TFHO1: A/S SHANNON AND SENIOR DIRECTOR RESTREPO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MADRID 001009 SIPDIS STATE FOR WHA/FO, WHA/CEN, WHA/USOAS NSC FOR RESTREPO E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/14/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM HO SP SUBJECT: TFHO1: A/S SHANNON AND SENIOR DIRECTOR RESTREPO DISCUSS HONDURAS WITH SPANISH MFA SECRETARY OF STATE DE LAIGLESIA Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES ARNOLD A. CHACON. REASON: 1.4 (B,D) ¶1. (C) Summary: WHA Assistant Secretary Tom Shannon and NSC Senior Director Dan Restrepo outlined U.S. concerns over the situation in Honduras for MFA Secretary of State (Under Secretary equivalent) for Latin America Juan Pablo de Laiglesia during an October 10 meeting in Valencia. Shannon noted that both President Zelaya and de facto president Micheletti were "dug in" to their positions, but there could be a way out through parallel tracks of dialogue and elections. The international community and Honduran presidential candidates need to step up efforts to create a space for free, fair, and transparent elections. End Summary. ¶2. (C) The meeting took place on the margins of the October 9-10 U.S.-Spain Forum in Valencia. A/S Shannon began with a readout of his recent visit to Honduras. On the plus side, a negotiating table ("Mesa de Dialogo") was established; however, it was not clear how long it would last. Both Zelaya and Micheletti are dug in, and neither is thinking about how to end the impasse. What is needed is a new dynamic. The USG believes the presidential candidates can help create this new dynamic by demanding results from the Mesa de Dialogo and insisting that the rhetoric remain under control. They also need to prevail on Zelaya and Micheletti to create a space for free elections; otherwise, Honduras faces a rough road. ¶3. (C) A/S Shannon predicted that free and fair elections could push Micheletti and Zelaya towards a resolution. Micheletti is seeking international assistance for the elections, but many Foreign Ministers will not want to assist the de facto regime. However, the candidates could take the initiative and ask for international assistance. ¶4. (C) Restrepo commented on the "extremely complicated dynamic" between the two dominant personalities, Zelaya and Micheletti. There is no perfect solution to this situation, he said, and it is important not to let the perfect be the enemy of the good. Micheletti wants to use the elections to justify his coup, and Honduras could be facing a serious division which must be avoided. Some sectors of civil society are beginning to seek solutions. The elections can help Honduras out of its bind but are not in themselves the entire solution. The country needs to go forward, not remain deadlocked. A key question is who will be the legal leader of Honduras in January when Zelaya's term ends. ¶5. (C) A/S Shannon underscored the extremely important role Spain and the EU can play in Honduras. He expressed doubt as to whether the OAS could organize election observation given its leading role in facilitating dialogue. With or without the OAS, other players could get involved in election monitoring, such as the EU, the Carter Center, and NDI. It was clear that Hugo Chavez and his ALBA allies would do their best to delegitimize elections. ¶6. (C) De Laiglesia commented that what Micheletti had done was intolerable, and the elections are likely to be contaminated by the context in which they are taking place. Micheletti is not interested in reconciliation. De Laiglesia was also concerned that Zelaya's people may walk away from the negotiating table. If the dialogue does not yield a solution, the focus should be on making the elections legitimate. The conflict between the Zelaya and Micheletti remains an obstacle. If Micheletti won't leave office, he must at least accept Zelaya's return on some sort of conditional basis. If Zelaya isn't allowed back into office, then the coup has succeeded, he said. Given that Micheletti's continued presence delegitimizes any elections and invalidates the OAS efforts, de Laiglesia doubted that the OAS or anybody else would want to send observers if Micheletti insists on remaining. ¶7. (C) Noting that the Supreme Electoral Tribunal manages elections, A/S Shannon suggested it might be possible to separate the elections from the de facto government, and have the elections and the Mesa de Dialogo run along two parallel tracks. De Laiglesia agreed that there may be a way to sever the connection betwen the two processes. It is necessary, though very difficult, to "decontaminate" the situation so that the EU and OAS can help. ¶8. (C) A/S Shannon noted that recent polls revealed that the MADRID 00001009 002 OF 002 Honduran public wanted both Micheletti and Zelaya out of the political scene. Honduras's leaders have failed, and the Honduran people want their democracy back. It is therefore important to let the people become the protagonist in the crisis and for the international community to help them. He reiterated that an international presence is key to holding elections in an atmosphere of calm. ¶9. (U) A/S Shannon and Senior Director Restrepo have cleared this message. CHACON