S/I SATTERFIELD MEETING WITH SPANISH PRESIDENCY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MADRID 000170

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/WE, NEA/I, NEA/IR

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/28/2019
TAGS: PREL PINR IZ IR SP
SUBJECT: S/I SATTERFIELD MEETING WITH SPANISH PRESIDENCY
SECGEN BERNARDINO LEON ON FEBRUARY 12

MADRID 00000170 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: Charge D'Affaires Arnold Chacon for reasons 1.4 (b) and
(d)


1. (C) SUMMARY. Ambassador Satterfield, accompanied by
Charge, briefed Spanish Secretary General of the Presidency,
Bernardino Leon, on recent developments in Iraq, as well as
Iraq's regional engagement with Arab states on February 12.
Referring to the February 11 meeting (reported septel) in
which he asked FM Moratinos for Spanish participation in the
NATO Training Mission-Iraq (NTM-I),Satterfield asked Leon if
President Zapatero would consider the request and received an
affirmative response. Leon said Spain would focus on Middle
East policy during its EU Presidency and seek alternatives to
the MEPP Quartet process that bred resentment among smaller
EU countries. Leon also offered a readout of Iranian Speaker
of Parliament Ali Larijani's February 9th meetings with
President Zapatero and FM Moratinos in Madrid. According to
Leon, Zapatero was unequivocal on the need for Iran to end
its nuclear program. Zapatero told Larijani that destructive
messages on Israel should stop. Zapatero said that Iran
should take advantage of the U.S. opening and have trust in
the new administration, emphasizing "the ball in is Iran's
court, you (Iran) now need to show your willingness and
determination." END SUMMARY.


2. (C) Ambassador Satterfield, accompanied by Charge,
briefed Spanish Secretary General of the Presidency,
Bernardino Leon, on recent developments in Iraq, as well as
Iraq's regional engagement with Arab states on February 12.
Referring to the February 11 meeting (reported septel) in
which he asked FM Moratinos for Spanish participation in the
NATO Training Mission-Iraq (NTM-I),Satterfield asked Leon if
President Zapatero would consider the request. Leon said
yes, and elaborated that he had just completed final edits on
Zapatero's first speech on Spain's EU Presidency objectives
for January-June 2010. Leon added that the Middle East would
continue to be a major focus area for Spain and, "the Spanish
EU Presidency is an opportunity to leave old debates about
Iraq behind; this is the moment to transform Spain's
political involvement as well." Ambassador Satterfield
expressed appreciation for Spain's Iraqi judicial training
efforts and noted that an additional NTM-I component would be
highly valued. (Note: Calling the Charge later in the day on
a different matter, Leon mentioned that he had spoken with
Moratinos after meeting with Satterfield, and he confirmed
that the NTM-I proposal was getting a positive reception.
End note.)

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SPANISH INTENTIONS FOR ITS JANUARY-JUNE 2010 EU PRESIDENCY
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3. (C) With reference to the EU Presidency, Leon said that
many small EU countries resented the Middle East Peace
Process Quartet. After recent meetings in Egypt, several
countries protested to the Czech FM that it was inappropriate
in the EU framework to have the perception of an "exclusive
club handling peace process issues. At the same time, Leon
acknowledged that the EU-27 was unwieldy, so some new format
would have to emerge. His team would be formulating ideas to
be implemented during Spain's EU Presidency, building on
Sweden's efforts during July-December 2009. Leon realized
that two-thirds of the Presidency effort would be spent on
internal EU political dynamics, but estimated that his team
would spend a third of their effort on international policy.

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IRAN: READ-OUT OF LARIJANI VISIT TO MADRID
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4. (C) Leon shared details about Iranian Speaker of
Parliament Ali Larijani's February 9th meetings with
President Zapatero and FM Moratinos in Madrid. According to
Leon, during Larijani's forty-minute session with Zapatero,
he had the sense that Larijani was only revealing glimpses of
what might have been his real thinking. Larijani was very
cautious about not making any policy commitments. Similarly,
when the Spanish pressed for one-on-one meeting formats,
Larijani demurred and insisted on being accompanied by others
in his delegation. Larijani said that Iran "liked the music"
of U.S. willingness to engage in direct talks, but that it
didn't see a specific course ahead. When Zapatero said that
Iran should take advantage of the U.S. opening and have trust
in the new administration, he emphasized, "the ball in is
Iran's court, you now need to show your willingness and
determination." In Leon's opinion, Larijani was very

MADRID 00000170 002.2 OF 002


diffuse in his response and it was difficult to accurately
gauge Iranian intentions.


5. (C) Describing Iran as having a "souk mentality", Leon
said that internally, Iran had different schools of thought
on its nuclear programs. Given Iranians ingrained need to
negotiate, they automatically default to bargaining, even
over the start of talks. They needed to receive an opening
offer that allowed them to show the electorate that they were
achieving gains over the U.S. to enhance their prestige.
Leon agreed with Satterfield that Iranian negotiating teams
were often comprised of individuals lacking empowerment to
take decisions; they only presented tightly scripted
dialogues without the ability to move the process forward.
The Iranian system made it difficult to access true power
centers and frustrated diplomatic efforts.


6. (C) According to Leon, Zapatero was unequivocal on the
need for Iran to end its nuclear program. He said that Iran
wouldn't find any sympathy in Europe for enrichment
activities. If Iran's intention was truly only civil use of
nuclear power, then it should utilize the P5 1 process to
achieve its goals. Zapatero also told Larijani that Iran
needed a constructive and intelligent policy - force was not
helpful. If Iran showed it could be a positive actor, it
could be viewed as a partner. Zapatero said that destructive
messages on Israel should stop.


7. (C) Larijani said that the Iranians believed that the
U.S. should change its Afghanistan policy and place less
emphasis on Pakistan. In Iran's opinion, al-Qaeda was
gaining strength; Pakistan was deteriorating and unreliable,
Leon said Larijani implied that the U.S. should foster an
alliance with Iran instead of further engagement with
Pakistan. Satterfield said that was ironic given Iranian
support for radical elements in Afghanistan, including the
Taliban - actions speak louder than words. Leon said Iran
seemed to be seeking a partnership with the U.S. in Iraq.
Satterfield said that it was difficult to envision any such
Iranian goal, when Iran used Iraq as a platform to project
its power elsewhere and ultimately sought U.S. defeat and
humiliation that would raise Iran's influence in consequence.
Addressing Iranian influence more broadly, Leon said that
in his impression, Hizballah learned its lesson in 2006 --
that links with Iran were not helpful -- and that Hamas had
similar concerns about Iran's negative capacity to destroy.
On Gaza, Larijani told Zapatero that Iran would focus on
humanitarian efforts and reconstruction, claiming that the
Palestinian Authority kept Gaza as a "huge refugee camp" to
serve its own purposes. Zapatero stressed the need for
political reconciliation among the Palestinians.


8. (C) COMMENT: As we have heard from various sources,
Spain,s interest in the NTM-I proposal appears genuine, but
they will want to be asked at a senior level from Washington.
Spain,s interest in close consultations with the U.S. on
issues such as Iran, Middle East peace, and Latin America is
genuine, but Washington should be aware that Spain,
especially FM Moratinos, is sometimes overeager for the role
of intermediary. In availing ourselves of Spain,s insights
on and contacts in these regions, we will need to be clear
about we do and do not want them to do. END COMMENT.


9. (U) This cable was cleared by S/I Satterfield.
CHACON