SLOVENIA FEELING TRAPPED BY CROATIAN INTRANSIGENCE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 LJUBLJANA 000095

NOFORN
SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/ERA, EUR/CE, EUR/SCE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/02/2019
TAGS: PREL EUN PGOV HR SI
SUBJECT: SLOVENIA FEELING TRAPPED BY CROATIAN INTRANSIGENCE
ON EU ACCESSION

Classified By: CDA Brad Freden, Reasons 1.4 (b,d)

Summary
--------------


1. (C) Iztok Mirosic, the Director-General for European
Affairs and Bilateral Politics (Under Secretary equivalent)
and Coordinator for Croatia, told CDA on April 3 that the
Government of Slovenia (GoS) wanted Croatia in the European
Union as soon as possible. However, Slovenia felt trapped
between Croatian intransigence and internal political
realities. We believe Slovenia would jump at the chance to
escape this dilemma if Croatia would offer a political
lifeline in the form of a face-saving compromise that takes
into consideration both sides' red lines. Absent some sign
that Croatia is willing to meet Slovenia half way, we see
this stalemate dragging on indefinitely.


2. (C) The GoS has accepted the March 25 proposal by EU
Commissioner for Enlargement Ollie Rehn for "ad hoc
arbitration" - as opposed to mediation - to resolve the
border issue and will also look at the expected Rehn proposal
with an open mind. However, the Slovenians are slowly coming
to believe that Croatia is not serious about finding a
compromise solution. Mirosic stated that Slovenia was
flexible, and only the political consensus about Slovenia's
need for territorial contact with the high seas limited
Slovenia's maneuverability. He explained that the government
must obtain a two-thirds majority in Parliament for the
ratification of Croatia's EU accession, and thus needed some
sort of compromise that it could take to the people and
Parliament. Slovenia had gone as far as it could politically
absent some sign of Croatia's willingness to meet Slovenia
half-way. Pressure on Slovenia by member-states or, he
implied, by the U.S. would be highly counter-productive
absent similar engagement with Croatia. End Summary.

Looking at Next Steps
--------------


3. (C) Mirosic repeated for CDA on April 3 a briefing about
Slovenia/Croatia that he had given to EU ambassadors the day
before. The main message was that Slovenia had gone as far
as it could go without some sign from Croatia of its
willingness to compromise. He noted that Slovenia and
Croatia were expecting Rehn to put forward another proposal
before Easter, perhaps around April 8; the parties would meet
after Easter break, perhaps around April 20, prior to the
Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) on April 24. He said he
had warned the EU ambassadors that this was a very narrow
time frame, and he doubted that Slovenia and Croatia would be
able to reach agreement by April 23 under the current
circumstances.


4. (C) He reviewed the latest Rehn proposal for ad hoc
arbitration, which would consist of five wisemen (he said
that Croatia did not want Ahtisaari). Rehn would name the
president of the "Senior Expert Group," who would then
appoint two of recognizable competence in international law
and dispute resolution, and Slovenia and Croatia would each
appoint one (if either side did not appoint somebody in a
reasonable time, then the ICJ would make the appointment).
He explained that Slovenian law required that entry of force
of the agreement to go arbitration be by Parliamentary
ratification, not signature; i.e. Parliament will have to
approve the arbitration proposal by a simple majority.
Mirosic said the need for an early vote in Parliament was
good in that it would help build the necessary political
consensus and prepare the public for compromise. A
two-thirds majority would still be required to ratify
Croatia's entry into the EU. He noted that although Slovenia
was not enthusiastic about arbitration, it had accepted
Rehn's latest proposal in principle. He speculated that
Rehn's proposal-to-come would incorporate Slovenian and
Croatian concerns.

Getting Ratification Requires Compromise
--------------


4. (C) Mirosic stressed that the government needed a
compromise solution to sell to its public and Parliament in
order to avoid a referendum that would likely block
ratification. He explained that there was strong public and
political consensus for Slovenia's position (88-90 percent
favored Slovenia taking a strong position),and that the
government needed to have a reasonable compromise in hand

LJUBLJANA 00000095 002 OF 003


that it could then sell to the public.

But Croatia Has Plenty of Reasons to Wait
--------------


6. (C) Mirosic put forward a couple of explanations for
Croatia's "unwillingness to compromise." He said Slovenia
was getting the impression that Croatia did not want to
conclude EU negotiations this year for a variety of reasons,
including upcoming elections, and politically-explosive
problems with other chapters. In his view, the Croatian
leadership is content to let Slovenia take the blame for
delaying Croatia's accession, at least until after local and
presidential elections, in order to avoid the domestically
painful measures needed to close the Competition and Justice
and Home Affairs chapters. He also suggested that Croatia
would let the Rehn initiative die on the vine in hopes that
member-states would pressure Slovenia to back down once the
issue was put back on the agenda of the Council. He
commented ironically that the recent ideas proposed by the
French about splitting the issue in various ways were
"surprisingly similar to Croatian proposals." Mirosic added
that Slovenia had informed France and Rehn that those
proposals were non-starters as they were politically
indefensible to the Slovenian public.


7. (C/NF) Mirosic and the Czech Ambassador in Ljubljana both
explained that some of the bigger member-states, e.g.,
France, were hoping to annex legal amendments to the Lisbon
Treaty (to meet Irish demands) to votes by member-states on
Croatia's accession. This would be a simpler and more
politically palatable process than requiring each
member-state to vote separately on the legal amendments to
the Lisbon Treaty. These member-states were thus pressuring
Slovenia to separate Croatia's accession from the border
issue, a position that Mirosic noted would make Slovenia's
ratification of Croatia's entry impossible.


8. (C/NF) The Czech Ambassador also reasoned that Croatia was
stalling in the hopes that Slovenia would yield to pressure.
She explained that the Czech Presidency was concerned that if
there were no progress between now and the April 24 IGC, then
the Foreign Ministers would discuss Slovenia and Croatia's
accession at the GAERC two days later. In her view, that
discussion would not lead anywhere and would only add to the
pressure on Slovenia, although Croatia would be happy. She
agreed that Slovenia would not and could not back down
because of the internal political situation, so Croatia would
be no nearer to accession. Andrej Benedejcic, Director of
the MFA's Directorate for Policy Planning and Multilateral
Policy, also told CDA on April 2 that Slovenia was concerned
about recent Croatian comments suggesting that Slovenia had
only ratified Croatia's NATO accession because of U.S.
pressure. While agreeing that the assertions were false,
Benedejcic noted that they were extremely counterproductive,
as would be pressure from EU member-states.

Hoping for Success with the Rehn Proposal
--------------


9. (C/NF) Mirosic noted that after Rehn had met with the EU
trio of France, Czech Republic, and Sweden on April 1, the
trio had expressed its support for Rehn and the clear view
that further progress was necessary before the IGC. Mirosic
held out hope that since Rehn now had the backing of the EU
troika, Rehn was likely to give the process more time in the
hopes that Croatia would accept his proposal. Although
Mirosic doubted, for the reasons above, that Croatia would
engage seriously, Slovenia views the Rehn process as the only
game in town. The Czech Presidency shares this view and
believes that this is the only initiative at the moment that
could lead to anything. The Czech Ambassador noted that
parallel initiatives could weaken the Rehn initiative.

Comment
--------------


10. (C) Slovenia's clear message is that it wants Croatia in
the EU, but it feels trapped between Croatian intransigence
and internal Slovenian political realities. We believe
Slovenia would jump at the chance to escape this dilemma if
Croatia would offer a political lifeline in the form of a
face-saving compromise that takes into consideration both
sides' red lines. Absent some sign that Croatia is willing
to meet Slovenia half way, we see this stalemate dragging on
indefinitely. Given the recent experience with the

LJUBLJANA 00000095 003 OF 003


referendum initiative on Croatia's NATO accession, we believe
that pressure on Slovenia alone will not result in a happy
ending to this story. Rather, we need to steer both sides
toward compromise in an even-handed manner.
FREDEN