SPAIN/CUBA: TITLE III OF THE LIBERTAD ACT

C O N F I D E N T I A L MADRID 001121 SIPDIS FOR JARAHN HILLSMAN, WHA/CCA USEU FOR BARBARA THOMAS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/20/2019 TAGS: CU ETRD ETTC PREL SP SUBJECT: SPAIN/CUBA: TITLE III OF THE LIBERTAD ACT REF: A. STATE 115416 ¶B. MADRID 483 ¶C. MADRID 920 ¶D. MADRID 983 ¶E. HAVANA 683 ¶F. HAVANA 639 Classified By: Acting DCM William H. Duncan, for reasons 1.4(b) and (d) . ¶1. (C) Per request in reftel A, Post provides the following for use in assessing whether to recommend that the President continue to suspend Title III of the Cuban Liberty and Solidarity (Libertad) Act. The information in this message is keyed to questions posed in reftel A, paragraph 4 and updates information reported in reftel B regarding the relationship between the Cuban government and the Government of Spain. ¶2. (SBU) Foreign Minister Miguel Angel Moratinos was the highest-ranking Spanish official to visit Cuba during the period covered by this report. The visit (refs E, F),the subsequent "release" of two political prisoners, and the ongoing debate about Spain's efforts to replace the EU's Common Position are the key factors in evaluating Spanish contributions to democratic change in Cuba during this period. Speculation that was rife during the first half of 2009 over a possible visit to Cuba by Spanish President Zapatero had all but dissipated at the end of the summer, in the wake of Cuba's expulsion in May of a team of Spanish intelligence agents and as the GOS anticipated changes in United States policy toward Cuba and toward its own EU presidency in 2010. Asked about an anticipated trip by President Zapatero to Cuba, Moratinos said October 18 that given the exigencies of the EU Presidency, a Zapatero visit was not anticipated in the near future. ¶3. (C) Has the host country, in Post's opinion, worked to promote the advancement of democracy and human rights in Cuba? The Spanish Government supports democratic objectives in Cuba. Nonetheless, its focus on building relationships and its fear of both provoking a backlash against human rights activists and jeopardizing Spanish economic interests limit Spain's willingness to take tough stands against the regime. With the European Union, Spain continues to seek political and economic engagement with Cuba and to play a leadership role in the EU's political and human rights dialogue with Cuba. During the period covered by this report, Spanish officials alluded to Spain's hopes for even greater EU-Cuba engagement during Spain's EU presidency in the first half of 2010. FM Moratinos has spoken increasingly of the possibility of replacing the EU's 1990 Common Position toward Cuba during the Spanish EU presidency. Spain is expected to encourage the EU27 to start negotiating an alternative cooperation agreement with Cuba, to include a "democratic clause" and requirements with regard to Human Rights and Rule of Law, as a precursor to eliminating the Common Position. (NOTE: A bi-partisan, non-binding roadmap for the Spanish presidency agreed to November 18 makes no mention of Cuba, however.) ¶4. (C) MFA officials claim the Zapatero Administration remains committed to the spirit of the Common Position but Spain seeks to initiate an EU process to find a new way to relate to Cuba that includes a political dialogue conditioned on results. Though the European Commission would decide among various forms of accords, the GOS says a new country strategy paper with a democratic clause that puts everything on the table would be stricter than the existing Common Position. FM Moratinos testified in the Senate on November 17 that not a single EU country had spoken against his intention to replace the Common Position on Cuba during Spain's EU Presidency. According to Moratinos, some other European countries might try to make adjustments, but the Spanish proposal -- to negotiate a bilateral EU-Cuba agreement that would lead to greater Cuban compliance with human rights and engagement on reform activities -- was not encountering any opposition. ¶5. (C) Following Spanish Foreign Minister Moratinos's October 17-19 trip to Havana, reportedly as a concession to the GOS, Cuba announced October 20 the release of two individuals and eased travel restrictions for two prominent dissidents seeking medical attention. Moratinos claimed publicly that the releases were proof that Spain,s policy of engagement achieved positive results. Cuba commuted the sentence (already half completed) of Nelson Aguiar, aged 64, one of the Group of 75 condemned in 2003. Spanish businessman Pedro Hermosilla, detained several weeks earlier in Havana on bribery charges, was released on bail the night of October 19, reportedly at the request of Moratinos. Lazaro Angulo, another of the Group of 75, had been granted provisional release in 2006 for health reasons but was prevented from leaving Cuba. As of October 20, Angulo was "free without conditions" (presumably to seek medical care in Costa Rica or the Untied States). A fourth individual, Elsa Morejon, the wife of imprisoned activist Dr. Oscar Biscet, who already had a GOC-issued health exit permit, was allowed by her handlers to travel in search of medical treatment. (She has been under a doctor's care in Oviedo since November 3.) Post's dissident contacts called the Moratinos trip and subsequent news of the releases "absurd" and "stingy" (cochinilla) and dismissed the lessening of restrictions on Angulo's and Morejon's movement, saying the Cuban government had no right to prevent free people from pursuing medical care. Asked whether the MFA felt it could take credit for the "releases" and whether Spain was satisfied, Director General for IberoAmerican Affairs Juan Carlos Sanchez Alonso conceded they were insufficient but "better than nothing." Cuba wanted to send a message and the GOS, though it wants all the prisoners to be released, encouraged the Cuban government to allow the sickest of the prisoners to leave. ¶6. (C) Has the host country made public statements or undertaken other governmental actions, such as resolutions in national assemblies condemning human rights abuses in Cuba; or actions in support of civil society in Cuba through the host country's diplomatic missions or other fora? President Zapatero publicly supported U.S. overtures toward Cuba on May 24, saying it was up to Raul Castro to make the next move. GOS officials have been generally supportive of U.S. policy initiatives, sometimes suggesting the United States is becoming more like Spain in its approach to Cuba. Referencing the June 3 resolution to lift the 47-year-old suspension of Cuba in the OAS, MFA State Secretary for Latin America Juan Pablo de Laiglesia commented June 4, "We think it is an important step for the strengthening of the inter-American system, and to overcome situations that took place under circumstances that are not the current ones." Before the Senate Commission for Latin American Affairs on June 9, FM Moratinos opined that the U.S. decision to "accept Cuba" (at the OAS) was in line with what Spain had always proposed: continued dialogue with Cuban authorities amid mutual respect. Moratinos commented, "We do not follow Washington. When the U.S. has the same policy as the GOS, we congratulate ourselves, we support it, and we go with it. But we don't subordinate ourselves, as the previous (PP) government did on an issue as important to Spain as Cuba." Moratinos outlined GOS policy on Cuba, claiming Spain pressed Cuba to release 12 political prisoners, engage with the international community, and open a dialogue with the U.S. on immigration and humanitarian aid issues. ¶7. (SBU) Secretary of State for IberoAmerican Affairs de Laiglesia testified June 23 before the congressional Commission of Foreign Affairs that Spain believed the rest of the EU, Latin American governments, and the Obama Administration supported GOS policy of "critical dialogue" with Cuba. De Laiglesia stated the GOS preferred not to judge the decisions made by Latin American countries and favored a policy of respect over a judgmental "policy of declarations." De Laiglesia told the commission there were noticeable reforms under Raul Castro, including a reduction in the number of political prisoners and the absence of new harassment measures against the Cuban opposition, directly attributable to the GOS decision to re-open communications with Cuba in 2004. ¶8. (C) Coupled with Moratinos's subsequent meeting in Madrid with Adriana Perez and Olga Salanueva, spouses of Gerardo Hernandez and Rene Gonzalez, two of five Cuban citizens sentenced in 2001 in the United States for serving as unregistered agents of the Cuban government, Moratinos's refusal to engage with civil society while in Havana drew harsh criticism from human rights activists. A group of 37 Cuban political prisoners released a statement October 26 criticizing Spain's policy toward Cuba, stating that FM Moratinos showed "disrespect" to the peaceful opposition by ignoring the group's request for a meeting during his recent visit. The group thanked the GOS for its efforts resulting in the release of political prisoner Nelson Aguiar, but warned that the gesture should not be taken as a "general willingness for change in general by the Cuban government, and should not merit changes in the Spanish and EU policy toward Cuba." By way of response, Moratinos pointed out that other prisoners have thanked the Spanish Ambassador to Cuba for GOS efforts and that the GOS is working for improvement on the island. Asked October 18 why he did not meet with Cuban dissidents, Moratinos responded that he did not come to meet with any one sector of society in particular but to strengthen bilateral relations, and he said that no one is his delegation would be meeting with the opposition or dissidents. MFA DG for IberoAmerican Affairs Sanchez Alonso told POLOFF October 29 that Moratinos knew of Cuban plans to liberate prisoners and did not want to risk their release over contentious discussions with the Cubans about where he could go and who he could see. The GOS did not make a formal offer to meet with dissidents, but Sanchez Alonso asserted they had unlimited access to the Spanish mission in Havana. He said Spain's political counselor talked to them (see also ref E),saying perhaps that was not the level of interaction the dissidents (none of whom had been elected and who did not represent all of Cuban society) would have preferred. ¶9. (C) Have there been any high-level diplomatic visits between Cuba and the host country in the past six months? --Representatives of Spanish autonomous community and local governments visit Cuba often and maintain contacts and collaborative relationships. The Cuban government encourages and facilitates relations with the autonomous communities, especially with the Basque Country and to a lesser extent with Andalucia, Galicia, Castilla-La Mancha, and the Canary Islands. Catalonian Vice President Josep Lluis Carod-Rovira, of the independence-minded Republican Left of Catalonia (ERC) party, visited Havana July 5-7 on a cultural trip entitled "The Catalan Footprint in the Caribbean," part of a longer trip in which Carod-Rovira visited Catalan communities in the Dominican Republic and Puerto Rico. Carod made public comments to Cubans of Catalonian decent, visited the Cuban Parliament and met the President of the Parliament, Ricardo Alarcon. -- Elena Valenciano, PSOE International Relations Secretary, announced in August she would lead a delegation to Cuba in October to assess the situation, and reach out to new interlocutors in the Cuban government and the Cuban Communist Party. Valenciano made no promises to meet with dissidents. Secretary of State de Laiglesia stressed to the Charge in September that Valenciano would be traveling in a political capacity and representing the Socialist Party, not/not the GOS (ref C). NOTE: The trip never took place, however. -- FM Moratinos earned the Wall Street Journal title of "Castro,s Man in Europe" upon visiting the island October 17-19. The trip had as stated objectives to reinforce political dialogue, promote bilateral dialogue, to inform Cuban Foreign Minister Bruno Rodriguez and other officials about Spain,s EU Presidency objectives, and to reciprocate the October 2008 visit to Madrid of former Cuban Foreign Minister Perez Roque. Moratinos saw his Cuban counterpart, Bruno Rodriguez, for lunch October 19. Following a three-hour meeting with Raul Castro on October 19 Half of which was devoted to human rights, according to MFA staff), Moratinos told the press that Spanish-Cuban bilateral relations were "normalized" and that as of one Spain's priorities during its EU Presidency, Madrid would seek the elimination of the EU's Common Position and its replacement with a mechanism that seeks to condition the normalization of relations between Member States and Cuba on the latter's democratization efforts and respect for human rights, in particular civil and political rights. Moratinos declared that the international community should not seek a political gesture from Havana and added it should be the Cubans who decide how to carry out their political affairs. According to press reports subsequent to both Moratinos's visit and Zapatero's October 13 meeting at the White House, President Obama asked Spain to transmit a message to the Cuban government: "Tell Raul that if he does not take any steps, I will not be able to either." Spanish diplomatic sources told leading daily El Pais that Obama said Moratinos should "tell the Cuban authorities we understand that change can't happen overnight, but down the road, when we look back at this time, it should be clear that now is when those changes began." ¶10. (C) What is the nature of investments (and names, if known) that host country businesses have in Cuba? Spain is believed to be the largest foreign investor in Cuba, though Spanish companies avoid publishing precise data out of concern that such information will be used to further U.S. enforcement actions under the Libertad Act. Spain's Ministry of Industry, Tourism, and Trade (MITYC) reported that there was no significant investment in Cuba in 2008 even though Spain continues to be among the foreign countries with the largest economic presence in Cuba. Tourism is one of the main industries in Cuba and Spain has a dominant position in the sector. Most of the 54 4-and 5-star hotels managed by foreign firms are owned by Spanish companies. Tobacco is another leading Spanish investment in Cuba. Imperial Tobacco, which acquired Altadis (formerly Tabacalera, S.A.) in January 2008, has a 50 percent interest in Corporacion Habanos, the exclusive worldwide distributor of premium Cuban cigar brands such as Bohiba and Montecristo. Cuba is also among Spain's largest markets Latin America, with Spanish exports of 312.7 million euros in the first eight months of 2009. During his October visit, Foreign Minister Moratinos tried to secure payment of USD 300 million owed by Cuba to 280 Spanish businesses but blocked in Cuban banks. Spanish telecommunications giant Telefonica -- currently operating in several Latin American countries including Mexico, Brazil, Colombia, and Venezuela -- expressed interest in entering the Cuban market at a telecommunications conference in Santander on September 2. President for Latin America Affairs Jose Maria Alvarez Pallete said Telefonica would like to buy Telecom Italia's 27 per cent stake in state-owned Cuban operator Etesca. Alvarez saw good prospects in Cuba, due to the low market penetration in a population of 11 million. ¶11. (C) Are there any bilateral trade agreements or other cooperative agreements between host country and Cuba? There is a bilateral "Commission on Economic-Industrial Cooperation" between Spain and Cuba that is intended to promote bilateral trade and investment. The work of the Commission has been suspended for several years due to disputes over Cuba's non-payment of debt to Spanish entities. Spain and Cuba have bilateral cooperative agreements on air transportation, mutual customs assistance, promotion and protection of investment, double taxation and tax evasion, tourism, and scientific and technical cooperation. Spain offered to restructure Cuba's debt of more than 1,500 euros and provide more than 100 million euros in short-term credit after the recent hurricanes. ¶12. (C) Are there any exchange programs between host country and Cuba, including but not limited to: scholarships for host country nationals to study in Cuba; Cuban-paid medical travel for host country nationals; and Cuban doctors working in the host country? Post is not aware of any such programs between Spain and Cuba. However, Spanish regional governments have substantial assistance programs in Cuba. Such assistance is channeled primarily through the Cuban government, and to a lesser degree through multilateral aid organizations. CHACON