ANDEAN PRESIDENTS CHAVEZ, MORALES DISCUSS U.S.

C O N F I D E N T I A L MADRID 000944 SIPDIS FOR ALEXANDRA MCKNIGHT, EUR/WE FOR WHA/AND FOR CHRIS WEBSTER, WHA/CEN USUN PLEASE PASS TO WHA A/S THOMAS SHANNON E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/19/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV SP SUBJECT: ANDEAN PRESIDENTS CHAVEZ, MORALES DISCUSS U.S. WITH SPAIN REF: A. STATE 94673 ¶B. MADRID 924 Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Arnold A. Chacon for reasons 1.4(b) an d (d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Pol-Mil Officer conveyed talking points (ref A) on the September 15 determination that Bolivia had "failed demonstrably" in meeting its international counter narcotics obligations. MFA interlocutors reported that during recent visits, both Venezuelan President Chavez and Bolivian President Morales shared with Spanish officials their impressions of the new U.S. administration. Chavez told the Spanish he wanted to discuss U.S.-Colombian military cooperation with President Obama. Morales, for his part, asked Spain to help Bolivia fill the gaps in counternarcotics cooperation left behind by the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration. The leaders also shared concerns with the Spanish about Honduras. Due to budget cuts, Spain will send a smaller delegation to the UNGA this year. Secretary of State for IberoAmerican Affairs Juan Pablo de Laiglesia will cover most regional events and will participate with WHA A/S Shannon in the Latin America Working Group on the margins in New York. END SUMMARY. //VENEZUELA// ¶2. (C) MFA Subdirector General for Andean Affairs Javier Triana, who was joined by Director General for IberoAmerican Affairs Juan Carlos Sanchez, also shared Spain's impressions of the September 11 visit of Venezuelan President Chavez and that of Bolivian President Evo Morales, who was in Madrid September 13-15 but left prior to the news of the majors list determination. Triana specified that President Chavez had invited himself ("se auto-invito") with only one week's notice. He characterized the visit as a technical lay-over for air crew rest and said that interaction with Chavez was limited by Zapatero's full schedule on September 11 (Council of Ministers followed by an afternoon trip to Paris to meet with French President Sarkozy that had been planned well in advance). Chavez told Spanish counterparts he wanted to talk with the Obama Administration about the U.S. presence on Colombian military bases and, according to Sanchez, asked the GOS to transmit the message. //BOLIVIA// ¶3. (C) During his September 13-15 trip to Madrid, President Morales met with President Zapatero and President of Congress Jose Bono, visited Madrid City Hall, and addressed Spanish business leaders. Shortly before meeting with King Juan Carlos I -- who hosted a dinner in honor of Morales -- the Bolivian President's erroneous reference to the "Republic of Spain" caused a media flutter. While in Madrid, Morales also campaigned to Bolivians resident in Spain, a percentage of whom are allowed by Bolivian law to vote from overseas, ahead of December 6 elections. In a predominantly Latino neighborhood of Madrid that is home to about 100,000 Bolivian citizens, Morales signed a reciprocal accord allowing Spanish citizens to vote in Bolivian municipal elections and vice versa. Foreign assistance and technical cooperation, including on a potable water pet project of Morales, were themes of his visit. Bolivian Minister of Hydro-Carbons Oscar Coca and public petroleum entity president Carlos Villegas accompanied Morales. Spain also agreed to forgive Bolivia's remaining debt (estimated at about $77 million and another 5.55 million Euros),in essence canceling the debt with 70 million Euros worth of development assistance and investments. Under the debt cancellation agreement signed, 40 per cent of the money is to be invested in educational programs. At the same time, President Zapatero stressed publicly and privately the importance to Spanish business interests of having clear rules and expectations regarding nationalization of industries. Morales stressed during a September 14 breakfast the good relationship (as he described it) between Spanish petroleum company Repsol and Bolivia and expressed hope that such cooperation could also take place with other companies, provided they respect Bolivian rules. "We want partners, not owners of our natural resources," Morales stated. COMMENT: Repsol seems less than enthused with Morales. While not pulling out, it does not plan to expand operations either. End comment. ¶4. (C) Triana said the Bolivian President's visit had gone well and observed that Morales seemed to have softened his approach generally and exercised greater caution than he had previously shown. Morales was "very respectful" in reference to President Obama and Secretary Clinton and observed to Spanish interlocutors a positive change in the U.S. attitude toward Bolivia. He nonetheless accused the Pentagon of complicity in the Honduran coup and complained about Bolivia's exclusion from the Andean Trade Preferences Act. During an interview with Spanish national television TVE, Morales insisted he had information that USAID was paying for his opponents' campaign and said he hoped Embassy La Paz -- which had previously "conspired" against him -- was not "involved again in political actions." ¶5. (SBU) Morales was also vocal about U.S, military presence in Latin America, particularly access to Colombian bases. Addressing a crowd of 5,000 Bolivians on September 13, he said Bolivia would not accept foreign military bases, much less U.S. bases, on its territory. Spanish media widely quoted Morales as saying, "Where there is a U.S. military base in Latin America, there are military coups, and (the bases) don't guarantee peace or democracy." Morales asserted publicly September 14 that his government had no plans to break relations with the United States or any other country over the bases, which he nonetheless called "an excuse for the empire to control natural resources, and not to fight drug trafficking, for example." ¶6. (C) Sanchez confirmed that Bolivian President Evo Morales had sought to increase counter-narcotics cooperation with Spain and acknowledged the increasing complexity and seriousness of the problem of drug trafficking. Spain is concerned about the proliferation of coca manufacturing labs and links to organized crime. Sanchez conceded Spain wanted to help but noted not even the EU -- much less Spain alone -- had the financial and material resources to fill the gap left by the expulsion of the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) in January 2009. He suggested perhaps a "pool" of like-minded and neighboring countries could work with Bolivia, adding that Morales had also approached Brazil and others. Triana held that Morales's distrust of the DEA had a "very personal element." We have urged Spanish MFA interlocutors to support UK efforts to set up an EU working group on drugs in Bolivia and to build a multilateral group involving the UN, Brazil, and others to serve as an intelligence sharing mechanism. //HONDURAS// ¶7. (C) Both Chavez and Morales spent considerable time discussing Honduras with the Spanish and expressed skepticism about Costa Rican President Oscar Arias as a negotiator. Following meetings of EU foreign ministers in Brussels, the Council of the European Union adopted conclusions September 15 expressing deep concern over the political crisis in Honduras and the ongoing violation of the constitutional order, expressing firm support for the OAS and the efforts of Arias, and calling all parties to refrain from violence. Spain issued its own communique September 15 announcing it had revoked the visas of 10 senior Honduran officials, among them 8 members of the de facto regime. Sanchez said that First Vice President de la Vega was prepared to announce the visa measures during her August trip to the region, but Spain had delayed hoping for EU consensus and concerted action. He held that the United Kingdom had an easier time and was able to act more independently because the UK is not included in the Schengen zone. Sanchez echoed Secretary of State for IberoAmerican Affairs Juan Pablo de Laiglesia's optimism over President Zelaya's September 7 letter to Secretary Clinton (ref C) and reiterated GOS support for the San Jose Accords as the best possible path to a resolution. Sanchez planned to meet September 16 with the Honduran Chargee d'Affaires, explaining that the GOS had withdrawn the Honduran ambassador's accreditation but stopped short of stripping all diplomatic staff of their credentials. (NOTE: Iris Yolanda Reyes Alvarez assumed charge of the Honduran Embassy in Madrid on September 9, following the August 4 dismissal from their posts of Jose Eduardo Martell (ambassador) and Iris Mejia Ponce de Claveria (head of consular affairs) over their support for the de facto regiQH'*< expression and explained that what he wanted to say was that he "welcomed and respected Spain's goodwill, but that at this moment Colombia (did) not consider a mediation useful or convenient." Colombian Foreign Affairs Minister Jaime Bermudez reportedly also told Radio Caracol, "We thank Spain for its interest and willingness, but at this moment we do not believe there should be any mediation." ¶10. (C) Regarding logistical arrangements for Spanish sponsorship of approximately 200 Colombian soldiers to deploy to Afghanistan, Spanish Director General for Defense Policy General Benito Raggio speculated to Defense Attache on September 18 that his Colombian counterparts were holding off on signing a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) until the media coverage of the US Colombian basing agreement subsided. Spain is still confident that the deployment of Colombians to Afghanistan in March 2010 by way of training in Spain to begin in January, per the draft MOU, is achievable. CHACON