ANDEAN PRESIDENTS CHAVEZ, MORALES DISCUSS U.S.

C O N F I D E N T I A L MADRID 000944

SIPDIS

FOR ALEXANDRA MCKNIGHT, EUR/WE
FOR WHA/AND
FOR CHRIS WEBSTER, WHA/CEN
USUN PLEASE PASS TO WHA A/S THOMAS SHANNON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/19/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV SP
SUBJECT: ANDEAN PRESIDENTS CHAVEZ, MORALES DISCUSS U.S.
WITH SPAIN

REF: A. STATE 94673

B. MADRID 924

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Arnold A. Chacon for reasons 1.4(b) an
d (d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: Pol-Mil Officer conveyed talking points
(ref A) on the September 15 determination that Bolivia had
"failed demonstrably" in meeting its international counter
narcotics obligations. MFA interlocutors reported that
during recent visits, both Venezuelan President Chavez and
Bolivian President Morales shared with Spanish officials
their impressions of the new U.S. administration. Chavez
told the Spanish he wanted to discuss U.S.-Colombian military
cooperation with President Obama. Morales, for his part,
asked Spain to help Bolivia fill the gaps in counternarcotics
cooperation left behind by the U.S. Drug Enforcement
Administration. The leaders also shared concerns with the
Spanish about Honduras. Due to budget cuts, Spain will send
a smaller delegation to the UNGA this year. Secretary of
State for IberoAmerican Affairs Juan Pablo de Laiglesia will
cover most regional events and will participate with WHA A/S
Shannon in the Latin America Working Group on the margins in
New York. END SUMMARY.

//VENEZUELA//


2. (C) MFA Subdirector General for Andean Affairs Javier
Triana, who was joined by Director General for IberoAmerican
Affairs Juan Carlos Sanchez, also shared Spain's impressions
of the September 11 visit of Venezuelan President Chavez and
that of Bolivian President Evo Morales, who was in Madrid
September 13-15 but left prior to the news of the majors list
determination. Triana specified that President Chavez had
invited himself ("se auto-invito") with only one week's
notice. He characterized the visit as a technical lay-over
for air crew rest and said that interaction with Chavez was
limited by Zapatero's full schedule on September 11 (Council
of Ministers followed by an afternoon trip to Paris to meet
with French President Sarkozy that had been planned well in
advance). Chavez told Spanish counterparts he wanted to talk
with the Obama Administration about the U.S. presence on
Colombian military bases and, according to Sanchez, asked the
GOS to transmit the message.

//BOLIVIA//


3. (C) During his September 13-15 trip to Madrid, President
Morales met with President Zapatero and President of Congress
Jose Bono, visited Madrid City Hall, and addressed Spanish
business leaders. Shortly before meeting with King Juan
Carlos I -- who hosted a dinner in honor of Morales -- the
Bolivian President's erroneous reference to the "Republic of
Spain" caused a media flutter. While in Madrid, Morales also
campaigned to Bolivians resident in Spain, a percentage of
whom are allowed by Bolivian law to vote from overseas, ahead
of December 6 elections. In a predominantly Latino
neighborhood of Madrid that is home to about 100,000 Bolivian
citizens, Morales signed a reciprocal accord allowing Spanish
citizens to vote in Bolivian municipal elections and vice
versa. Foreign assistance and technical cooperation,
including on a potable water pet project of Morales, were
themes of his visit. Bolivian Minister of Hydro-Carbons
Oscar Coca and public petroleum entity president Carlos
Villegas accompanied Morales. Spain also agreed to forgive
Bolivia's remaining debt (estimated at about $77 million and
another 5.55 million Euros),in essence canceling the debt
with 70 million Euros worth of development assistance and
investments. Under the debt cancellation agreement signed,
40 per cent of the money is to be invested in educational
programs. At the same time, President Zapatero stressed
publicly and privately the importance to Spanish business
interests of having clear rules and expectations regarding
nationalization of industries. Morales stressed during a
September 14 breakfast the good relationship (as he described
it) between Spanish petroleum company Repsol and Bolivia and
expressed hope that such cooperation could also take place
with other companies, provided they respect Bolivian rules.
"We want partners, not owners of our natural resources,"
Morales stated. COMMENT: Repsol seems less than enthused

with Morales. While not pulling out, it does not plan to
expand operations either. End comment.


4. (C) Triana said the Bolivian President's visit had gone
well and observed that Morales seemed to have softened his
approach generally and exercised greater caution than he had
previously shown. Morales was "very respectful" in reference
to President Obama and Secretary Clinton and observed to
Spanish interlocutors a positive change in the U.S. attitude
toward Bolivia. He nonetheless accused the Pentagon of
complicity in the Honduran coup and complained about
Bolivia's exclusion from the Andean Trade Preferences Act.
During an interview with Spanish national television TVE,
Morales insisted he had information that USAID was paying for
his opponents' campaign and said he hoped Embassy La Paz --
which had previously "conspired" against him -- was not
"involved again in political actions."


5. (SBU) Morales was also vocal about U.S, military presence
in Latin America, particularly access to Colombian bases.
Addressing a crowd of 5,000 Bolivians on September 13, he
said Bolivia would not accept foreign military bases, much
less U.S. bases, on its territory. Spanish media widely
quoted Morales as saying, "Where there is a U.S. military
base in Latin America, there are military coups, and (the
bases) don't guarantee peace or democracy." Morales asserted
publicly September 14 that his government had no plans to

break relations with the United States or any other country
over the bases, which he nonetheless called "an excuse for
the empire to control natural resources, and not to fight
drug trafficking, for example."


6. (C) Sanchez confirmed that Bolivian President Evo Morales
had sought to increase counter-narcotics cooperation with
Spain and acknowledged the increasing complexity and
seriousness of the problem of drug trafficking. Spain is
concerned about the proliferation of coca manufacturing labs
and links to organized crime. Sanchez conceded Spain wanted
to help but noted not even the EU -- much less Spain alone --
had the financial and material resources to fill the gap left
by the expulsion of the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration
(DEA) in January 2009. He suggested perhaps a "pool" of
like-minded and neighboring countries could work with
Bolivia, adding that Morales had also approached Brazil and
others. Triana held that Morales's distrust of the DEA had a
"very personal element." We have urged Spanish MFA
interlocutors to support UK efforts to set up an EU working
group on drugs in Bolivia and to build a multilateral group
involving the UN, Brazil, and others to serve as an
intelligence sharing mechanism.

//HONDURAS//


7. (C) Both Chavez and Morales spent considerable time
discussing Honduras with the Spanish and expressed skepticism
about Costa Rican President Oscar Arias as a negotiator.
Following meetings of EU foreign ministers in Brussels, the
Council of the European Union adopted conclusions September
15 expressing deep concern over the political crisis in
Honduras and the ongoing violation of the constitutional
order, expressing firm support for the OAS and the efforts of
Arias, and calling all parties to refrain from violence.
Spain issued its own communique September 15 announcing it
had revoked the visas of 10 senior Honduran officials, among
them 8 members of the de facto regime. Sanchez said that
First Vice President de la Vega was prepared to announce the
visa measures during her August trip to the region, but Spain
had delayed hoping for EU consensus and concerted action. He
held that the United Kingdom had an easier time and was able
to act more independently because the UK is not included in
the Schengen zone. Sanchez echoed Secretary of State for
IberoAmerican Affairs Juan Pablo de Laiglesia's optimism over
President Zelaya's September 7 letter to Secretary Clinton
(ref C) and reiterated GOS support for the San Jose Accords
as the best possible path to a resolution. Sanchez planned
to meet September 16 with the Honduran Chargee d'Affaires,
explaining that the GOS had withdrawn the Honduran
ambassador's accreditation but stopped short of stripping all
diplomatic staff of their credentials. (NOTE: Iris Yolanda
Reyes Alvarez assumed charge of the Honduran Embassy in

Madrid on September 9, following the August 4 dismissal from
their posts of Jose Eduardo Martell (ambassador) and Iris
Mejia Ponce de Claveria (head of consular affairs) over their
support for the de facto regiQH'*< expression and
explained that what he wanted to say was that he "welcomed
and respected Spain's goodwill, but that at this moment
Colombia (did) not consider a mediation useful or
convenient." Colombian Foreign Affairs Minister Jaime
Bermudez reportedly also told Radio Caracol, "We thank Spain
for its interest and willingness, but at this moment we do
not believe there should be any mediation."


10. (C) Regarding logistical arrangements for Spanish
sponsorship of approximately 200 Colombian soldiers to deploy
to Afghanistan, Spanish Director General for Defense Policy
General Benito Raggio speculated to Defense Attache on
September 18 that his Colombian counterparts were holding off
on signing a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) until the
media coverage of the US Colombian basing agreement subsided.
Spain is still confident that the deployment of Colombians
to Afghanistan in March 2010 by way of training in Spain to
begin in January, per the draft MOU, is achievable.

CHACON