SUDAN/DARFUR: LONDON-BASED OPPOSITION LEADERS

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 LONDON 000952 SIPDIS SENSITIVE DEPARTMENT FOR S/USSES E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PREL PGOV EAID KPKO PHUM SU UK SUBJECT: SUDAN/DARFUR: LONDON-BASED OPPOSITION LEADERS DISMAYED BY JEM, BASSOLE AND DOHA TALKS ¶1. (SBU) Summary. Two prominent Darfuris in exile in the UK, one Fur and one Zaghawa, see the situation in Darfur as increasingly fractured and the path to peace littered with hazards and potential spoilers. Mohamed Dousa, a Zaghawa leader in the Sudanese Constitutional Party, said his constituency remains focused on pushing for the return of the expelled NGOs and a legitimate ceasefire. Critical of Bassole and the Doha peace talks, Dousa his party support the ICC arrest warrant against the Sudanese president, and supports the establishment of a single unified Darfuri position prior to any negotiations of Darfuris with the Khartoum regime. Mohamed Baraka, one-time NCP candidate for Governor of North Darfur, said that with the Fur rebel movements weakened beyond resuscitation, Fur leaders are in a position to negotiate a separate peace with the GoS, and Doha may prove successful in that outcome if the U.S. can persuade Libya to push for peace in Darfur as well. End summary. Zaghawa Leader: Negotiations Marginalize Non-JEM Darfuris -------------- -------------- ¶2. (SBU) Mohamed Dousa, Zaghawa leader-in-exile and political chief of the Sudanese Constitutional Party (SCP),told Embassies London and Khartoum poloffs on April 21 that SCP-aligned Darfuris in the UK support the International Criminal Court (ICC) arrest warrant against Sudanese President Omar Al-Bashir and demand the return of the 13 expelled INGOs. Claiming that the SCP maintains a network of 7,000 "soldiers" who stand ready in the UK and Israel, Dousa said the party, aligned with Sudanese Liberation Army/Minni Minnawi (SLA/MM) rebels in Darfur, will push for a federal-style governing system for Darfur within the larger context of what remains of Sudan following the 2011 Southern Sudan referendum on independence. Agreeing with his Darfuri opposition colleagues elsewhere in the world, Dousa ticked off a laundry list of demands to which the Government of Sudan (GoS) must agree before the SCP would take part in negotiations, including: a fully implemented ceasefire between GoS forces and rebel movements; complete deployment of UNAMID peacekeeping troops; and a return of the 13 expelled international NGOs. Contrary to some observers in and out of Khartoum, Dousa and the SCP believe the ICC's investigations in Darfur have lessened the violence there, and a push now for an Article 16 deferral of the indictment and arrest warrant would lead to increased levels of GOS-supported janjaweed activities. ¶3. (SBU) Dousa detailed the reasons for which the SCP, and Darfuris in the UK, were unenthusiastic towards the Doha negotiations led by Joint UN/AU Chief Mediator Gibril Bassole. "The majority of Darfuris and the rebel movements believe Bassole is ignorant of the situation in Darfur," Dousa said, adding that the process so far has favored the GoS and Khalil Ibrahim's Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) at the expense of IDPs, civil society and members of the Zaghawa tribe not aligned with JEM (including SLA/MM). For Dousa and the SCP, complete negotiations on the fate of Darfur should begin with wide-ranging "talks" among Darfuris and the movements in Darfur, with participation by civil society, IDP and tribal leaders, and then move on to formal "negotiations" between Darfuris and the GoS. Pointing out that the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) faces an uncertain future because of mandated deadlines neither party seems eager to meet, Dousa said that while deadlines move the situation forward at a pace acceptable to the international community, they also tend to undermine the fragile internal agreements that bind negotiating parties when they come to the table. Fur Leader: Rebels Weak, Libya Can Play a Positive Role -------------- -------------- ¶4. (SBU) Mohamed Baraka, former Darfuri parliamentarian with the ruling National Congress Party (NCP) and a Fur politician now living in asylum in London, was more optimistic than his Zaghawa counterpart on the prospect of peace talks in Doha, as he believes both Fur leaders and the NCP are more amenable to talks than during previous rounds. Still in regular contact with his former colleagues and exiled SLA leaders Abdel Shafie and Abdul Wahid, Baraka views the SLA Fur factions as weaker than every before, a situation which has increased the chances that the Fur can unite to move forward in negotiations with the GoS. Besides strengthening the position of prominent Fur civil society actors such El Tigani Sesei and Ahmed Adam Rijal, the dissolution of the Fur rebel movements has also increased the importance of traditional Fur leaders, and Baraka recommended LONDON 00000952 002 OF 002 that the U.S. reach out to El Tayeb Kokora Ahmedein, Shartai of Kebkabiya, North Darfur, and Suleiman Hassanbaro, Shartai of Kass, South Darfur. Regarding Abdul Wahid, Baraka was unsympathetic, saying, "He is only interested in self-promotion. His visit to Israel was destructive. Now he is weak and has nothing." ¶5. (SBU) More amenable to the Doha talks than SLA/AW representatives in London, Baraka said that international players can assist in pushing the NCP for full implementation of any peace accords. "Who will make sure this is not just the second phase of Abuja?" he asked rhetorically. Formerly resident in Libya for ten years, Baraka believes that an agreement at Doha will succeed only if the international community can translate its achievements into full Libyan cooperation in Darfur. With no solid connection between the Qataris and Darfur, and also with many Darfuris doubting Qatari intentions in bringing peace and development to Darfur, Libyan acquiescence to a Doha agreement will factor strongly into whether positive outcomes result in Darfur post-Doha. Claiming that the NCP offered that he succeed Ibrahim Suleiman as governor of North Darfur in 2004, Baraka received asylum in Britain in 2005 but remains in contact with his former classmates from Khartoum, including NCP Minister of Defense Abdulraheem. Calling him the "mastermind" of the current political climate in Sudan, Baraka sees the reclusive minister as "very interested" in the Doha negotiations, willing to negotiate to achieve a ceasefire in Darfur. Baraka pointed out that while the Sudanese military could attack rebel-held positions in Darfur, proof of the GoS's good faith in Doha can be found in the reality of the tense ceasefire on the ground. Visit London's Classified Website: http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Unit ed_Kingdom LEBARON