UK ANALYSTS ASSERT CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPEAN

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 LONDON 001369 SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: EFIN ECON EINV XG UK SUBJECT: UK ANALYSTS ASSERT CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPEAN BANKING SYSTEM FACES PROBLEMS BUT NOT COLLAPSE REF: LONDON 1321 LONDON 00001369 001.2 OF 004 ¶1. (U) SUMMARY: Compared to the acutely fragile economic climate in Central and Eastern Europe from November 2008 to February 2009, UK-based market watchers now feel the worst is behind them. Their views are spurred in part by positive news on U.S. and UK banks in recent weeks and assumptions that European banks will be fine as well. Though the risk of a slow recovery still looms, analysts generally felt confident the largely foreign-owned Central and Eastern European banking sector, backed by commitments from foreign parent banks and IMF/EC financing, had the tools needed to cope with the ongoing economic crisis. End Summary. The Banking Sector May Be Out of Acute Danger -------------- ¶2. (SBU) Market analysts from Royal Bank of Scotland, Credit Suisse, and HSBC told us recently they felt Central and Eastern European banks had gotten past the worst of the credit crunch. Troubles in this region's banking sector now center around liquidity--not solvency--for emerging Europe, said RBS' Head of Central and Eastern Europe Middle East and Africa Research, Timothy Ash during a May 14 meeting. He saw positive indicators, namely that Eastern European banks were not highly leveraged and governments had maintained lower levels of public sector debt. Compared to Western Europe, public sector debt to GDP in Eastern Europe is only 40 percent vice 70 percent. Moreover, even in case of a bank failure and the need for recapitalization, Ash pointed out Eastern European banks are small relative to Western European institutions, with bank assets to GDP reaching 100 compared to 215 and higher in some Western European countries. Ash implied, consequently, they are not too big to fail or too problematic to rescue. Central European Banks on Solid Ground -------------- ¶3. (SBU) Contrary to worrying Central Europe's banks could fail, the key for Central Europe is whether foreign-owned parent banks will drag down their Central European subsidiaries, HSBC and Credit Suisse analysts told us on May 22 and June 2, respectively. Jacqueline Madu, Emerging Markets Analyst at Credit Suisse asserted Czech subsidiaries are in fact net creditors to their foreign parent banks. She also pointed out that some of the journalists who used Bank of International Settlement (BIS) data on liabilities used the wrong table, exaggerating the exposure of Austria's Erste bank's exposure to the Czech banking sector. On Poland, Madu said only a severe contraction could lead to deterioration in portfolios of Polish banks, and this seemed unlikely as the crisis bottoms out in Western Europe. In addition, despite the exposure of Polish banks to foreign exchange mortgage loans (denominated in Swiss francs),Maciej Baranski, Central Europe Analyst in HSBC's EMEA Equities division, told us he sees no major deterioration in the quality of those loans because the decline in Swiss interest rates. Non Performing Loans Bound to Rise but Not Alarming -------------- -------------- ¶4. (SBU) Rising non-performing loans (NPLs) represent one challenge for the banking system but the cleansing needs to happen, according to RBS analysts. RBS estimates Ukraine's NPLs at above 20 percent and Lithuania at 8 percent, with Latvia and Kazakhstan also at high levels. Turkey,s NPLs of around 5 percent are less of a risk. Russia falls in the middle of the extremes, but bankers are nervous, says RBS. Economists who use a baseline scenario of a two percent contraction in GDP in 2009 predict Russia will see NPLs reaching ten percent. If, however, the Russian economy contracts 6 to 7 percent this year (as expected from first quarter 2009 figures),NPLs will likely rise to 15 percent or more and banks will need to recapitalize, according to Ash. ¶5. (SBU) NPLs in Poland, Hungary and Czech Republic have been rising and are likely to increase further as economic growth slows and unemployment rises, but they are lower than NPL rates in 2007 and analysts do not foresee markets reacting badly. In Poland, Jacqueline Madu from Credit Suisse stressed to us NPLs have reached 5.5 percent this year but are still lower than the 8 percent level two years ago when LONDON 00001369 002.2 OF 004 unemployment hovered around 13 percent. She said NPLs in the three central European countries will likely peak in the third quarter of this year, eroding profitability, but will not instigate bank insolvency. Maciej Baranksi from HSBC projected nine percent NPLs and single digit loan growth in Poland this year, but he saw Polish banks as generally stable. Foreign Banks and Multilateral Institutions Remain Committed -------------- -------------- ¶6. (SBU) The banking sector in Eastern and Central Europe is largely foreign-owned, mainly by Nordic, Austrian, Greek, and Italian banks. The consensus among the analysts is parent banks will not allow subsidiaries to fail. (Comment: As an example, on May 19, the parent banks of nine large foreign-owned banks in Romania reaffirmed their commitment to subsidiaries and agreed to increase capital ration from 8 to 10 percent in conjunction with IMF/EU financial support. End Comment.) Madu told us Hungary's central bank and supervisory authority ran stress tests with a very severe 10.5 percent contraction scenario, and the results suggested banks need 1 billion euros, which corresponds to the amount received from the IMF/EU. Baranski also agreed and told us Western European banks will not let Polish subsidiaries fails as this would gravely impact pension funds invested by Western banks in Polish subsidiaries. The parent banks may force Polish banks to find other sources of funding such as local deposits; the ensuing competition for local deposits will kill profitability as net interest margins decline. ¶7. (SBU) Foreign banks will remain active in the region because of the competitive tax advantage Eastern Europe provides compared to Western Europe, labor market flexibility, and home market sentiment, analysts said. RBS' Ash acknowledged his bank was cutting operations from 70 to 56 units in the region, some of which were inherited from its merger with ABN Amro. RBS is looking to reduce risk in the region but maintain presence. Analysts expect some sell offs in Kazakhstan Czech Republic, Azerbaijan, and Uzbekistan, but RBS is committed to the big emerging markets in the region, namely Russia, Turkey, and Poland. HSBC's Baranski, citing AIG as an example, told us sell offs of Central European subsidiaries will be strategic in nature with financial institutions looking for buyers to pay a decent price vice a fire sale. Juliet Sampson, HSBC Chief Economist, Emerging Europe, Middle East and Africa Economics and Investment Strategy told us May 20 the only "pulling out" scenario she can envision is if the parent banks are going out of business. Austrian and Swedish banks, in Central Europe and the Baltics respectively, consider the region as home territory so they cannot pull out without "shooting themselves in the foot." These parent banks are playing a long game and not willing to concede territory to competitors, she said, and commented the banks may be less committed to investments further afield, such as those in Ukraine and Kazakhstan. ¶8. (U) Multilateral institutions will continue to support small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) through local bank lending. Sampson points to the European Investment Bank's (EIB) 440 million euros agreement with Erste Group Bank and the EBRD's 432 million euros loan to Unicredit in early May. (Comment: EIB will grant loans to four local Erste branches--including Ceska Sporitelna, Erste Hungary, and Immorent--to provide funding for SMEs projects in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, Slovenia, and Austria. The Unicredit loan is part of a joint effort of EBRD, the World Bank, and EIB to provide over 24 billion euros in support of banks in the region and to fund lending to companies hit by the crisis.) The Need to Recapitalize Banks May Be Easing in Some Parts -------------- -------------- ¶9. (SBU) Baranski asserts the capital position of Central European banks is good, thus alleviating the need for bank recapitalization in Central Europe, even for Hungary's OTP Bank. Earlier this year, Poland's financial regulator requested banks not pay out dividends from 2008 profits. Such actions combined with continued, albeit reduced, profitability and slower loan growth give Baranski confidence that Polish banks' capital positions are strong enough to LONDON 00001369 003.2 OF 004 withstand rising NPLs. In addition, a greater weighting of government securities in their balance sheets may further help the capital ratios. Nonetheless, in his May 5 report on Polish banks, Baranski points out a number of banks--namely PKO and BRE--are seeking to use various forms of funding to boost their capital positions; these capital raisings are more to maintain lending in Poland vice solvency concerns. He views Russia as a different "kettle of fish" than Central Europe. Most of the liquidity in the banking system is focused on the largest banks. Foreign exchange reserves have been used to protect the ruble. Russian banks lack alternative resources such as raising funds overseas, so the government will have to recapitalize if NPLs rise or banks will have to sell assets said Baranski. (Comment: Earlier this year, the Russian government put forth a 900 billion ruble bank recapitalization plan for commercial banks, with state-controlled banks receiving the largest share. Russia also dipped into its sovereign wealth funds putting 400 billion rubles of the National Wealth Fund's money on deposits at state bank Vneshekonomobank (VEB) as part of Moscow's crisis rescue package and a further 225 billion rubles to be given to VEB for subordinated loans to banks. Nonetheless, President Medvedev announced last month that the government will no longer offer large bailouts to businesses and state-owned companies.) Potential Knock-on Effects from Troubles in the Baltics -------------- -------------- ¶10. (SBU) Despite gaining IMF/EU loans, Lativia remains a weak link in Eastern Europe. A Latvian devaluation could put pressure on other fixed exchange rate regimes in the region, particularly Estonia and Lithuania (Ref London 1321). A renewed crisis in the Baltics potentially brings heavy losses to Western European banks, especially Swedish ones, and dampens some of resilience shown in recent months. Following Latvia's failed debt auction on June 3, Sweden's Finance Minister attempted to reassure the market that Swedish banks could ride through the crisis with a public statement that the government of Sweden is prepared to take stakes in Swedish banks if they fail to manage mounting losses. In his June 3 markets report, RBS' Ash suggested the lack of vocal EU, IMF and Swedish officials' support of Latvia's peg implies an underestimation of the size of the problem and a failure to realize the extent of the potential regional currency corrections making the adjustment in Latvia more brutal. Ash, however, argues Latvia's 7.5 billion euros IMF/EU program -- while maybe not the right mix of policies to bring Latvia out of the crisis -- allowed other economies in the region and foreign banks to build up defenses. Ash does not believe a Latvian devaluation will necessitate immediate devaluation of other fixed exchange rate regimes in the region. The key risk will be capital flight vis-a-vis local currency deposits. Overnight deposit rates which doubled to 24 percent on June 3 rose to 25 percent June 4 amid fears of capital flight. During our May 20 meeting, Sampson said the mounting troubles in Latvia could be handled in a "controlled explosion" and maintained this view in her June 4 HSBC Global Research Flashnote. Sampson argues a devaluation before April would have produced more devastating fallout. With the banking sector "on the mend" and risk appetite improving, the threat of an extra-regional collapse is limited. Like Ash, Sampson asserts banks with exposure in the region have had ample time to assess their risks and prepare for such an event. ¶11. (SBU) Also, if Latvia devalues and region-wide currency sell-offs ensue, Poland may have to tap the IMF's Flexible Credit Line (FCL),according to Madu and Baranski. Poland's fiscal deficit has widened significantly, already reaching 3.8 percent and likely to increase to 4.8 percent by year end. RBS' Ash, however, views the FCL as free money since the there is no conditionality attached and consequently believes there's a greater likelihood officials may take the money to address budget financing problems. IMF money technically is not meant for fiscal support; however, the IMF cannot do anything if Warsaw uses it for the budget. He told us IMF officials have privately commented they do not really care if Poland uses the money for fiscal support. As for investors, Ash does not believe the market will react negatively if Poland taps the FCL money. The money will go into central bank reserves, the central bank will issue local currency and reserves stay the same. This type of scenario allows Poland to cover its budget deficit cheaply if needed. LONDON 00001369 004.2 OF 004 ¶12. (U) Comment: Central and Eastern Europe,s banking sectors generally appear more resilient than several month ago and market confidence has held -- so far -- even under pressure of Latvian devaluation. It remains to be seen whether the Latvian problem can be contained, with IMF officials and European Commission representatives demanding meaningful fiscal reform prior to handing out more assistance. While London analysts generally do not see spill-over effects, uncertainty remains as demonstrated by the cost of insuring sovereign debt in Eastern Europe. Moreover, with no clear and transparent Europe-wide bank stress tests, it is uncertain which individual foreign parent banks are poised to withstand further market strain. Visit London's Classified Website: http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Unit ed_Kingdom LeBaron