SCENESETTER FOR MADRID HIGH-LEVEL MEETING ON FOOD

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MADRID 000067 SIPDIS STATE/EEB FOR DAVID NELSON, BILL CRAFT, MIKE LURIE STATE/F FOR PAULA LYNCH STATE/IO FOR JOHN TUMINARO USUN ROME FOR LEE BRUDVIG, SUSAN HEINEN USAID/AFR FOR FRANKLIN MOORE, JEFF HILL USAID/DCHA FOR SUSAN BRADLEY USAID/EGAT/AG FOR JOSETTE LEWIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/16/2017 TAGS: EAGR EAID KMCA SMIG SOCI SP SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR MADRID HIGH-LEVEL MEETING ON FOOD SECURITY FOR ALL, JAN. 26-27 REF: STATE 4845 Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Arnold Chacon for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary and Comment: Embassy Madrid warmly welcomes your visit. This meeting is of great importance to Spanish President Zapatero. It is also very important for our bilateral relationship, as it is the first high-level engagement since our change of government, which the GOS hopes will lead to dramatically improved relations at the senior level. The GOS is seeking a political sign of support from the USG for Zapatero's effort to mobilize additional resources to fight hunger, and officials are willing to be flexible on details of his financial facility initiative if we can provide such a sign. Post urges the delegation to consider how to participate in a way that will lead to a successful meeting that will advance our multilateral and bilateral interests (see para. 7). End Summary and Comment. -------------- What the GOS Wants from the Meeting -------------- ¶2. (SBU) We believe there are three main reasons this meeting, referred to by its Spanish initials as the RANSA, is very important to President Zapatero. The first is humanitarian, which is a key consideration for Zapatero and his center-left Spanish Socialist Workers Party (PSOE). The second is that Spain believes addressing food security will eventually help reduce pressure for illegal immigration from western Africa. The meeting fits into a broader GOS Africa agenda that has seen it open six embassies and two foreign assistance offices in the region since early 2007. ¶3. (C) The third is the opportunity it gives Zapatero to be seen as a key player on international issues. Under Zapatero, Spain has been seen domestically as having less influence on international issues than the world's eighth largest economy should have. This is a great contrast with his predecessor, who had a close relationship with President Bush. The media played up Zapatero's failure to meet with President Bush or visit the White House until the G-20 financial summit, which he only was able to attend because of the intervention of French President Sarkozy. Typical of the unflattering coverage was a front-page photo from a NATO summit last year showing Zapatero (who does not speak English) alone in his seat during a break while several other leaders talked in the background. With Spain preparing for its EU presidency in the first half of 2010, the GOS wants to be seen as making Spain one of Europe's leaders and not one of the less important countries. A successful meeting, including participation by the UNSYG and as high-level a USG delegation as possible, would help address this concern. ¶4. (U) At the Rome Conference last June, Zapatero called for an increase in international aid and multilateral action to fight poverty and hunger. He said the GOS had provided 50 million euros ($66 million at current exchange rates) in foreign assistance, especially to Africa, since the beginning of the food crisis. Zapatero pledged 500 million euros ($655 million) in additional assistance over the next four years. He also announced the GOS' willingness to host a followup conference, which is next week's meeting. ¶5. (SBU) GOS officials have said Spain's main reason for hosting the meeting is to focus political attention on the global food crisis and ensure that the international financial crisis/economic slowdown not cause the international community to overlook the food crisis. The GOS is interested in reviewing actions taken since the Rome conference and their effectiveness, and would like to launch the consultative process to establish the Global Partnership for Agriculture and Food Security (GPAFS). It understands our views on the "right to food." The UN right-to-food envoy will give a speech during the conference, but Spanish officials have said this will not be a major focus of the meeting. ¶6. (SBU) Zapatero's proposed financial facility to generate additional resources for the fight against hunger is a key issue for the GOS. Spain's national security advisor has emphasized to us that details are very much subject to MADRID 00000067 002 OF 003 discussion. As we understand it, the facility will not be discussed prominently during the meeting, but Zapatero intends to list in his closing speech those countries that are willing to participate in the initiative and in followup technical meetings led by the UN HLTF. Both before and in response to our reactions, the GOS has repeatedly stressed that the Madrid meeting will not/not be a pledging conference and emphasized its interest in using existing mechanisms and working through the HLTF. It is hoping for countries to eventually commit $1 billion over five years, and Spain is considering a $100 million contribution. ¶7. (C) Comment: While the GOS understands that the timing of the meeting means that we will not be able to take a position on the facility, it still hopes for a positive signal from us, even if only on the general aim of mobilizing more resources to fight hunger. If we are perceived as dismissing Zapatero's efforts entirely, it would get relations with the new Administration off to a very poor start and could damage prospects for bilateral cooperation on issues such as Afghanistan. Post urges the delegation to consider ways to express support - for example, welcoming Zapatero's effort to mobilize additional resources, and/or agreeing to participate in followup technical meetings without any further commitment, and/or "merging" his initiative into the Global Partnership in some way that the GOS can claim as a victory. Active USG participation in the various sessions of the meeting also would be helpful. Post believes that these sorts of actions would contribute to a positive conference outcome that would advance our multilateral and our bilateral interests. End Comment. -------------- Political Background and Bilateral Relations -------------- ¶8. (U) President Zapatero's center-left Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE) was reelected in March 2008 and gained support over its 2004 showing. It is seven seats shy of a working majority in the congress and is usually able to pass legislation with the support of small parties. The conservative opposition Partido Popular (PP) also gained seats. ¶9. (SBU) Spain is an important ally of the U.S., and we value its cooperation. Spain's Rota and Moron military bases are valuable links in the logistics chain supporting our war efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, and Spanish troops are carrying out UN, NATO and EU missions in countries such as Lebanon, Afghanistan, Kosovo and Bosnia. The fights against terrorism and narcotics are among the cornerstones of our bilateral relationship. Spain has long fought a domestic threat from the Basque terrorist group ETA and suffered from Islamic extremist terrorism in the 2004 Al-Qaeda Madrid train bombings, which killed 191. This bombing, and efforts by the incumbent conservative government to blame ETA, may have been responsible for Zapatero's election a few days later, after which he immediately pulled Spanish troops out of Iraq, leading to a chill in high-level relations. ¶10. (SBU) Spanish officials closely followed our Presidential election and made no secret of their pleasure over the outcome. They expect relations at the senior levels of government to improve significantly. This gives us the opportunity to strengthen cooperation, and Spanish officials expect the new Administration to ask Spain to increase its contributions in Afghanistan. It also makes this meeting unusually important in setting the stage for an improved bilateral relationship. ¶11. (U) Rapidly increasing Spanish investment in the U.S. has been a positive factor in our relationship. Spain wields significant influence in Latin America, where its businesses have invested heavily. We have held sharply differing views on Cuba, as Spain believes it can encourage change via engagement with the Castro regime, but we seek the same end result. On most international issues, such as Iran and missile defense, Spain has sought to stay within the EU consensus. Spanish officials are planning for their EU Presidency in the first half of 2010. -------------- Economic Context MADRID 00000067 003 OF 003 -------------- ¶12. (U) Since Zapatero was reelected, the GOS has faced a deepening economic slump. After 15 years of rapid economic growth, the end in 2007 of a long construction boom has led to surging unemployment, now at 13 percent. Inflation peaked at 5.3 percent last summer but has fallen to 1.4 percent due to the drop in oil prices and the economic downturn, spurring concerns over possible deflation this year. The economy is in recession, having contracted in the third and (everyone assumes) fourth quarters of 2008. The GOS, which has been overly optimistic in the recent past, now expects a 1.6 percent contraction in 2009 with unemployment of more than 15 percent in 2009 and 2010. After being in surplus each year from 2004 to 2007, the budget deficit is expected to approach 6 percent this year. The economic slowdown has hurt Zapatero politically, not so much for being unable to stop it but for having been too upbeat during the 2008 election campaign and for having downplayed the economic difficulties long after many others were saying Spain was in a crisis. ¶13. (U) Spain's banks have so far weathered the international financial crisis better than their counterparts elsewhere in Europe, due in part to the Central Bank's countercyclical reserve provisioning requirements. However, Spain's domestic property crash has left banks with bad construction and real estate loans, rising unemployment has contributed to increased delinquencies, and the country's very high current account deficit makes it dependent on crossborder lending that is now scarce. Spain has begun implementing bank support measures like those elsewhere in Europe, including asset purchases, guarantees for new debt, and possible capital infusions. The GOS announced in November plans for 11 billion euros in additional spending including 8 billion for municipal government infrastructure projects. ¶14. (SBU) The medium-term economic picture remains reasonably favorable. Spain has the world's eighth largest economy and is the second largest international tourism destination and eighth largest auto manufacturer. Its per capita GDP (PPP basis) is now above Italy's. In the bilateral economic relationship, investment is more important than trade. U.S. investment has played an important role in the Spanish economy for decades, and U.S. firms employ over 200,000 Spaniards. Spanish investment in the U.S. has surged in the last few years, particularly in renewable energy, banking and toll road construction. -------------- Personal Security -------------- ¶15. (U) In general, Spain is safe. However, Madrid and other large cities attract a large number of criminals and pickpockets, and frequent incidents of crime of opportunity against the unwary do occur. It is best to carry only essential items, including a photocopy of your passport's photo page. Visitors can protect themselves against crime by being street-smart, alert, and aware of their surroundings. Travelers are encouraged to review the most recent State Department Worldwide Caution and other Consular Information Program documents, available on the Internet at http://www.travel.state.gov. Additional information regarding safety and security in Spain is available on the website www.embusa.es CHACON