SPAIN PROVIDES ITS VIEWS, PRIORITIES ON NUCLEAR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MADRID 000179 SIPDIS PASS TO EUR/WE FOR ELAINE SAMSON AND STACIE ZERDECKI DEPARTMENT PASS TO NPT COLLECTIVE ISN/MNSA FOR SCOTT DAVIS INR FOR JANICE BELL UNVIE FOR IAEA GENEVA FOR CD DELEGATION UNSUN FOR POL USNATO FOR POL USEU FOR POL E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/19/2019 TAGS: AORC CDG ENRG KNNP MNUC PARM PGOV PREL UNGA IAEA, NPT, SP SUBJECT: SPAIN PROVIDES ITS VIEWS, PRIORITIES ON NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY REF: A. SECSTATE 06970 ¶B. 07 MADRID 807 ¶C. 08 MADRID 957 ¶D. 06 MADRID 2343 MADRID 00000179 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: DCM William H. Duncan for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY AND COMMENT: Carlos Torres, MFA Counselor for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, on February 13 replied to Post's faxed list of questions from Reftel A, paragraph 8, with more than two typed pages of answers. He noted that the GOS answers had been cleared by MFA Special Ambassador for Disarmament Miguel Aguirre de Carcer. Below are the GOS answers to the questions in the order in which they appeared in REFTEL A. END SUMMARY AND COMMENT. ¶2. (C) Q: What are the host government's objectives for the NPT in general, and for the current review process in particular? A: In regard to the NPT in general, Spain wants it to move forward in a balanced manner on the three pillars: nonproliferation, nuclear disarmament and cooperation on the peaceful use of nuclear energy. There are shortfalls or challenges regarding each of the three pillars. (1) On nonproliferation, the clear dangers presented by Iran and North Korea are being managed through diplomatic channels and UNSC Resolutions. We fully support these efforts. We are also concerned over potential nuclear weapons use by terrorists and support all nonproliferation regimes. We therefore feel that we must continue along the same path we are already on. (2) Regarding nuclear disarmament, we are looking for new progress. There is much theoretical discussion of doctrine and calls from specialists and former leaders clearly advocating significant nuclear arsenal reductions. Russia and the U.S. bear the principal responsibility and we would like them to reach new agreements, particularly, post-START and new arsenal reductions. (3) Although we acknowledge the associated proliferation risks, we must acknowledge all countries, right to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. We support strengthening IAEA capabilities to appropriately deal with these new needs, and the Additional Protocol is an essential instrument to provide guarantees of peaceful uses. Regarding the 2010 review process, our principal focus is that we will be in the EU Presidency during the April-May 2010 Conference. We are already in contact with the Czech EU Presidency to work together during the Third and last PrepCom in May 2009 in New York. (COMMENT: See REFTEL B for the GOS' thoughts on the May 2009 PrepCom as of June 2007. END COMMENT). In this capacity, we want to try as much as we can to help the Conference be successful, and not repeat the failure of 2005. We know it will not be easy. Notwithstanding the fact that the EU contains varied sensitivities regarding the NPT, it has always firmly supported effective multilateralism. Therefore, we will work to intensify the dialog with the main NPT players to achieve a substantive result in the 2010 Conference. Of course, in our work towards a positive result we cannot renounce the EU's basic positions, which are well know (declarations at 2005 Review Conference and documents presented at the First PrepCom in 2007). ¶3. (C) Q: What policies or actions regarding the NPT does the host government hope to see from the United States? A: Initial indications, in particular declarations by Secretary of State Clinton at her Senate confirmation, are certainly positive. Prompt ratification of the CTBT by the U.S. would be very well received and could help to break the deadlock in some multilateral fora, as would also an agreement with Russia before December 2009 to extend the most important parts (verification) of START. We additionally MADRID 00000179 002.2 OF 003 trust that talks will be started to achieve additional reductions of both countries' nuclear arsenals. We are also awaiting decision by the Obama Administration on deployment of the anti-missile system in the Czech Republic and Poland and, consequently, the possibility of moving toward some new type of ABM treaty. 4 (C) Q: What does the host government believe would represent a successful outcome to the current NPT cycle ending with the 2010 Review Conference? How important is it for Parties to reach consensus on substantive matters? A: A consensus on substantive issues would certainly be very important for a successful 2010 Conference. It is not a matter of trying to achieve this at any price. It is clear that all countries, including the EU, have "red lines" beyond which they are not willing to go. However, the objective should no doubt be to try to reach consensus on a document or be very close to one, "consensus minus one or two." To do so, it seems clear that "balanced" progress needs to be made on the three NPT pillars. Another matter is that this progress may be perceived or assessed differently by the different country groups, but if progress is actually made, it should be possible to try to set it forth in a consensus document. Probably one of the most difficult areas will be the implementation of the 1995 Declaration of the Middle East. The situation in the region and the history of previous Review Conferences do not offer much room for optimism. But, even so, we must try to find a way for the rest of the process not to be kept from advancing. ¶5. (C) Q: Does the host government believe that NPT parties should take action to address the NPT issues described below? If so, what actions would it support? -- Noncompliance with the NPT, e.g., on the part of Iran and North Korea? A: We share the concerns of the U.S. and our other partners and Allies. We fully support the 5 1 and the Six-Party negotiations taking place. We hope it will be possible to reach a diplomatic solution in both cases. ¶6. (C) Q: The prospect of Parties violating and then withdrawing from the Treaty? ¶A. We must find a formula to keep the IAEA inspection capabilities in place even after withdrawal from the NPT. ¶7. (C) Q: The lack of NPT universality? ¶A. We obviously support accession by all countries to the NPT and adherence to its principles. Even though an ad hoc formula for India has been found following its strategic agreement with the U.S., we cannot abstain from demanding that India and other countries in a similar situation join the NPT. (COMMENT: See REFTELS C and D for more on this.) ¶8. (C) Q: The lack of universality of NPT safeguards agreements and the Additional Protocol? A: We also advocate the universality of both types of agreements with the IAEA. We hesitate to create specific, differentiated procedures on a country-by-country basis. We have maintained that if safeguards are not established by an Additional Protocol with the IAEA, they still should be identical to same. ¶9. (C) Q: The spread of enrichment and reprocessing capabilities to additional countries? ¶A. (COMMENT: This question was not answered. END COMMENT.) ¶10. (C) Q: Fulfilling the Treaty's obligation for the fullest possible international cooperation for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy consistent with the Treaty's MADRID 00000179 003.2 OF 003 nonproliferation obligations. A: It is clearly a right of every NPT signatory State and therefore should be fully abided by. Again, we must provide the IAEA with the needed capability to verify that nuclear energy use is exclusively devoted to civilian uses. ¶11. (C) Q: Fulfilling the Treaty's obligations to pursue negotiations relating to nuclear disarmament? A: We consider that the nuclear disarmament aspirations of the large majority of countries of the international community have not been fulfilled, although there important advances have been made, such as START and SORT. Russia and the U.S. have the prime responsibility in this area. Therefore, we would like new negotiations to begin as soon as possible to advance the goals of nuclear disarmament. ¶12. (C) Q: Transparency on the part of nuclear weapon states with regard to their nuclear weapons forces and policies? A: We do not think this is an especially relevant or urgent matter at this time. Much has changed since the secrecy that prevailed during the Cold War. New transparency measures would always be welcome but do not seem to be a major priority. CHACON