SPAIN: S/GC DAN FRIED PRESENTS CASE FILES ON GTMO DETAINEES

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 MADRID 000604



NOFORN

SIPDIS



FOR EUR/WE, NEA, S/GC, INR

PASS TO NSC FOR RASMUSSEN, BRADLEY



E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/20/2024

TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PTER, PHUM, MOPS, KAWK, KISL, KPAO, SP

SUBJECT: SPAIN: S/GC DAN FRIED PRESENTS CASE FILES ON GTMO

DETAINEES



REF: A. MADRID 351

B. MADRID 551



MADRID 00000604 001.2 OF 004





Classified By: CDA Arnold A. Chacon for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)



1. (S//NF) SUMMARY: As part of ongoing engagement with the

GOS on the issue (See Ref A),Ambassador Dan Fried, the

Special Envoy for the Closure of the Guantanamo Detention

Facility (S/GC),on June 17 provided a list of four

Guantanamo Bay (GTMO) detainees' case files to an

inter-ministerial group of Spanish officials for the GOS to

consider for resettlement in Spain. Embassy Madrid

hand-delivered a fifth case file to the MFA on June 18.

Spanish officials emphasized that Spain is disposed to assist

the USG and is in solidarity with the Obama Administration on

the need to close the GTMO detention facility, but the GOS

will need to review the files on a case-by-case basis to

ensure that the individuals meet certain legal, security,

political and financial conditions. Spanish officials

indicated that the profile of detainees would be more

important to the GOS than the number accepted; it will be a

case of finding the right match. Following the June 17

meetings, President Zapatero, his First Vice President, and

FM Moratinos all made public comments emphasizing that any

detainees accepted would pose no danger to the Spanish

public. Interior Minister Rubalcaba on June 23 told

reporters in Washington DC that the GOS could accept "up to

five" GTMO detainees for resettlement. END SUMMARY.



2. (C//NF) The GOS delegation was led by two Directors

General (DGs) - Assistant Secretary equivalent - from three

ministries: Luis Felipe Fernandez de la Pena, MFA DG for

non-EU Europe and North America, and Arturo Avello, the

Ministry of Interior's DG for International Relations and

Alien Issues. The Ministry of Justice was also represented.

The detainee issue meeting occurred on the eve of Fernandez

de la Pena's June 19 meetings in Washington with EUR A/S

Philip Gordon and the NSC and Interior Minister Alfredo Perez

Rubalcaba's June 23-24 meetings in Washington with a slew of

senior USG officials (See Ref B).



//Opening Statements to Explain The Case Files//



3. (S//F) El Pais, Spain's leading daily, on June 17,

published a front page story citing GOS sources which

suggested that Spain might accept 3-5 detainees, which served

as an opening discussion point at the meeting. Ambassador

Fried expressed appreciation for the GOS availability to

discuss the issue and specifically thanked the GOS for being

consistent in its stance of offering to help the USG close

the facility. In presenting the four case files (TS-46,

TS-502, TS-892, and TS-894) and describing the fifth

(YM-252),he explained that the GOS would have essentially

the same information that the USG did when it made its

determinations about the status of these detainees. He

encouraged the GOS to make its own judgments about these five

and to let the USG know if case files of others detainees

might be more appropriate to find the right fit, although he

cautioned that there was competition for the detainees with

the least problematic profile and that the detainees would be

resettled on a first come, first served basis. Fried

emphasized that the USG was open to ongoing discussions to

address any specific questions and encouraged the GOS to be

in contact via the US Embassy in Madrid, the Spanish

Ambassador in Washington, intelligence channels, or directly

with the S/GC office.



4. (S//NF) Ambassador Fried stated that if the GOS decided it

was willing to accept detainees, the next step would be an

exchange of brief diplomatic notes in which the USG would ask

that the detainees receive humane treatment, not be

extradited to a third-country, and be subject to various

other measures, e.g., regarding travel. He added that, when

the time came, the USG would work with the GOS to provide

information that could be provided to Spain's EU and Schengen

partners about the detainees that the GOS planned to accept.

Ambassador Fried suggested the GOS ideally would respond to

the five case files (four Tunisians and a Yemeni) within two

weeks, but also highlighted that the case files of other

detainees could be provided to find the right match to suit



MADRID 00000604 002.2 OF 004





Spanish interests.



//Why the GOS Is Cooperating//



5. (S//NF) Fernandez de la Pena outlined two reasons the GOS

was supporting the USG on the detainee issue. First, he

stressed that the GOS highly values its relations with the

USG, especially at this moment of a revitalization in the

bilateral relationship, and that maintaining strong bilateral

relations is a GOS priority. He also explained the GOS

supported the closure of the GTMO detention facility because

it fits in with the Zapatero Administration's

counter-terrorism and humanitarian policies. Nevertheless,

Fernandez de la Pena commented that the GOS would study the

files carefully because the review process was more important

than timelines. He predicted that Spain might not be among

the countries to accept detainees the most quickly, but nor

would it be a laggard.



//GOS Legal Criteria//



6. (S//NF) Fernandez de la Pena stated that any detainees

that Spain accepts must have "clean" records or Spain will

have legal problems. Ambassador Fried replied that the USG

has deemed these five detainees suitable for transfer, but

acknowledged that each country has its own criteria and

emphasized that the USG will work with the GOS on this issue.

Fried acknowledged that these five are "no saints" but

neither are they hardened terrorists or ideologues. They

were living on the margins of society, had drug problems and

were recruited as low-level soldiers. Fried assured the

Spanish that the detainees were "clean" in the sense that the

USG would not be asking the GOS to incarcerate them, but

stressed that the GOS security services may well want to

monitor them. Fernandez de la Pena and Avello expressed

concern that former detainees would arrive in Spain with an

"aura" among radicalized Islamic communities, for whom the

detainees would become "icons."



//GOS Security Criteria//



7. (S//NF) Fernandez de la Pena emphasized that the GOS needs

to avoid accepting any detainees that pose a security risk to

its EU and Schengen Area partners and suggested that the GOS

might need further information from the USG in this regard.

It is important to the GOS that those detainees that it

accepts have expressed their interest to resettle in Spain, a

factor which the GOS may need in writing at a later point in

negotiations. Fernandez de la Pena described current Spanish

legislation as "toothless" in enforcing any restrictions on

the freedom of movement of resettled detainees.



//GOS Political Criteria//



8. (S//NF) Fernandez de la Pena noted that the bulk of the

case files involved Tunisians and indicated that Tunisia is

an important country for Spain, with which it enjoys close

relations. He suggested accepting Tunisian detainees could

be interpreted as Spain buying into the USG argument that

there are "compelling reasons" why the detainees should not

be returned to their home country. The Spaniard expressed

GOS concern that the issue could sour Spanish-Tunisian

bilateral ties. Fernandez de la Pena also made clear that

the GOS already had made the political decision that it would

not accept any Uighurs, so as not to disrupt ties with China.

Avello, however, expressed interest in whether there were

any case files on Uzbek detainees.



//GOS Financial Criteria//



9. (S//NF) The Spanish raised the issue of what financial

contributions the USG was prepared to make on an ad-hoc basis

to cover costs associated with the resettlement process.

Ambassador Fried replied that the USG was prepared to discuss

the issue, but highlighted that the DOD has limited funds for

this and that recent press coverage suggesting that Palau was

given $200 million to accept 13 detainees was wildly off the

mark. Noting that the GOS is not a poor country, Fried

suggested $85,000 per person was a more likely figure to help

defray certain actual costs.



MADRID 00000604 003.2 OF 004







//Detainees' Connection to Spain//



10. (S//NF) Asked if any of the five detainees had a

connection to Spain, Ambassador Fried replied that they did

not. Some had connections to Italy, their experiences there

had not been satisfactory ones. Fernandez de la Pena likened

detainees prospective connection to Spain to a "double-edged

sword." He said it would be a good selling point to the

public to be able to say that they did have a Spanish

connection, but if they did then Spain would run the risk of

one of the GTMO "icons" radicalizing Spain's Muslim

community.



//The Role of NGOs//



11. (S//NF) Fernandez de la Pena indicated that the GOS had

been approached by a number of NGOs - including UK-based

Reprieve - which have sought to act as intermediaries for

certain detainees. He added that the GOS response has been

that the USG had not yet made any specific requests regarding

specific cases. Ambassador Fried encouraged the GOS to

approach the S/GC office and ask if what the Spanish are

hearing from lawyers or NGOs is accurate.



//Universal Jurisdiction//



12. (S//NF) Fernandez de la Pena noted that Lakhdar

Boumediene, the former detainee recently resettled in France,

had announced his intentions to sue the USG. Asked if the

USG assessed that this would become a pattern, Ambassador

Fried replied that perhaps so, but the USG cannot do anything

about that and will proceed with the resettlement of

detainees. In a brief follow-on meeting with the US

delegation, Deputy FM Angel Lossada re-confirmed Spanish

willingness to be helpful and noted that Madrid was taking

steps to limit the future ability of resettled detainees

citing Spain's "universal jurisdiction" laws, to sue the USG.





//The Role of the Media//



13. (S//NF) Both Fernandez de la Pena and Lossada stressed

the GOS's preference in keeping discussions on the detainee

resettlement issue - especially the numbers of case files and

nationalities of detainees - out of the media, to which Fried

and Embassy Madrid readily agreed. Nevertheless, within half

an hour of the U.S. delegation's departure from the MFA, FM

Moratinos told a press conference the number of files

provided to the GOS and detailed the context of the

discussions. President Zapatero and First Vice President

Maria Teresa Fernandez de la Vega also voiced their support

for engaging with the US on this issue. Meanwhile, following

a phone call with Fried, Congressman Gustavo de Aristegui, a

foreign affairs expert in the center-right Popular Party, the

primary opposition party, also publicly voiced his support

for GOS efforts to accept detainees. By June 22, the Spanish

media, citing GOS sources, had identified the nationalities

of all five detainees. Interior Minister Rubalcaba on June

23 told reporters in Washington DC that the GOS could accept

"up to five" GTMO detainees for resettlement.



//Comment//



14. (S//NF) Ambassador Fried's meeting took discussions with

the Spanish on this issue to the next step - going from the

general discussions to providing specific case files for them

to review. In this meeting, the Spanish showed they are

serious about the issue and are inclined to follow-through on

their stated goodwill. The Zapatero Administration's public

remarks are likely the initial stages of a public diplomacy

campaign designed to lay the groundwork for the Spanish

public's acceptance of the eventual resettlement in Spain of

some detainees. Embassy Madrid believes the USG would be

well served by refraining from making public statements about

our specific discussions with the GOS on this issue and

instead keeping the focus on generalities and appreciation

for Spain's willingness to discuss options. While Post is

aware of Spanish press reports suggesting that "at least two"

of the Tunisians may be unacceptable to the GOS because of



MADRID 00000604 004.2 OF 004





their criminal backgrounds, Post has not yet heard any

official response to the case files from the GOS.



15. (U) This cable was cleared by Ambassador Fried.

CHACON