Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09MADRID1029
2009-10-20 17:05:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Madrid
Cable title:  

CHARGE D'AFFAIRES OCTOBER 19, 2009, MEETING WITH

Tags:  PREL MOPS KIPR SP AF KV BK LE IR CU HO 
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R 201705Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY MADRID
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1359
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0206
RUEHTG/AMEMBASSY TEGUCIGALPA 0222
RUEHLA/AMCONSUL BARCELONA 4163
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0520
RUEHUB/USINT HAVANA 0292
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MADRID 001029 

SIPDIS

FOR EUR/WE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/20/2019
TAGS: PREL MOPS KIPR SP AF KV BK LE IR CU HO
SUBJECT: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES OCTOBER 19, 2009, MEETING WITH
SPANISH SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE PRESIDENCY BERNARDINO LEON

MADRID 00001029 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES ARNOLD A. CHACON, REASONS 1.4(B),(D).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MADRID 001029 SIPDIS FOR EUR/WE E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/20/2019 TAGS: PREL MOPS KIPR SP AF KV BK LE IR CU HO SUBJECT: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES OCTOBER 19, 2009, MEETING WITH SPANISH SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE PRESIDENCY BERNARDINO LEON MADRID 00001029 001.2 OF 002 Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES ARNOLD A. CHACON, REASONS 1.4(B),(D). ¶1. (C) Summary: CDA and Leon discussed President Zapatero's October 13 meeting with POTUS including Zapatero's plans for a return visit to Washington in January, Spanish intentions regarding police trainers in Afghanistan, Guantanamo detainees, Kosovo, EUFOR, UNIFIL, Iran, Cuba, and Honduras. Leon stressed the importance of the White House meeting for Spain and Zapatero's sincerity regarding cooperation with the U.S. End summary. Washington Meetings -------------- ¶2. (C) Leon said Zapatero was very pleased with his Washington meetings and quite serious about finding ways to partner effectively with the U.S. internationally. He noted Zapatero hopes to return to Washington in January at which time he hopes to address the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and give a major speech on economic issues, underscoring Spain's commitment to robust economic and investment ties. In that regard, Leon acknowledged that the U.S. message on IPR had been received and that it was now on the GOS radar screen. He said the January visit would also be an opportunity for the GOS to engage U.S. critics on IPR. Afghanistan -------------- ¶3. (C) Leon explained that before Zapatero's trip to Washington, there had been extensive interagency consultations involving the Minister of Interior and the head of the Guardia Civil and National Police. There was genuine political will behind Spain's commitment to send more police trainers beyond the 40 already announced. He said any press reports to the contrary were unfounded. However, Leon noted that the first 40 were not yet deployed (arrangements are still being ironed out with NATO and ISAF) and said Spain needed to field those trainers before moving on to specifics regarding additional trainers. Guantanamo Detainees -------------- ¶4. (C) Leon mentioned that since the White House meeting he had received a call from NSC Senior Director for Europe Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall and said he intended to talk to S/GC Ambassador Fried. Leon welcomed these interactions and noted Spain hoped to take five Guantanamo detainees. He emphasized that Spain had
the political will to be helpful and to give an example to, if not help us convince as EU President, other European countries. He said it would have to be done case by case but stressed Spanish willingness to look at new files. (Note: Spain is preparing to send a team to Guantanamo the week of October 27 to interview two detainees it believes might be suitable for resettlement in Spain. End note.) Kosovo and EUFOR -------------- ¶5. (C) Leon expressed surprise that Kosovo had come up in the White House meeting. He insisted Spain -- while no where near recognizing Kosovo -- was trying to play a constructive role (he noted Moratinos had reassured Zapatero of this following the White House meeting). The CDA enumerated all the ways (lobbying, support for Serbia's ICJ brief, negative votes in IFIs, KFOR withdrawal) in which Spain was emphatically not being helpful. Leon requested a non-paper on this, which CDA undertook to provide (Post is in touch with EUR/SCE on this). Leon stressed that Spain did not want to cause the U.S. problems on the issue of Kosovo. ¶6. (C) CDA noted that Spanish MOD Chacon's recent public comments suggesting Spain might pull out of EUFOR in 2010, raised the specter of another uncoordinated withdrawal from an international mission, similar to what happened with KFOR. Leon assured the CDA that Chacon had learned her lesson with KFOR and any moves with regard to EUFOR would be well-coordinated with Spain's allies. He said he did not see anything on the horizon regarding Spain's EUFOR participation that would come as a surprise to anyone. MADRID 00001029 002.2 OF 002 UNIFIL -------------- ¶7. (C) The CDA urged that as Spain prepared to take over the UNIFIL command, it work with Italy to keep overall troop levels up. He stressed that European troop levels were important indicators of international resolve to maintain the peace in south Lebanon. Leon said Spain was increasing its commitment there by 200 (the headquarters element) but noted there had been no request for Spain to increase troop levels as a condition of Spain taking the command. Leon said he was present when this issue was discussed with Berlusconi, and it was clear the Italian Prime Minister wanted to give up the Italian command of UNIFIL. Leon did not give any indication that he was aware of a possible extension of the Italian command nor did he suggest that either Israeli or Lebanese officials had raised the issue with the Spanish during Zapatero's visit to the region last week. Iran -------------- ¶8. (C) Leon noted that while in Israel, Zapatero had been very clear with the press regarding Spain's stance: if Iran did not negotiate seriously, the international community must be united in taking appropriate measures (i.e., sanctions). Leon said the U.S. and Spain were on the "same sheet of music." Cuba and Honduras -------------- ¶9. (C) On Cuba, the CDA expressed disappointment that FM Moratinos' October 17-19 visit there had not included a meeting with dissidents. He noted the U.S. managed to signal its willingness to engage the GOC while maintaining a focus on human rights and the need for democratic change. So far, the U.S. had not seen improvements in political or human rights conditions. The CDA stressed the importance of the EU and Spain keeping a focus on human rights and not allowing the GOC to believe it could split the EU and the U.S. on that issue. He also underscored the importance of the EU Common Position. Leon agreed that Cuba had yet to take any meaningful measures toward democratic change and respect for human rights and discounted any possibility of a Zapatero near-term visit to Cuba. Regarding Honduras, Leon -- in contrast to what we have been hearing from the MFA -- stressed the need for pragmatism. He described Micheletti as disagreeable and Zelaya as more so and noted that Venezuela would like to discredit the Honduran elections. CHACON

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