ANGOLA IN NO RUSH TO SETTLE MARITIME BOUNDARY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 LUANDA 000776 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/21/2024 TAGS: PREL EPET AO CG SUBJECT: ANGOLA IN NO RUSH TO SETTLE MARITIME BOUNDARY DISPUTE WITH DRC REF: KINSHASA 1058 (U) CDA Jeff Hawkins, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. Unease and anxiety over maritime boundary disputes between Angola and the DRC in the lower-half of the Gulf of Guinea appear to be one-sided, with GRA officials content with the current demarcation. Angolan officials, as well as oil executives operating in the disputed territory, downplay the importance of the dispute and believe that, eventually, the dispute will be settled diplomatically. In the meantime, Angola retains possession of the fields and almost certainly counts on the upper hand it enjoys in the bilateral relationship to keep Congolese claims in check. END SUMMARY. -------------- Angola Generally Unconcerned -------------- ¶2. (C) According to recent reporting from Kinshasa, the GDRC is increasingly vocal regarding conflicting claims over oil-rich offshore territories in the Gulf of Guinea. The dispute centers on maritime borders drawn from the Angolan enclave of Cabinda, which is not contiguous with the rest of Angolan territory. Using one of several accepted methods of demarcation of maritime boundaries, Angola has interpreted the frontiers in such a way as to leave it in possession of major oil producing areas and the DRC with only a small sliver of coastal waters. Angolan offshore oil blocks 0, 14 and 15 - operated by Exxon-Mobil and Chevron and some of Angola's richest - could be impacted by the DRC claims. ¶3. (C) In general, the Angolan response to DRC claims has been muted. Angolan diplomatic and defense officials downplay the dispute, and in bilateral relations the GRA is generally much more focused on the recent round of reciprocal expulsions than on the maritime boundary dispute. Naval Chief of Staff Admiral Cunha, for example, brushed off any concerns about increasing tensions during December 16 call by AFRICOM Deputy to the Commander Ambassador Holmes and assured Holmes that both countries would work out the dispute through diplomacy. While the subject was raised during bilateral meetings in Luanda on December 15-16 (septel),this was apparently not the focus of the talks. ¶4. (C) Oil company reps in Angola likewise seem relatively unconcerned. Senior Chevron officials told DCM that GDRC officials had been increasingly strident with their management (the Chevron affiliate in Luanda oversees the small Chevron office in Kinshasa) but that this was a relatively new phenomenon. In the past, they said, the government in Kinshasa was far more focused on rich mineral resources in the Congolese interior and "didn't even know how much oil they had." The same officials told DCM that Angola's state-owned oil firm Sonangol had been categorical with Chevron; operators in Angolan waters had absolutely nothing to worry about. During a 16 December roundtable on energy security in the Gulf of Guinea for Ambassador Holmes, Carlos Silva, Chevron's Director of Security, did note that further development and exploitation is up in the air in contested blocks until the border issue with the DRC is resolved, but again downplayed the dispute noting that land and border disputes are common all over the continent and an unfortunate colonial legacy. -------------- Several Conflicting Claims -------------- ¶5. (C) There may also be additional parties to the dispute. Ambassador met on 10 December with a lawyer who has been working on the issue on Luanda's behalf for years. The lawyer said both the RoC and Gabon are also trying to carve out some of Angola's maritime territory and have delineated territories that follow the natural contours of their borders, which consequently overlap with Angola's borders. All four countries, he said, have submitted their territorial claims to the UN's Law of the Sea. (NOTE: Naval Chief of Staff Cunha told Ambassador Holmes on 16 December that Angola intends to expand its maritime boundary an extra 150 miles, which would bring it to the edge of the continental shelf. END NOTE) ¶6. (C) None of the countries, however, have brought their LUANDA 00000776 002 OF 002 cases to the International Court of Justice (ICJ). The lawyer believes that if the issue were ever brought to the ICJ, the court could reach a compromise with Gabon, DRC, and RoC gaining some ground at Angola's expense. Countries can demarcate their borders normally one of two ways: either by drawing parallel lines out to sea or by following the natural contours that their borders follow inland. The ICJ, he said, typically draws parallel borders, and then take into consideration what is fair and equitable. In most cases, parallel lines end up being both fair and equitable, but he noted that when enclaves are involved, as is the case with Cabinda, the issue becomes more complicated. ¶7. (C) Chevron officials meeting with DCM were particularly dismissive of the DRC claim, noting that the documents DRC has submitted to the Law of the Sea are "ridiculous." The officials said the DRC is arguing its borders follow a parallel trajectory out to a certain point in the Gulf of Guinea, but then follow a sharp downward turn towards waters richer in proven reserves, as if the DRC chose to combine both methods of border delineation. ¶7. (C) Comment. The DRC's inflammatory ministerial statements (reftel) accusing Angola of stealing its rightful resources do not seem to be lighting any fires here in Luanda. Angolan officials have been and will continue to participate in diplomatic missions aimed at resolving the issue, but most likely with the full intention of dragging it out as long as possible. Angola knows it has nothing to gain from a speedy resolution, and GRA officials appear confident that Angola's upper hand in the bilateral relationship will win the day. For now, time is on Angola's side and we expect Angola to make the most of it. End Comment. HAWKINS