NICARAGUA'S TAXMAN COMETH

C O N F I D E N T I A L MANAGUA 001151 SIPDIS DEPT PLEASE PASS MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORPORATION E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019/12/21 TAGS: ECON EFIN EAID PGOV PREL NU SUBJECT: NICARAGUA'S TAXMAN COMETH REF: MANAGUA 1141 CLASSIFIED BY: RobertJCallahan, Ambassador, STATE, Embassy Managua; REASON: 1.4(B),(D) Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) The Nicaraguan National Assembly passed a sweeping tax reform package with the approval of President Ortega on December 3, which, according to most observers, will lead to price increases and decreased demand during an economic downturn. The GON cited the need for increased tax revenues in order to address a projected $282 million deficit in 2010. The petroleum and supermarket industries appear to be the most at risk as a result of a new tax on gross sales, which will negatively affect these high-volume/low-margin businesses. Critics have also noted the GON's failure to use Venezuela's ALBA (Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas) funds to resolve the deficit, along with its reluctance to rein in government spending. Several economists here predict that the GON's new tax law will only push more Nicaraguan consumers into the unregulated informal sector, far from the grip of the tax authorities. At the same time, most businesses acknowledge that while any tax hike is unwelcome, it could have been worse. End Summary. Higher Taxes and More of Them -------------- ¶2. (U) On December 3, the Nicaraguan National Assembly passed a controversial tax reform package designed to address the GON's projected fiscal deficit in 2010 of approximately $282 million (reftel). In a speech on November 18, President Ortega stated that the GON needed to raise additional revenue to fill the deficit because of the effects of "savage capitalism" which had created the world economic crisis. Ortega also blamed the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for Nicaragua's current financial predicament, referring to the Fund as an "instrument of capitalism." The following measures constitute the major elements of the new law: a 1% minimum tax on gross sales for businesses, a 10% tax on interest income generated by deposit accounts, a 10% tax on dividend income, a 1.5% tax on transactions in the Nicaraguan commodities exchange market, and a 20% tax on income earned in Nicaragua by citizens who reside abroad (rental income, for example). The GON claims that these new taxes will raise the equivalent of 0 .7% of GDP, or approximately $45 million. ¶3. (C) The new law affects employees who earn as little as $3,700 per year, who will now owe 10% of their wages in taxes. At the other end of the bracket, those who earn over $25,000 per year will be taxed at a rate of 30%. The new law also cracks down on tax-exempt abuses prevalent among Nicaraguan NGOs, prohibiting tax-free treatment for the following items: alcoholic beverages, tobacco products, jewelry, perfumes, cosmetics, yachts and sport and recreational boats, and airplanes for private use. [Comment: It is common knowledge that many "NGOs" in Nicaragua are nothing more than shell companies which exist purely for members of the ruling class to import the aforementioned products into Nicaragua duty-free. End Comment.] Jose Adan Aguerri, President of the Nicaraguan Federation of Businesses (COSEP),represented a wide range of commercial sectors negotiating the tax package with the GON. He told the media that these new taxes will negatively impact economic growth, but added that all Central American countries are introducing tax reform packages, some of which may prove much tougher than the GON's. Exxon, WalMart Share Concerns... -------------- ¶4. (C) The supermarket and petroleum industries are likely to be the hardest hit as a result of the new tax law. On December 14, econoff met with Joaquim De Magalhaes, Country Manager for Exxon in Nicaragua, to discuss the effects of the GON's new tax reform law on its operations here. Exxon operates the country's only refinery, and is the sole supplier of gasoline and diesel to the Nicaraguan market. De Magalhaes told econoff that Exxon's primary concern is the new 1% tax on gross sales. While Exxon is analyzing the implications of this new tax, the nature of its high-volume/small-profit margin business likely means that this new tax will result in increased gasoline prices at the pump. ¶5. (C) Similarly, Eduardo Garcia, Corporate Affairs Manager for WalMart/Nicaragua, told econoff on December 10 that the new 1% tax on gross sales will strongly affect its grocery business given low industry profit margins (1 to 2%). Garcia claimed that the GON's new law means that WalMart will see its tax bill climb by 400%. He recounted to econoff his meetings with various deputies in the National Assembly, in which he explained to them how PALI (one of the supermarket chains in Nicaragua operated by WalMart) earns 80% of its revenue by selling basic food items (rice, beans, for instance). Garcia noted that with the new 1% tax on gross sales, WalMart will be compelled to raise prices, and that as a result low-income customers will purchase basic foodstuffs in unregulated, informal local markets. As a result, according to Garcia, the GON will ironically collect less tax revenue. ¶6. (C) Garcia asserted that from a regional perspective, the new tax law renders Nicaraguan products less competitive throughout Central America. For example, Garcia said that almost all beef sold by WalMart in El Salvador is imported from Nicaragua. Since Nicaraguan beef prices will increase as a result of the new gross sales tax, WalMart will turn to more competitive suppliers, possibly in Guatemala. Despite the GON's new tax law, Garcia refuted reports in the local media that WalMart plans to leave the Nicaraguan market, at least in the short term. He held out the possibility, however, that should the new tax burden result in consistent losses, ultimately WalMart would be forced to discontinue its operations here. Garcia expressed hope that the National Assembly might pass a legislative fix during the first quarter of 2010 specifically addressing the grocery sector's tax dilemma. ...While Others Claim It Could Have Been Worse -------------- -------------- ¶7. (C) Most attendees at the Ambassador's December 4 Economic Roundtable acknowledged Aguerri's efforts at heading off a much more onerous tax law; originally, the GON sought to raise revenue equivalent to 1.5% of GDP, but in the end settled on 0.7%. Julio Cardenas of BANCENTRO, Nicaragua's second-largest bank, observed that the tax reform law could have been much worse. However, he said it will still result overall in higher prices throughout the economy, leading to a corresponding reduction in demand. Cardenas told the Ambassador that banks in Nicaragua will see their tax bill rise from 30% - 40%, making them less competitive compared to other regional banks. Cardenas said he believes the GON will review the effects of the new tax reform in six months to determine whether or not amendments are necessary. Another prominent banker, Gabriel Solorzano of BANEX, characterized the tax reform as yet another grim development in the context of anemic economic growth in Nicaragua, brought on by the recent drought, the lack of international credit, and the increasingly authoritarian nature of the GON. Solorzano said that all of these factors are contributing to a steady exodus of the country's best and brightest out of Nicaragua. ¶8. (C) During the same event, Erwin Kruger, former head of the Nicaraguan Federation of Businesses (COSEP),lamented that President Ortega could have easily filled the nation's budget gap with Venezuelan ALBA funds. He opined that this would have been a far better fiscal solution instead of a new tax law which further impedes investment and economic prosperity. Luis Rivas, General Manager of BANPRO, Nicaragua's largest bank, said that his bank, along with several others, had offered to purchase $60 million in GON bonds to fill the budget deficit. Unfortunately, according to Rivas, the IMF did not approve this initiative, arguing that such a move was not sustainable and would harm credit availability in Nicaragua. All of the participants in the Roundtable agreed that the new tax reform law could have been avoided had the FSLN (Sandinista National Liberation Front) not engaged in the widespread electoral fraud perpetrated in November 2008, which in turn led European donors to withdraw crucial budget support funds from the GON. Others commented that the FSLN will suffer political consequences in the lead up to the 2011 presidential elections as a result of this unpopular new tax. ¶9. (C) As described in reftel, the tax reform passed with the support of one nominally opposition party (the Nicaraguan Liberal Alliance - ALN) and the abstention of another (the Constitutional Liberal Party - PLC). COSEP head Aguerri argued to the DCM on December 15 that even those parties that opposed the reform (Vamos Con Eduardo - VCE and the Sandinista Renewal Movement - MRS) understood perfectly well that this was the best deal that could be gotten and their denunciations were pure political posturing. He was particularly angry at Eduardo Montealegre's attack on Carlos Pellas, Nicaragua's most powerful businessman, for negotiating the reform with Ortega. Aguerri said that it was absurd for Montealegre to attack the same people from whom he is seeking funding. Comment: Aguerri was clearly unhappy that the business community, of which he is the public face, now has to take partial ownership for what will inevitably be an unpopular measure. Comment Continued -------------- ¶10. (C) A widely-held misconception here is that the IMF, under its Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF),initiated this tax reform in order to increase GON revenues to address the looming budget deficit. In fact, the GON itself proposed these new tax measures to the IMF last summer on its own accord, instead of utilizing Venezuelan ALBA funds or cutting government spending sufficiently to fill the deficit. While most of these taxes primarily affect the wealthiest echelons of Nicaraguan society, it is likely that these measures will result in higher prices across-the-board, so all segments of the socioeconomic ladder may feel a hit, which could result in political costs for the FSLN. Collecting these new taxes will prove to be challenging for the GON's tax authority, which lacks sufficient resources and technology even to collect current taxes on the books. CALLAHAN