CORRUPTION SCANDALS TURN OFF DONORS (AND SOME

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 LUSAKA 000367 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/25/2019 TAGS: EAID KCOR PGOV PREL ZA SUBJECT: CORRUPTION SCANDALS TURN OFF DONORS (AND SOME DONOR FUNDING) REF: LUSAKA 295 LUSAKA 00000367 001.2 OF 005 Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Michael Koplovsky for Reasons 1.4(b) a ¶1. (C) Summary. The governments of Sweden and the Netherlands froze their development assistance to Zambia's health sector following reports of serious fraud at the Ministry of Health (MoH). Their course of action reflects mounting donor anxiety, not so much at corruption itself as at the Zambian Government's (GRZ's) seemingly tepid response to it. Seized with the idea that other donors will slash their funding, President Rupiah Banda summoned numerous heads of diplomatic missions to State House on May 26, in order to reassure them of the GRZ's ongoing commitment to fighting corruption. During the meeting, the diplomatic/donor community called for decisive GRZ action to improve the tansparency of public procurement and financial management. These developments present an opportunity to the diplomatic community, which has the GRZ's full attention and which may be better poised to secure long-awaited government buy-in on several anti-corruption priorities, including anti-money laundering. Although there is much cause for concern, Zambia has made significant strides in its anti-corruption campaign, which today features relatively independent judges, capable prosecutors, vigilant journalists, and vocal civil society organizations. End Summary. -------------- Recent Corruption Scandals -------------- ¶2. (C) Numerous developments over the past six months have set government watchdog organizations ablaze with allegations that President Banda is at best not committed to and at worst interfering with the government's fight against corruption. They claim he is taking the country "back to the Chiluba era," renown for the scale of national plunder and depredation of government assets that took place during the presidency of Frederick Chiluba (1991-2001). Recent corruption scandals include: --tribunal findings (reftel) that former Communications and Transport Minister Dora Siliya circumvented procurement procedures in awarding a two million dollar contract to RP Capital, a Cayman Islands based business (with no previous experience in financial valuation),to assess the assets of the parastatal telecom company, Zamtel; although she resigned from her ministerial position (not her parliamentary seat),Siliya has challenged the court finding; President Banda, who has stood beside Siliya even after the release of the tribunal findings, has not appointed a replacement minister, perhaps in the hopes that Siliya will win her appeal; --the GRZ's plan for a USD 53 million loan from EXIM Bank of China to acquire nine mobile hospitals from a Chinese company (in a single sourced, no bid contract); following strong objections from the donor community, which provides significant health sector support, the GRZ postponed (but did not cancel) its decision to move forward on this costly investment that does not figure into the government's health strategy or budget; --allegations that former Ministry of Finance Permanent Secretary (and Zambia's new Ambassador to Japan and relative of Zambia's Ambassador to the United States) Wamundila Mbikusita Lewanika contracted a public financial management project to a company in which he has a personal interest; --revelations that the GRZ committed over two trillion Kwacha (approximately USD 400 million) for road works in 2008, despite budget allocations of only Kwacha 750 billion; according to World Bank analysis, 65 percent of the bids were assigned to four contractors, primarily during the pre-election period (September and October 2008),when Banda served as Acting President; despite making payments on ten percent of these contracts, World Bank officials claim that the contractors have not undertaken the certified works; --President Banda's inclusion of former President Chiluba (who was found liable for USD 41 million for abuse of office in a London court in May 2007 and who is the subject of an ongoing criminal case) and former First Lady Regina LUSAKA 00000367 002.2 OF 005 Chiluba (who was convicted of public theft by Task Force on Corruption prosecutors in March 2009, but whose case is pending appeal) at state events, during which the duo receive VIP treatment; their participation reinforces public perceptions that President Banda condones corruption; and --the icing-on-the-cake exposure of a two million dollar fraud perpetrated by a former MoH human resource manager, Henry Kapoko, who used public resources to acquire a lodge, as well as 12 luxury vehicles; although the GRZ began investigating the fraud as long as one year ago (according to some accounts),MoH officials were apparently unaware of the investigation and Kapoko was never fired or suspended, but instead was transferred to another ministry; on May 27, the GRZ locked down the MoH to secure evidence and suspended twenty MoH employees. ¶3. (C) On May 26, the Executive Director of the Economics Association of Zambia (EAZ) told Emboff that these corruption incidents are "but the tip of the iceberg." He noted that the EAZ is performing research and training on behalf of the Ministry of Finance to improve government accountability, something he projected was in decline in Zambia due in no small part to President Banda's own poor example. (Comment: Banda's sons are rumored to be involved in extremely diverse business deals, including the RP Capital sole source contract.) He sharply criticized the GRZ for its budget planning, which he said prioritized unnecessary expenditures, such as international travel and personal vehicles, over critical public services. He also noted that Zambia's financial red tape is excessive enough (and the processes in releasing funds do not lead to transparency and accountability) that when funds are abused, controlling officers (permanent secretaries) are often involved, as well as perhaps "a dozen other civil servants." To illustrate this, he cited the case against former MoH Permanent Secretary Kashiwa Bulaya (whom the Task Force on Corruption convicted in 2007) -- where so many MoH civil servants had benefitted from Bulaya's corruption that they refused to testify in his trial. -------------- Swedes, Dutch Freeze Funding -------------- ¶4. (C) Following the Kapoko scandal, the Swedish Embassy made a panicked call to Stockholm to stop the disbursement of the next tranche of Swedish direct budget support (USD 11 million) to the MoH. The Swedish Embassy then informed the GRZ that it had put its disbursement to the sector on hold until at least the completion of an investigation by the Auditor General. The Dutch, who had been growing impatient with GRZ's poor accountability and responsiveness, quickly followed suit. Both Embassies await guidance from their headquarters to determine the criteria for resuming health-related development assistance. Several Ambassadors, including the U.S., Swedish, Irish, Norwegian, and Dutch, met with President Banda in Livingstone during the week of May 18 to discuss GRZ transparency and governance. The Dutch Ambassador later described this meeting to Charge as "not reassuring" of "sincere GRZ commitment." The Irish Ambassador was underwhelmed by Banda's cavalier and dismissive attitude and the Norwegian Ambassador described it as a "missed opportunity." When asked what she thought about the Swedish course of action, a former high-ranking Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA) official who is now the UNICEF country representative told Charge that she supported the move and was "surprised it did not happen sooner." ¶5. (C) The Swedish and Dutch frustration partly stems from the difficulty of delivering budget support (whether "basket" support that is tagged for a particular sector, as in this case, or direct budget support to the Ministry of Finance to be spent as the GRZ sees fit) to a country with a recent history of pervasive and endemic corruption. (Note: The USG, Zambia's largest country donor, delivers its assistance primarily through non-governmental organizations). For basket donors, misappropriation of public funding becomes not merely a governance issue, but a political liability in their home countries. The Dutch Ambassador (who previously served as an inspector of the Dutch Foreign Service) told Charge that he is under enormous pressure from The Hague, with parliament and LUSAKA 00000367 003.2 OF 005 ministries watching carefully how every Euro is spent in the present economic environment. He speculated that the Netherlands would not resume assistance until the GRZ "changes the way it does business," alluding to its non-transparent and inefficient procurement and public financial management systems. The Finnish Ambassador (who had delayed apprising Helsinki of latest developments fearing repercussions) noted that the Finnish Government is scheduled to disburse its next budget support payment soon, but would need to evaluate whether to defer doing so. Although other donor countries have not suggested that they intend to join the Swedish and Dutch lead, they share the sentiments and frustration. Not naive to the existence of corruption within the civil service, the donors appear less frustrated by reports of corruption than by perceived GRZ indifference, including recent rumors that the GRZ had been turning a deaf ear to the findings of the Auditor General's Office and the parliamentary Public Accounts Committee. -------------- GRZ Promises Action -------------- ¶6. (C) On May 26, President Banda summoned a group of heads of diplomatic missions and development agencies to State House to offer his personal guarantee that action would be taken against those responsible for theft of public resources. Together with his health, finance, public works, justice, and home affairs ministers, he directed most of his comments at the fallibility of mid- and junior-level civil servants, deflecting attention away from his controlling officers and cabinet. On the whole, donors (particularly those who attended the Livingstone meeting with the President) agreed that Banda and his advisors delivered the right message, expressing penitence and regret and underscoring the exigency of meting out punishment to offenders. Banda also pledged to suspend all MoH officials implicated in the Kapoko affair, including those who may have been inadvertently involved. He acknowledged the scarcity of resources during the global economic downturn and therefore the necessity of protecting donor funding with increased caution. ¶7. (C) While the Swedish Charge and the European Commission representative scolded Banda and his ministers on sector-specific policies and processes related to their development aid, the head of the UK's Department for International Development (DFID) and the Dutch Ambassador appealed to Banda to demonstrate his commitment to fight corruption and establish the GRZ's bona fides as a responsible and responsive government. The Dutch Ambassador also sought to convey that Zambia's attractiveness as a partner and aid recipient is contingent upon its commitment to upholding the rule of law and its progress on uprooting corruption. President Banda took these points well and agreed on the importance of introducing legislative and institutional reforms that will strengthen the GRZ's ability to prevent and prosecute corruption. Banda said that he hoped cooperating partners would be satisfied and would resume their aid. "Even if cooperating partners do not resume aid flows," he mused, "Zambia would still hold all to account." ¶8. (C) President Banda referred to Justice Minister (and Vice President) George Kunda as the coordinator of GRZ's anti-corruption efforts (despite Kunda's reputation as an obstacle to progress in fighting corruption). Kunda noted that the implementation of the newly passed anti-corruption policy is a government priority. He recognized the importance of the Auditor General's Office and pledged to fund this and other anti-corruption institutions. Kunda conceded the need to reform the Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC),introduce new legislation, and establish a Financial Intelligence Unit and a stronger anti-money laundering regime. With regard to the Task Force on Corruption, which former President Mwanawasa established to prosecute high-level corruption committed during the Chiluba presidency, Kunda suggested that it has concluded most of its cases (Comment: This is not entirely true, given that most cases are in the appeal stage before the High Court) and the GRZ should now build the capacity of the Directorate of Public Prosecutions and ACC rather than fund the Task Force in perpetuity. Following the meeting, Charge reminded State House presidential advisor that Zambia should not rest on its laurels and should remain vigilant to continue to qualify for a Millennium Challenge LUSAKA 00000367 004.3 OF 005 Account compact. -------------- Glass Partly Full -------------- ¶9. (C) Although recent developments are cause for concern, particularly as they have weakened public confidence in government, in a broader context, Zambia has made significant progress in its anti-corruption campaign. The Task Force on Corruption has secured numerous convictions, including a civil victory against Chiluba in a London court, and has operated with relatively little interference from State House. The magistrates who have adjudicated the Task Force cases have proven to be untouchable. Although the daily independent newspaper The Post discredited itself in its reporting of the 2008 presidential election, its reporters have played an important role in bringing new cases to light, placing pressure on the government for action, and guiding the public toward "zero tolerance" of corruption. Civil society has been vigilant, vocal, and active, serving not only as a government watchdog, but in some cases engaging in investigations that culminated in ACC action. According to the head of the Jesuit Center for Theological Reflection, Zambia may have one of the strongest civil societies in Africa. ¶10. (C) The Ministry of Finance is also moving forward to establish a single treasury account and treasury department (with U.S. Department of Treasury technical assistance), which will improve budget execution and bring increased transparency and accountability to the management of public resources. In light of this, GRZ may be better prepared to tackle corruption than ever before, despite perceptions of waning commitment levels. Although the public has lionized the late President Mwanawasa for launching the anti-corruption "crusade," Mwanawasa's commitment was at times unsteady, perhaps due to lack of support from within his party. President Banda presumably faces this same challenge--and may feel beholden to MMD members for placing him at the helm of the party. The President may have to lay these considerations aside, given the donor message that progress on fighting corruption is no longer a governance interest but a government imperative. Banda's next steps will provide some measurement of his moral will (which civil society has largely criticized) and political leadership (which has been conspicuously lacking). To succeed, Banda will need to look beyond the peccadilloes of civil servants to the practices of his immediate advisors as well as the example that he himself sets. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶11. (C) At present, many donors remain skeptical that the GRZ will follow through with its pledges. This tension points to a growing distrust between the donor missions and a country that may have grown too complacent as a "donor darling" and recipient of huge amounts of foreign assistance (the GRZ relies on donor budget support for one quarter of its annual spending). Although these strains may not break apart the European-Zambian "partnership," it does not bode well for Zambia's ability to draw in development assistance at the same proportions, let alone foreign investment. At every available opportunity, including during Foreign Minister Kabinge Pande's June meetings in Washington, it is worth noting that Zambian progress on anti-corruption is essential to the effectiveness of official development assistance and Zambia's own economic prosperity and poverty alleviation objectives. ¶12. (C) Now that the diplomatic community has the GRZ's attention, it is imperative to send a clear message on what types of reforms specifically would best improve GRZ accountability. Certainly some of these reforms should focus on the transparency and efficiency of public procurement and financial management. However, broader legislative and institutional reforms, including whistleblower protection, asset disclosure, and asset forfeiture laws and enhanced and well-funded, independent watchdog agencies, as well as robust and independent media are also vital. We continue to press for these and other changes through diplomatic engagement. Diplomatic coordination, however, has been constrained in Zambia by LUSAKA 00000367 005.2 OF 005 the tendency to combine development cooperation (as agreed under the Paris Declaration) with policy harmonization (a natural sequitur to development cooperation). On May 26, for example, some international community representatives (particularly those representing development agencies) referred to specific problems related to individual assistance projects, focusing on the manifestations of -- rather than roots of -- corruption, thereby failing to present the GRZ with a clear picture of donor expectations. Despite these challenges, we will coordinate with other missions, as we have done in the past, to improve our engagement with the GRZ and to take advantage of the opportunity to move forward on our anti-corruption agenda. KOPLOVSKY