NICARAGUA: RAAN ELECTIONS AS PREDICTED - FSLN WINS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 MANAGUA 000103 SIPDIS DEPT FOR KRAAIMOORE E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/20/2019 TAGS: PHUM PGOV NU SUBJECT: NICARAGUA: RAAN ELECTIONS AS PREDICTED - FSLN WINS MOST RACES REF: A. MANAGUA 84 ¶B. MANAGUA 79 ¶C. 08 MANAGUA 1517 ¶D. 08 MANAGUA 1383 ¶E. 08 MANAGUA 1367 ¶F. 08 MANAGUA 1136 Classified By: Amb. Robert J. Callahan for reasons 1.4 (b) & (d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: On January 19 the Supreme Election Council (CSE) declared the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) party victor in four of the seven municipalities in the North Atlantic Autonomous Region (RAAN) - Bonanza, Rosita, Waspam and regional capital Puerto Cabezas. As expected, the Liberal Constitutional Party (PLC) won in Siuna and Mulukuku, and the Miskito Indian Yatama (Yatama) regional party won in Prinzipolka (see Reftel A & C). On election day absenteeism was high but there were few reports of violence. However, there were several credible allegations of election fraud and irregularities in each municipality that revealed a new level of sophistication and coordination, and were difficult to detect by election observers. The FSLN victory in the Yatama-strongholds of Puerto Cabezas and Waspam was particularly troubling for Yatama leader Brooklyn Rivera and may signal the end of his control over the party (see Reftel B & F). END SUMMARY -------------- THE CSE OFFICIAL RESULTS -------------- ¶2. (SBU) With 97 percent of the vote count, the CSE declared on January 19 that the FSLN party has won four of the seven municipalities in the RAAN. The remaining three municipalities were split by the PLC and Yatama. In Bonanza, historically a Sandinista stronghold, the FSLN won with 64 percent of the vote, followed by 35 percent for the PLC. In Rosita, the FSLN won with 56 percent of the vote, followed by 42 for the PLC candidates. In Waspam and regional capital Puerto Cabezas, areas dominated by the Yatama party, the FSLN won with 40 and 36 percent respectively, followed by Yatama with 33 and 31 percent respectively, and the PLC candidates with 25 and 28 percent respectively. In Siuna and Mulukuku, historically Liberal strongholds, the PLC won with 57 and 56 percent respectively, followed by the FSLN with 41 and 23 percent. In Prinzipolka, Yatama won with 46 percent, the remaining votes went to the FSLN (28 percent) and PLC (23 percent). The Nicaraguan Liberal Alliance (ALN) party captured approximately 19 percent of the vote in Mulukuku and three percent in Puerto Cabezas. Other regional parties, such as the Nicaraguan Resistance Party (PRN),Atlantic Coast Regional Party (PAMUC) and Alternative for Change (AC) party also fielded candidates in the election, but captured less than two percent of the vote combined in most of the contests. -------------- HIGH ABSENTISM, LOW VIOLENCE, ON ELECTION DAY -------------- ¶3. (SBU) As previously reported (see Reftel C, D and E) absenteeism was expected to be high, and the CSE announced that roughly 50 percent, or approximately 84 thousand voters of the 170 thousand registered voters, participated on the day of the election. Mauricio Zuniga, executive director of the Institute for Democracy and Development (IPADE), confirmed the CSE assessment of lower turnout. Zuniga told the press that the RAAN historically has lower voter turn-out for elections, in part because of the extreme poverty of the region. According to Zuniga, voters were dissatisfied with the candidates and lacked the motivation to come out in force, particularly the Yatama supporters. ¶4. (C) Election observers from IPADE, Etica y Transparencia, and the Center for the Development of the Atlantic Coast (Cedehca) reported that voting centers generally opened on time, with minimal delays, and that only a few voting centers closed early. Of the two voting centers in Bilwi that closed early, large crowds gathered outside and demanded that they be reopened. There were also some polling stations that tried unsuccessfully to close with people still in line. IPADE reported to the media that the election proceeded peacefully; however, there were a few incidents of violence. The media reported that a group of armed men approached a voting station in Mulukuku, but that there was no MANAGUA 00000103 002 OF 004 confrontation. In Puerto Cabezas, our contacts told us that the ALN candidate, Victor Alvarado (see Reftel A),confronted and punched Yatama leader Brooklyn Rivera in the back after pre-marked ballots were discovered at a voting station. In general, election day violence was diminished by the presence of over 1,500 riot police and military personnel that maintained public order throughout large cities in the RAAN. -------------- CAREFULLY ORCHESTRATED FRAUD -------------- ¶5. (C) Despite the generally peaceful election day and the presence of election observers outside of many of the polling stations, there were irregularities that occurred in all of the municipalities, including allegations of election fraud. Unlike the fraud that occurred in the November 9 municipal elections in the rest of Nicaragua, the RAAN municipal election fraud was carefully planned and orchestrated by the FSLN to be difficult to detect by election observers outside of the polling stations. In fact, our contacts tell us that most of the fraud took place well before election day through the careful control of the lists of eligible voters and their cedulas, the Nicaraguan national identity document issued by the CSE and required for voting. Even if a voter was pre-registered to vote, polling station officials would not permit entrance without presenting a valid cedula. ¶6. (C) As reported previously (see Reftel C),FSLN controlled Citizen Power Council (CPC) members staffed most of the voter registration tables on November 9, during the verification process. Our contacts believe that CPC operatives noted party affiliation during the verification process in order to control who would be able to vote in the January election. Voters sympathetic to Liberal or Yatama candidates did not receive new cedulas in time to vote, whereas FSLN sympathizers received their cedulas well in advance of the election. One contact told us that an estimated 4,000 cedulas were purposely not delivered to Liberal voters in the Sandy Bay communities of Puerto Cabezas. Other voters who had previously registered for a change of polling station on November 9 could not find their names on the CSE prepared electoral list on Election Day - some traveled to multiple polling stations trying to locate their names, and in the end gave up in frustration without voting. There were also credible reports that the FSLN-controlled CSE illegally included the names on voter lists and issued cedulas to under-age voters from FSLN families. ¶7. (C) Another irregularity that both the PLC and Yatama candidates denounced was non-residents voting in the RAAN elections. Our contacts reported that at least five buses from neighboring Matagalpa brought in voters to polling stations in Mulukuku. Puerto Cabezas PLC candidate Osorno "Comandante Blas" Coleman told the press that the Sandinistas bused in some 700 party supporters from different municipalities to vote in Puerto Cabezas. (NOTE: For these non-RAAN residents to vote, CSE officials purposely included their names and cedula numbers on the list of eligible voters. END NOTE) There were also reports that many of the 1,500 military and police personnel transferred from the Pacific coast to provide election security also voted in the RAAN elections. Nicaraguan election rules allow members of the military to vote at any polling station without requiring that they pre-register to be on the list of eligible voters. In Puerto Cabezas alone, our contacts estimate that approximately 250 military and police personnel voted. (COMMENT: The same thing occurred during the November 9 election, when large groups of military or police personnel voted at specific polling stations to favor FSLN candidates and use up ballots intended for registered voters in the polling district. It is quite possible that some of these military voters could have voted in both the November 9 and January 18 elections. END COMMENT) ¶8. (C) Near some voting stations CPC members gave out rice, sugar, and other food stuffs to voters in exchange for signed promises to vote for FSLN candidates. The lack of basic civic education regarding secret ballots in elections prevented many RAAN voters from voting their conscience after accepting the FSLN handouts. Meanwhile, inside some voting centers CPC members harassed voters and Liberal party election monitors, threatening them with expulsion by the CPC-staffed electoral police. Our contacts told us that FSLN MANAGUA 00000103 003 OF 004 member Steadman Fagoth was in Rio Coco in Waspam bribing election officials with C$3,000 ($150 USD) to falsify results to favor FSLN candidates. Finally, there were reports from our contacts and in the media of pre-marked election ballots for FSLN and Yatama candidates discovered at polling stations in Bilwi and Waspam. -------------- THE REAL WINNERS AND LOSERS -------------- ¶9. (C) In 2004 municipal elections, the FSLN actually won in two RAAN municipalities, Bonanza and Puerto Cabezas. However, Yatama leader Brooklyn Rivera staged protests and negotiated directly with FSLN until Daniel Ortega conceded to let Yatama take Puerto Cabezas. The remaining RAAN municipalities were split between the PLC and Yatama, leaving Yatama with three municipalities, the PLC with three, and the FSLN with one. Our contacts told us that the 2006 presidential election motivated Ortega to sign his infamous "pacto" with Rivera in May 2006 to share both political and economic control of the Atlantic coast. The decision to form a Yatama-FSLN alliance cost Rivera tremendous political capital among his Miskito Indian base; many indigenous and former Contra leaders, such as Osorno Blas Coleman, Alfonso Smith, Jimmy Hernandez and Filepe Mitchell left Rivera's inner circle and split the Yatama party into different factions, such as the Yatama-No-Sandinista group led by Blas (see Reftel F). The Yatama-FSLN pacto effectively gave the FSLN greater control over RAAN's municipalities and its regional council, while preserving the illusion that Yatama dominated the region. ¶10. (C) The current election results have destroyed the illusion that Yatama controls the region. In this election, the PLC lost Rosita to the FSLN, but Yatama lost both Puerto Cabezas and Waspam to the FSLN, putting in an awkward third place. Rivera has refused to accept CSE results in Waspam and Puerto Cabezas, claiming that the elections were "dirty," and has called on his supporters to take action. The results were clearly embarrassing to Rivera and have created further challenges to his leadership. Our contacts told us that Rivera felt betrayed by the FSLN and expected them to manipulate results to favor a Yatama victory in Puerto Cabezas and Waspam, even though the Yatama candidates were unpopular. In the end, our contacts believe that Rivera would negotiate with the FSLN to get at least Waspam back, but from a weakened position. ¶11. (C) Rivera is not the only loser in this election. Blas has also lost prestige by losing another election and coming in third behind Yatama. During the campaign, he used his daily Miskito radio program as a bully pulpit to attack primarily other Liberals instead of the Sandinistas, and reinforced his image as a military-person and not a politician who could reach out and build a coalition. It is widely believed that his behavior in the campaign followed by this loss would diminish his authority as the main leader within the Yatama-No-Sandinista group (See Reftel F). -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶12. (C) As expected the FSLN manipulated the voting process to favor its candidates over Liberals and even their erstwhile Yatama allies during the RAAN municipal elections. The FSLN election fraud showed greater sophistication and coordination between the CSE and local CPCs and FSLN party leaders, particularly in the way that cedulas and eligible voter lists were controlled. In doing so, the FSLN could allow some election observation while avoiding the messy fraud of the November 9 elections where the opposition could show voting center counts signed by their party election monitors that did not match CSE announced results. Only fully accreditated, independent election monitors, who had free access inside the voting centers, would have been able to detect the sophisticated fraud in this election. Neither IPADE nor Etica election observers were accreditated by the CSE, and we believe that Cedehca election observers were biased for the FSLN in their observations. ¶13. (C) The election results put FSLN candidates in control of the majority of the RAAN municipalities, which was a huge MANAGUA 00000103 004 OF 004 blow to the Yatama indigenous party, led by Brooklyn Rivera. We believe that there may be episodes of post-election violence if negotiations between Yatama and FSLN break down over the final status of Waspam; but in the end the FSLN would give Waspam to Yatama just as it gave Puerto Cabezas to them after the 2004 elections in order to maintain their political and economic alliance in the Atlantic Coast. Returning Waspam to Yatama would help to slow the hemorrhaging of the Yatama base away from Rivera. Unfortunately, Comandante Blas' loss and his comments to the press that he and his nemesis Rivera have the same enemy and should join forces to contest the results confuse the calls for new leadership within the Yatama base. The FSLN has worked over time to eliminate and subsume its opposition; this election revealed that it may be actively working to create the conditions for Yatama to collapse and cease to be relevant in the region. The next Regional Council elections set for March 2010 will demonstrate whether Yatama can regroup in time to prevent the FSLN from overwhelming, and perhaps destroying it. CALLAHAN