INTERAGENCY DECISION NEEDED ON PALOMARES RESPONSE TO GOS

C O N F I D E N T I A L MADRID 000432



SIPDIS



STATE FOR EUR/WE, EUR/RPM, EUR/PRA, ISN, OES/PCI, OES/S/IHB

NSC FOR TOBIN BRADLEY

DOE FOR PWORTHINGTON, GPETERSON, BFOUNTOS

DOD FOR OSD, OGC, J-4, J-5/POL-MIL FOR TPAWLOWSKI, WMACKIE,

OSD/IE FOR CBOWLING, WNICHOLLS, OSD/ISA FOR MSADOWSKA



E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/29/2019

TAGS: KGCN, KRAD, PARM, PGOV, PREL, SENV, SP

SUBJECT: INTERAGENCY DECISION NEEDED ON PALOMARES RESPONSE

TO GOS



REF: 06 MADRID 2853



Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Arnold Chacon for Reasons 1(b) and (d)



Summary and Action Request

--------------

1.(C) The GOS has for several months been seeking USG

interlocutors to discuss final cleanup of radiation

contamination at the Palomares site. In a March 16

diplomatic note, it asked for names of USG officials who

would participate in a working group to consider future

collaboration on site cleanup. Documents available to post

give no indication that the USG has ever formally committed

to fund a final cleanup. However, the contamination is the

result of a 1966 accident between two U.S. military aircraft.

For over four decades, DOE and its predecessor agency have

helped fund GOS health and environmental monitoring, and DOE

has helped fund a recently-completed GOS study of remaining

contamination. GOS officials have indicated for some years

that they expect USG assistance in funding cleanup costs, and

they plan to seek disposal of additional contaminated soil in

the U.S.



2.(C) Post believes that an interagency policy decision,

likely involving the NSC, is needed on what the USG as a

whole should do )- not just what any individual agency is

legally obligated to do. Should the USG decide not to help

fund a cleanup, we anticipate GOS surprise, significant

negative publicity, and some negative impact on other areas

of our bilateral relationship. Post recommends that the USG

respond positively to the GOS diplomatic note and assure

Spanish officials that the USG interagency has the matter

under consideration and will respond appropriately. End

Summary and Action Request.



Background

--------------

3.(U) On January 17, 1966, a USAF B-52 carrying four

plutonium-uranium 235 hydrogen bombs from Johnson AFB

collided with a USAF KC-135 tanker aircraft based at the

Spanish base of Moron during refueling above Spain,s

southeastern coast. The collision killed seven of the two

planes, 11 airmen and resulted in three bombs falling near

the town of Palomares and one in the Mediterranean off the

nearby coastal town of Villaricos. The non-nuclear

detonation of two of the bombs resulted in the dispersal of

plutonium contamination across 558 acres of the Palomares

area.



4.(U) In the following months, DOD and the GOS conducted a

cleanup of the affected areas. An estimated 1,400 tons of

radioactive soil and vegetation were excavated and sent to

the United States for disposal at the Savannah River site in

South Carolina. After the cleanup, the GOS expropriated the

affected areas and restricted their use. In the February

1966 Hall-Otero Agreement, the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission

(AEC) agreed to provide technical assistance to the Spanish

Junta de Energia Nuclear in investigating health and safety

aspects of the accident.



5.(U) Since then, the USG has assisted GOS monitoring

efforts, with DOE (the successor agency to the AEC) and its

predecessor agency paying a portion of the costs of annual

medical testing of all residents. A 1997 Implementing

Agreement between DOE and the GOS scientific research agency

CIEMAT outlined health and environmental monitoring

cooperation. In Project Annex I to the Implementing

Agreement, signed at the same time, DOE committed to pay 25%

of CIEMAT,s annual costs for environmental and medical

monitoring, up to $300,000, as well as $50,000 for a program

review.



Seeking to Finish the Program

--------------

6.(SBU) As we understand it, lead agencies in both

governments would like to end the program. DOE has spent

over $3 million on Palomares in the last decade alone.

CIEMAT would like a final cleanup, especially as measurements

in 2001 led it to believe that remaining contamination might

be more serious than previously believed. Cost may also be a

factor in CIEMAT,s eyes; it has said it has about 100

employees working an average of half their time on Palomares

issues. In addition, growth in the Palomares area over the

last decade has led to pressure from the local government and



developers who would like to construct housing on the site,

which is near the coast. (Spain,s current housing slump and

construction collapse may reduce this pressure in the short

term, but CIEMAT remains very interested in a final cleanup.)





7.(SBU) Reftel discusses in detail the events that led to DOE

and CIEMAT agreeing on a project to map contamination in the

area, the results of which were to be used to recommend a

final cleanup plan if needed. In a 2006 Project Annex II and

a 2007 Project Annex III to the Implementing Agreement, DOE

agreed to contribute $1.983 million to support this project

(as well as continued environmental monitoring). In Annex

III, DOE committed to help CIEMAT contact the Department of

Defense six months before completion of the mapping project.

After a July 2008 DOE visit in which preliminary project

findings were discussed, DOE and CIEMAT agreed to begin

discussions with their respective militaries. As we

understand it, September 2008 conversations between

individuals at DOE and USAF were inconclusive. In November,

CIEMAT sought to contact DOD directly, but was discouraged

from doing so. CIEMAT also has discussed with DOE its intent

to seek International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA) review

of the eventual final version of its cleanup plan, which it

envisions will include USG input; an IAEA visit is scheduled

for June. The cost of the final cleanup will depend upon

what is determined to be necessary.



Next Steps ) Interagency Decisions Needed

--------------

8.(SBU) The study was completed in December, and the GOS

would like to begin talks on a final cleanup plan. In a

March 16 diplomatic note, it asked for names of USG officials

who would participate in a working group to define

responsibilities for cleanup. We understand that Washington

agencies are considering how to respond to that note. We

expect that the GOS will ask the USG to fund at least part of

the cleanup costs and dispose of additional contaminated soil

in the U.S. We see at least two issues to be addressed:



1) Which agency within the USG has the lead on the issue?



2) Is the USG willing to consider paying for at least some of

the cleanup costs and disposing of additional contaminated

soil in the U.S.?



DOE officials have stated to GOS officials that any support

for final cleanup is not a responsibility of DOE but of DOD.

Post is not aware that DOD agrees that it has responsibility.

Post believes that interagency consideration of these

questions, likely with NSC involvement, will be necessary.



No Legal Obligation for Cleanup?

--------------

9.(SBU) Post is not aware of any documents indicating that

the USG has committed to help fund a final cleanup. (We have

seen one reference in a low-value 1969 USG-GOS contract to an

assurance by General Wilson )- we assume Major General

Delmar Wilson, who was in charge of initial accident response

-- that the USG would defray &all expenses caused by the

accident,8 but the contract contains no information on what

this assurance covered.) The Hall-Otero Agreement refers to

&a previously contaminated rural area that has been

decontaminated in accordance with mutually agreed upon

decontamination limits and procedures,8 and contains no

reference to additional cleanup efforts. However, it is

clear that, as a result of advances in scientific knowledge

of what contamination levels are acceptable, further testing,

and the preliminary results of the mapping project,

additional cleanup is now considered necessary. The 2006

Project Annex II and 2007 Project Annex III state that

nothing in them constitutes a commitment by either party to

undertake or fund any cleanup activity.



But an Expectation

--------------

10.(SBU) CIEMAT has for several years expressed its

expectation that the USG will support a final cleanup effort

and, more recently, its desire to send additional

contaminated soil to the U.S. for disposal. Reftel describes

how events in 2005 and 2006 contributed to this expectation

of USG support, which we believe has been reinforced by

continued contacts over the past two years. Stories in the

Spanish press also have contributed to this perception.





What if We Say No?

--------------

11.(C) If the USG decides not to engage in this effort, we

anticipate a significant negative reaction, from the GOS and

from the Spanish public and press. (We expect that the U.S.

press, which occasionally writes followup stories, also would

be interested.) We assume other areas of our bilateral

relationship would be affected, but we do not have a sense

for the extent of any reaction. The political and public

focus will not be on whether the USG ever explicitly or

implicitly made any commitments. Instead, it will be on USG

unwillingness to help finish cleaning up contamination caused

by U.S. weapons that fell from USAF airplanes. Post

recommends that the USG respond positively to the GOS

diplomatic note and assure Spanish officials that the USG

interagency has the matter under consideration and will

respond appropriately.

CHACON