SLOVENIA: POLITICAL DECISION ON OMLT, CAVEATS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 LJUBLJANA 000337 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/19/2019 TAGS: PREL NATO MARR AF SI SUBJECT: SLOVENIA: POLITICAL DECISION ON OMLT, CAVEATS LIKELY LATE OCT, EARLY NOV Classified By: A/DCM Sue Shultz, reasons 1.4(b,d) Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) The Ministry of Defense (MOD) and Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) are both preparing for the government to make a decision on the possibility of a Slovene-led Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team (OMLT) in late October or early November, according to MOD State Secretary Uros Krek and MFA Director General for Multilateral Affairs Andrej Benedejcic. Krek and Benedejcic told CDA that the ministries are "pushing ahead" and are hopeful that the government will lift caveats and approve an OMLT. Both Krek and Benedejcic acknowledged that political opposition to deploying an OMLT and lifting caveats came from within the coalition, not the opposition. They also highlighted the important role public opinion plays in shaping Slovenia's efforts in Afghanistan, with Benedejcic stressing the need to "fight the perception that there is no endpoint." CDA offered post's assistance on the public diplomacy front, and Krek and Benedejcic strongly agreed with CDA's emphasis on getting Slovene and Afghan voices involved in the broader debate on why Slovenia is and should be involved. End Summary. Increase Effectiveness, Not Numbers -------------- ¶2. (C) MOD State Secretary Uros Krek told CDA on October 19 the parliamentary Foreign Affairs and Defense committees would take up the issue of overseas operations on October 29 in a joint meeting. Krek noted that increasing the number of Slovene troops in Afghanistan was "politically unacceptable," but he was hopeful that the government coalition would recognize that the "only viable way" for Slovenia to contribute more would be to field the OMLT and lift caveats. Krek acknowledged that OMLTs are a centerpiece of building capacity of and shifting responsibility to Afghan forces, and that a Slovene OMLT would provide greater added value than sending more Slovene troops in the current force protection role with caveats. He highlighted that budget cuts would not affect Slovene participation in Afghanistan, saying that the transition to a deterrent posture in Kosovo meant that any reduction in overall Slovene deployments abroad would stem from the drawdown there. ¶3. (C) Resistance to the proposed OMLT would likely come from within the governing coalition, Krek told CDA, while the main opposition party SDS would likely support the proposal. Franco Juri, a parliamentarian from coalition party ZARES, has recently called for a withdrawal of Slovene forces from ISAF. Krek was pleased to note, however, that Juri will accompany Krek on a November trip to Afghanistan, becoming the first parliamentarian to travel there. Though not optimistic that Juri would change his mind on withdrawal, Krek said that Juri's trip was a good start towards getting Slovene politicians and public to see and understand the "broader picture" of why NATO is in Afghanistan. Timeframe Key Selling Point -------------- ¶4. (C) Although the "general climate is full of doubt about the Afghan endeavor," MFA Director General Andrej Benedejcic told CDA on October 21 that the MOD and MFA are pushing ahead on "strengthening the (Slovene) presence" in Afghanistan. Benedejcic noted that the biggest obstacle to political or public support for Slovene efforts was the perception of "no endpoint" in sight. He said that parliament would have a "discussion role," though no formal role in the decision, and providing a timeframe for Slovene commitment would address many of the doubts from parliamentarians. ¶5. (C) Both Krek and Benedejcic expressed concern on how politicians and the public would handle any Slovene casualties, though Benedejcic indicated that he was optimistic that Slovenians would have a similar response as the publics in the Baltic states after their first casualties--"initial shock," but then moving forward. He said the reaction would be completely different were the Slovene Armed Forces still on a conscription system rather than the all-professional military model. Painting the Broader Portrait -------------- ¶6. (C) In response to CDA's offer of public diplomacy assistance, Krek and Benedejcic heartily agreed that getting LJUBLJANA 00000337 002 OF 002 Afghan speakers or Slovenes with civilian experience in Afghanistan in front of the public would significantly enhance any PD efforts. Both acknowledged that Slovene audiences, public and official, needed to see the context of general development, of which security is the essential first step. Benedejcic specifically cited women's rights as a topic that would resonate in Slovenia. He also outlined the MFA's plan to hold some PD events around the November 13 NATO Strategic Concept meeting in Slovenia, with Madeleine Albright to possibly headline the event as the chair of the group of experts. Comment -------------- ¶7. (C) The Government of Slovenia's upcoming decision to possibly lift caveats and approve an OMLT will be an important test of the Pahor administration's resolve to continue Slovenia's active engagement in Afghanistan, especially given Defense Minister Jelusic's recent announcement of projected budget cuts that will decrease the number of Slovene troops deployed abroad. With Prime Minister Pahor already taking a political beating over negotiations to resolve the Slovenia-Croatia border dispute, an OMLT offers a more concrete timeframe that can help dispel public qualms over an endless commitment in Afghanistan, thus avoiding yet another potential landmine for the embattled government. If the PM is able to win over skeptical coalition partners to support the OMLT, he could likely find uneasy common ground with opposition leader Janez Jansa, who as leader of the previous government sent four Slovene soldiers to Iraq as trainers. Committing to an OMLT would also earn Slovenia greater credibility within NATO, as ISAF is looking to increase the number of both military and police OMLTs in Afghanistan. Public diplomacy efforts will be critical in the government's efforts; Post will work closely with both the MFA and MOD to shape an effective PD strategy. FREDEN