Identifier | Created | Classification | Origin |
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09LONDON517 | 2009-02-26 15:13:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy London |
1. (C) Summary. AF Acting A/S Carter met with London-based Fur leader Ahmed Diraige to discuss how to widen the Darfur peace discussions started in Doha to encompass other movements including Fur representation in order to take advantage of the opportunity the recent JEM-GNU agreement provided. Diraige said the international community, possibly the USG, should communicate to Fur movements that no one group can solve the crisis in Darfur and offer Fur leaders an invitation to a conference to consolidate their positions. Those who refuse to attend, he said, should be isolated and left out of the process. Diraige said Abdul Wahid and Abdul Shafi did not "have the mentality for peace" but offered no suggestion on how to prevent them from becoming spoilers to peace processes in which they choose not to participate. Diraige said Fur leaders in Darfur will meet on February 27 to determine what to do about Abdul Wahid's non-engagement in the peace process. Diraige also said he and other Fur leaders had been invited to Washington by a university (NFI) to discuss a unified Fur position, but he did not say that he had committed to attend. The fact that Diraige did not accept Carter's separate invitation for a Fur meeting in Washington seems to indicate that Diraige knows that the Fur are not ready to form a consolidated position. End summary. 2. (C) AF Acting Assistant Secretary Phillip Carter met London-based Fur Leader Ahmed Diraige in London on February 26. Carter said the agreement concluded in Doha between the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and the Government of National Unity of Sudan (GNU) represented an opportunity and was a first step in what needed to be a broader discussion. Carter said that no agreement for peace in Darfur will be sustainable without participation by the Fur people and noted that Paris-based Fur leader Abdul Wahid al Nour refused to engage. Recognizing that JEM only represents a small percent of the population in Darfur and drawing on lessons learned from the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA), Carter said that the USG wants to bring the Fur into a broader discussion in Doha and solicited Diraige's advice on how to do that. Carter explained that the USG would like to consult in Washington with a group of Fur leaders who can speak as a collective with a collaborative versus a competitive stance. 3. (C) Beginning with a summary of his 1986 political dissertation on a new political structure for Sudan and the Sudan Federal Democratic Alliance's (SFDA) manifesto, Diraige explained that the National Congress Party (NCP) regime is not a "normal government" because it tries to "socially engineer the people (of Sudan) to be Arab and Muslim." Diraige said he had recently explained to London-based JEM representatives in advance of their travel to Doha that Darfur's problems were two-fold. First, it had been marginalized, similar to South Sudan. Second, Darfur now has 3.5 million IDPs and countless refugees in other countries. Diraige said that he had tried to speak directly with Abdul Wahid, but that Abdul Wahid had refused. Describing the armed movements' leaders as "uneducated" and not "having the mentality for political discussions," Diraige said that Abdul Wahid "should be discarded" because he does not engage while the people suffer, and the SLA's Abdul Shafi does not have the people's interests in mind. 4. (C) Offering his way forward, Diraige argued that the international community should communicate to Fur movements that no one group can solve the crisis in Darfur and offer Fur leaders an invitation to a conference to consolidate their positions. Those who refuse to attend, he said, should be isolated and left out of the process. He said that the 2007 Sitre meeting in Libya had been a good start for that process, but then argued, slightly contrary to his idea that those who do not engage should be isolated, that the problem in Libya was that Abdul Wahid and Abdul Shafi refused to participate. There was "no need for partial agreements, like Minni Manawi's (DPA)," and any "serious talks" would have to involve all of the movements. Diraige offered no suggestion on how to deal with Abdul Wahid or Abdul Shafi if they become spoilers in the process. He said that the international community should put more pressure on them to engage. Diraige noted that UN/AU Chief Negotiator Bassole had not been in touch with him. 5. (C) Diraige said that Fur leaders in Darfur will meet on February 27 to determine what to do about Abdul Wahid's non-engagement and told Carter he would be in touch about what decision the Fur take. Diraige also said he and other Fur leaders had been invited to Washington by a university to discuss a unified position. He said he did not have the details with him, forgetting the name of the university and the exact dates, but said that he would pass Carter the LONDON 00000517 002 OF 002 details. Diraige did not say that he committed to attending the Washington event. Embassy Poloff is following up with Diraige to find out the details and will pass them to AF/FO and AF/SPG. Comment -------------------------- 6. (C) Diraige's argument that Fur leaders, like Abdul Wahid, who do not engage in the peace process should be isolated seems like an attempt to maneuver and consolidate his own position as the Fur leader with whom the international community should engage. The fact that he did not accept Carter's invitation for a Fur meeting in Washington seems to indicate that Diraige knows that the Fur are not ready to form a consolidated position. 7. (U) Acting A/S Carter did not have an opportunity to clear this cable before his departure. Visit London's Classified Website: http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Unit ed_Kingdom LEBARON |