ENERGY WOES IN THE MARSHALL ISLANDS

UNCLAS MAJURO 000020 E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: ECON ENRG PGOV RM SUBJECT: ENERGY WOES IN THE MARSHALL ISLANDS ¶1. SUMMARY: The immediate outlook for energy issues in the RMI remains gloomy. The status quo is fundamentally unsustainable, and thus far the political will to correct the problem has not been found. The energy problems act as a severe damper on any attempts to promote economic development as they consume resources to little positive effect and add layers of costs to any transaction. Efforts are underway by technocrats to improve long-term energy policy in the RMI, but getting the political buy-in remains a significant stumbling block. END SUMMARY ¶2. The RMI's ongoing electricity generation problems refuse to lie down. The long term problems plaguing the Marshalls Energy Company (MEC) are representative of the problems facing the energy sector as a whole. Analysis of MEC conducted by a USDA Graduate School team identified two major problems with MEC's operations. The first is ineffective or counter productive GRMI policies and the second is MEC implementing unsustainable business models in reaction to those policies. GRMI interference has come in the form of manipulating tariff rates for electrical service, keeping them artificially low and not allowing them to react to fuel price changes quickly and efficiently. This has forced MEC to generate electricity at a substantial loss, especially on Kwajalein, Jaluit and Wotje atolls, where MEC's costs are four times higher than on Majuro but their prices must be the same. GRMI interference also resulted in imposition of gross revenue and import taxes on MEC that damaged their competitive advantage in fuel re-sales to fishing vessels. Such re-sales had been MEC's one source of consistent profit. MEC's response to these policies has not helped their operations in the long term, either. In response to inflexible and unrealistic tariff rates, MEC subsidized their power generating operations through fuel re-sales. When taxes made these non-profitable, MEC diverted funds from maintenance and depreciation accounts to sustain operations. This has left power production and transmission efficiencies below benchmark standards, and MEC without the funds to correct the issue. ¶3. The situation came to a head when the oil price shocks of 2008 finally wiped out MEC's last reserves. In the face of rapidly climbing prices they found themselves unable to pay for the fuel shipments they receive on consignment from SK Networks of South Korea. Since that time they have continued operations largely by subsidies from the GRMI, with the underlying funds coming from international donors. However, these subsidies have not been managed in a coherent, transparent manner. Some have been outright grants, but much of the funding has come in the form of advances against future GRMI utility costs. Advancing funds provides MEC with immediate operating capital at the cost of deferring the problem to a later date when the absence of income from billing the GRMI will limit's MEC's cash flow. Thus budgeting for the transfers is not sustainable in the medium term and they have been clouded by a series of loan guarantee arrangements the GRMI has undertaken on an ad-hoc basis. The GRMI stated they had the situation under control in December of 2008 when fuel prices dropped dramatically and the GRMI repealed the import and gross revenue taxes on MEC, theoretically re-establishing their competitive advantage in fuel re-sales. This has proven to not be the case. ¶4. MEC was unable to meet their most recent consignment payment in February, despite the payment date being extended from January. The GRMI was again forced to look to outside sources of funding to keep the lights on, ultimately paying for the shipment with part of the annual Taiwan grant money and funds guaranteed by the Japan. An assessment by an energy policy specialist in the RMI on a project funded by the European Commission found that fuel sales by MEC have not significantly increased because it has not had the cash flow needed to purchase sufficient stocks to make significant sales - also the winter months are naturally a low point in annual fuel sales as fewer ships are fishing in RMI waters. The study noted the GRMI forced MEC to lower tariffs back to unsustainable levels as soon as fuel prices dropped, rather than allow MEC to recoup some of its operating capital. The assessment further concluded that MEC's problems will not be fixed without a major recapitalization, something that cannot happen at this time as MEC does not have accurate valuations on assets and the GRMI's ad-hoc approach to crisis resolution consumes the resources that could be used for a permanent solution. At this point there is no apparent solution to MEC's cash flow problems. ¶5. The RMI's energy issues do not stop there. A series of projects to install home solar power units on the outer atolls is not working out as hoped. While many of the units have been installed under a program funded by the EU, many others are tied up in political disputes as the change in Government brought a corresponding change in which outer atolls would be receiving the units. Other units are waiting for installation funds to be found. Beyond the problems with getting the units into place, MEC is finding the units are not bringing in revenue to make the program sustainable. While the program is able to pay for the routine maintenance costs of the panels, it will not be able to pay for replacement batteries for the units when they are needed in a few years' time. ¶6. The current energy situation is proving to be a significant drain on economic development. The GRMI is constantly scraping for resources to prop up power generation thus diverting money away from development and growth projects. It is also placing increasing strain on the already thin GRMI budget and in the opinion of an economist studying the problem is likely to push the GRMI towards an "inevitable crash." The inefficient power generation infrastructure results in unreliable service and the constant threat of the power going off in the near future certainly does nothing to promote outside investment. MEC's current state also prevents it from fully realizing the value of many of its assets, especially the large fuel depot, one of the few in the region not owned by an outside company. The depot could serve as the keystone in a proposed regional fuel purchasing and distribution scheme, but only if MEC can obtain the capital needed for startup. The problems with the outer atoll solar projects are preventing any increase in productivity of outer atoll economic activity such as copra production and handicraft manufacture by limiting work to daylight hours. ¶7. Moves are finally starting to be made at the technocratic level to address some of these issues, especially those stemming from lack of sound, long term policy on energy issues. In the next few months the Government of Australia will be providing an alternative energy policy expert to work for the RMI on a two year contract. The EC is funding an energy policy expert to help the RMI formulate plans for their overall needs, and the USDA Graduate School has a team trying to spearhead an overall reform of GRMI finances that could free considerable resources and help break the GRMI off of their habit of reeling from one crisis to the next. The limiting factor on all these efforts is the will of the national leadership. Most of the solutions to the RMI's energy problems will require hard choices from the GRMI, such as allowing tariffs to increase and shrinking the size of government to free budget resources. Sadly, it is probable that an outside trigger such as another price shock will be required to force the political leadership into taking action on these solutions. Until that time the RMI will most likely continue to depend on the donor community to keep the power flowing and continue to waste resources maintaining the status quo. BISHOP