AI or Pandemic Influenza.
v. Mission informs the State Department that persons
in neighboring countries infected with Avian or Pandemic
Influenza cannot be transferred to Nicaragua, due to
inadequate medical facilities.
vi. Mission and Consular Warden Messages are
disseminated frequently, updating official Americans and
private Amcits about Embassy advice and actions. The Embassy
Webpage is updated day-to-day.
vii. The Mission records details of all Americans,
Mission personnel and private citizens who become sick,
quarantined, or hospitalized with Avian or Pandemic Influenza
in the established database. The CMS database is used to
track cases of private U.S. Citizens infected with AI or
pandemic flu.
viii. The mission initiates plan to distribute
Tamiflu/Relenza to Health Care workers and other Embassy
personnel, as advised by State MED and CDC.
ix. The Mission ascertains from Nicaraguan public
health officials morgue location and procedures to transfer
the dead to the morgue. The Consular section is informed in
order to record information and notify families.
x. Water and food supplies will be consolidated at
the Embassy compound.


15. (U) Tripwire Four: the pandemic situation results in
civil unrest (Federal Government Response Stage 3, and WHO
Phase 6).

a. Stage One: the pandemic situation is such that random
acts of violence or an increase in threats are occurring.

i. As soon as Tripwire Four is crossed, front office
calls State Department Ops Center to report on the developing
situation. EAC, in consultation with the Operations Center's
Crisis Management Staff (S/ES-O/CMS) and the State Department
Task Force, confirms that tripwire has been crossed.
ii. Request an update to the Travel Alert or a Travel
Warning to reflect current circumstances and post actions.
If the Department issues a revised Travel Alert or Travel
Warning, posts should promptly disseminate it to the local
American community.

b. Stage Two: The pandemic situation is such that the
local government cannot contain civil unrest, much of which
is directed against the U.S. Embassy and Americans, who may
be perceived as having food, water and medications, and
refusing to share same. American homes may be broken into by
mobs seeking medications and food, and numbers of Americans
may be seeking refuge at the Embassy.

i. Request conference call via State Operations
Center with CMS (Crisis Management Support),CA/OCS, and the
regional bureau's EX office to discuss requesting ordered
departure.
ii. Request Ordered Departure status from the
Department, and provide post's assessment of the current
situation. Include information about potential numbers of
private Americans departing, and about transportation
availability.
iii. If Ordered Departure status is granted, the
following actions will become necessary:

-- If more transportation is needed than is available,
request Department assistance. A/LM is responsible for
arranging increases in regularly scheduled flights to post,
charters, etc.
-- If departure will not be possible via regularly-scheduled
commercial flights or chartered commercial aircraft, CMS and
the regional Bureau will discuss request for DOD assistance.
Ambassador should brief the relevant combatant command on the
situation at hand.
-- Depending on departure option(s) selected, identify
preferred options for internal movement, staging points,
routes, assembly areas, embarkation points, etc. Also,
consider transportation, timing, and size of group movements.
-- If potential transportation includes stopovers at a
location where there is a U.S. diplomatic post, include
transit post(s) as info addressee on all related cable
traffic. Provide guidance to transit post on services
required for those departing, such as special medical needs,
diapers, etc.
-- Inform other foreign missions of drawdown status.
-- Disseminate the Travel Warning (issued by the Department
when Ordered Departure is granted) to the American community
via post's warden system and Internet website. The
communication to the private American community should
strongly urge private Americans to review their individual
circumstances and consider whether they should relocate to

the United States at this point. It should note that those
who do not depart should be prepared to remain in country,
and that embassy services may soon become unavailable to
those who stay. Note that warden system and website updates
may also become unavailable, and that Americans who stay
should monitor the State Department website, and,
specifically, http://travel.state.gov.
-- Consult with M/FLO for services to personnel who depart
post.
-- Request that the Department impose Minimize status.
-- Ensure the guidelines in 4 FAH-3 H-830 "Emergency
Evacuation Fiscal Policy" are followed by all agencies at
post.
-- Contact the regional bureau to replenish post operating
funds to sustain post operations, and also contact K Fund
Manager, RM/CFO, for special K funds for evacuation related
operations and evacuee travel. Charter aircraft will be
funded at the Department level.
-- Confirm travel orders are prepared for departing post
personnel. Consider actions that must be accomplished in the
event all employees depart post and operations are suspended.
Be ready to initiate document destruction plan.
-- Arrange administrative control of residences and personal
property of departing U.S. Government personnel.
-- Designate liaison officers, arranging at high level to
ensure acceptance by host government and ensuring
communication capability.
-- Consider disposition of pets. (State Department policy
precludes evacuating pets via chartered or military aircraft
or ships, and they therefore require alternate
accommodations. Working animals, such as guide dogs, are not
considered pets and will be accommodated if possible.)
-- Consider assigning officers at the main ports of departure
to offer routine consular services, assist in liaison with
local authorities, and track private Americans leaving the
country via the Consular Task Force application. Assign
personnel only after consultation with post's Regional
Medical Officer or Foreign Service Health Practitioner in
case additional protective measures are advised.
-- Update personnel lists on WebPASS Post Personnel System
(PS),making sure that TDY personnel have been included, and
that the Emergency Management System module is current in its
tracking of travels and destinations. If computers are not
functioning, transmit up-to-date staffing pattern to
S/ES-O/CMS, CA and post's regional bureau, including
breakdown of employees and family members by agency and names
of TDY personnel, and indicating who is out of country and
their status (TDY, annual leave, home leave, R&R).

iv. At the discretion of the Chief of Mission, in
coordination with the Department, assistance may be extended
to other foreign nationals when humanitarian or U.S. national
security interests dictate. Post must obtain prior approval
from the Department before offering departure assistance.
Points to cover in such local discussions may include:

-- The U.S. Government will consider assisting third-country
nationals (TCNs) and host-country nationals in departure on a
case-by-case, space available, and reimbursable basis when
doing so serves U.S. interests and the passenger(s) has
appropriate travel documents, including a valid visa for
entry to the United States.
-- Priorities of movement and how they will be integrated
into departure plans.
-- Reimbursement for departure assistance to third-country
nationals is billed directly from the U.S. Government to the
government of the individual (except where the national is a
family member of a U.S. citizen in which case the national
becomes part of the U.S. citizen's individual promissory
note).
-- Advance travel documentation.
-- Sharing of personnel assignments, communications and other
management considerations for the departure process.
-- Screening procedures at assembly and embarkation areas.
-- Responsibilities at safe haven, transit points or final
destination.
End Text.

SANDERS

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