SUDAN/DARFUR: SLA/AW REPS DISCUSS PRIORITIES AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 LONDON 000933

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR S/USSES

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/21/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL EAID SU UK
SUBJECT: SUDAN/DARFUR: SLA/AW REPS DISCUSS PRIORITIES AND
DOHA AS PEACE TALKS VENUE

Classified By: Political Counselor Richard Mills, reasons 1.4 (b/d).


1. (C) Summary. London-based representatives of Abdul Wahid
al Nour's Sudan Liberation Army/Movement (SLA/AW) Yahia Ahmed
Elbashir and A. A. Ezaldeen said improving the humanitarian
situation caused by the expulsion of NGOs in Darfur and
improving security on the ground are their top two priorities
in an April 21 meeting with Embassies London and Khartoum
poloffs. Doha is not an appropriate venue for peace talks,
they argued, because it was selected by the National Congress
Party (NCP),the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM),and
others who promote Arab and Islamic interests. On the
contents of a peace agreement, Elbashir and Ezaldeen said
SLA/AW wanted full-humanitarian access, full security control
without Government of Sudan (GoS) threats, and establishment
of governance structures capable of responding to Darfuri
needs. They agreed to further discuss with Abdul Wahid the
need for SLA/AW engagement with UN/AU Chief Mediator Bassole
and at discussions in Doha, indicating that some Fur leaders
are interested in what steps can be taken immediately to
improve the situation on the ground. End summary.

SLA/AW Priorities: Humanitarian Situation and Security
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2. (C) Yahia Ahmed Elbashir and A. A. Ezaldeen, London-based
spokesmen for Abdul Wahid al Nour's Sudan Liberation
Army/Movement told Embassies London and Khartoum poloffs on
April 21 that SLA/AW's top priorities are improving the
humanitarian situation and security on the ground in Darfur
in the wake of the March 4 expulsion of NGOs working in
Darfur. Elbashir noted that over 3,000 Dafurians had lost
their jobs with the NGOs' departure and that the provision of
IDPs' humanitarian needs was becoming increasingly critical.
A second priority is improving the security situation on the
ground as violent attacks continue to occur and as, they
claimed, the Government of Sudan continues to arm janjaweed
groups.

"Much Doubt" About Doha as a Venue for Peace Talks
-------------- --------------


3. (C) Couching SLA/AW's objectives for a democratic and
secular state as fundamentally different from the "Islamic"
NCP and JEM, Elbashir said SLA/AW has "much doubt" about Doha
as an appropriate venue for peace talks, especially as Qatar
is not a democratic or regional player. He noted the Qatari
Amir's public support for the NCP and Sudanese President Omar
al Bashir and said SLA/AW was never consulted on the venue
for the talks. One side - the Islamists - he said, cannot
unilaterally determine the location of the talks. He said
Abdul Wahid would support Egypt over Qatar as a venue for
talks, though he did not address Abdul Wahid's overall
reticence to engage. He also questioned why Bassole, as an
independent mediator, would support Doha as the venue without
consulting all major groups concerned. Elbashir suggested
there should be two venues: allowing JEM to continue its
discussion in Doha and a second venue for other groups to
talk in the region. The two groups could then merge once
consolidated positions had been reached. They agreed to
engage Abdul Wahid further on how SLA/AW might be able to
achieve its objectives in Doha.

The Contents of an Agreement
--------------


4. (C) Arguing that the venue was important because it
affected the contents of the agreement and the parties'
ability to negotiate on an equal footing, Elbashir and
Ezaldeen listed SLA/AW's core asks for an agreement:
full-humanitarian access, full security control without GoS
threats, and establishment of governance structures capable
of responding to Darfuri needs. Elbashir said the NCP uses
the process of peace discussions as a delaying tactic and
creates humanitarian crises, as it did with the expulsion of
the NGOs, to distract the international community's attention
from long-term solutions. He explained that there is
currently a short-term struggle for humanitarian access and a
long-term struggle to resolve the political crisis, and
SLA/AW had to approach the situation with both of these
issues in mind. Because SLA/AW views itself as a party to
the 2004 Ndjamena cease-fire, they reiterated that any
conflict suspension agreement would depend on the GoS and its
allies in Darfur, actors they view as destabilizing the
situation and bringing in new settlers from West Africa to
Darfur. Elbashir commented that the GoS is always ready to
sign a peace agreement, as it did with the Darfur Peace
Agreement (DPA) in 2006, but is never interested in
implementing agreements, as evidenced by the South's
continual struggle for implementation of the Comprehensive

LONDON 00000933 002 OF 002


Peace Agreement (CPA).

Comment
--------------


5. (C) Elbashir and Ezaldeen were open to the idea that
SLA/AW should consider how it could achieve its objectives in
Doha and agreed to engage Abdul Wahid further. While that is
a long way from Abdul Wahid's agreement to participation in
peace talks in Doha, it does indicate that there are Fur
activists who are considering what steps can be taken
immediately to improve the situation on the ground in Darfur.
The two leaders will be traveling to Geneva next week to
meet with Abdul Wahid and senior SLA/AW commanders, and their
amenability to talks may assist in persuading the notoriously
stubborn Abdul Wahid to go to Doha.



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