SLOVENIA: POLITICAL DECISION ON OMLT, CAVEATS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 LJUBLJANA 000337

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/19/2019
TAGS: PREL NATO MARR AF SI
SUBJECT: SLOVENIA: POLITICAL DECISION ON OMLT, CAVEATS
LIKELY LATE OCT, EARLY NOV

Classified By: A/DCM Sue Shultz, reasons 1.4(b,d)

Summary
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1. (C) The Ministry of Defense (MOD) and Ministry of Foreign
Affairs (MFA) are both preparing for the government to make a
decision on the possibility of a Slovene-led Operational
Mentoring and Liaison Team (OMLT) in late October or early
November, according to MOD State Secretary Uros Krek and MFA
Director General for Multilateral Affairs Andrej Benedejcic.
Krek and Benedejcic told CDA that the ministries are "pushing
ahead" and are hopeful that the government will lift caveats
and approve an OMLT. Both Krek and Benedejcic acknowledged
that political opposition to deploying an OMLT and lifting
caveats came from within the coalition, not the opposition.
They also highlighted the important role public opinion plays
in shaping Slovenia's efforts in Afghanistan, with Benedejcic
stressing the need to "fight the perception that there is no
endpoint." CDA offered post's assistance on the public
diplomacy front, and Krek and Benedejcic strongly agreed with
CDA's emphasis on getting Slovene and Afghan voices involved
in the broader debate on why Slovenia is and should be
involved. End Summary.

Increase Effectiveness, Not Numbers
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2. (C) MOD State Secretary Uros Krek told CDA on October 19
the parliamentary Foreign Affairs and Defense committees
would take up the issue of overseas operations on October 29
in a joint meeting. Krek noted that increasing the number of
Slovene troops in Afghanistan was "politically unacceptable,"
but he was hopeful that the government coalition would
recognize that the "only viable way" for Slovenia to
contribute more would be to field the OMLT and lift caveats.
Krek acknowledged that OMLTs are a centerpiece of building
capacity of and shifting responsibility to Afghan forces, and
that a Slovene OMLT would provide greater added value than
sending more Slovene troops in the current force protection
role with caveats. He highlighted that budget cuts would not
affect Slovene participation in Afghanistan, saying that the
transition to a deterrent posture in Kosovo meant that any
reduction in overall Slovene deployments abroad would stem
from the drawdown there.


3. (C) Resistance to the proposed OMLT would likely come from
within the governing coalition, Krek told CDA, while the main
opposition party SDS would likely support the proposal.
Franco Juri, a parliamentarian from coalition party ZARES,
has recently called for a withdrawal of Slovene forces from
ISAF. Krek was pleased to note, however, that Juri will
accompany Krek on a November trip to Afghanistan, becoming
the first parliamentarian to travel there. Though not
optimistic that Juri would change his mind on withdrawal,
Krek said that Juri's trip was a good start towards getting
Slovene politicians and public to see and understand the
"broader picture" of why NATO is in Afghanistan.

Timeframe Key Selling Point
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4. (C) Although the "general climate is full of doubt about
the Afghan endeavor," MFA Director General Andrej Benedejcic
told CDA on October 21 that the MOD and MFA are pushing ahead
on "strengthening the (Slovene) presence" in Afghanistan.
Benedejcic noted that the biggest obstacle to political or
public support for Slovene efforts was the perception of "no
endpoint" in sight. He said that parliament would have a
"discussion role," though no formal role in the decision, and
providing a timeframe for Slovene commitment would address
many of the doubts from parliamentarians.


5. (C) Both Krek and Benedejcic expressed concern on how
politicians and the public would handle any Slovene
casualties, though Benedejcic indicated that he was
optimistic that Slovenians would have a similar response as
the publics in the Baltic states after their first
casualties--"initial shock," but then moving forward. He
said the reaction would be completely different were the
Slovene Armed Forces still on a conscription system rather
than the all-professional military model.

Painting the Broader Portrait
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6. (C) In response to CDA's offer of public diplomacy
assistance, Krek and Benedejcic heartily agreed that getting

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Afghan speakers or Slovenes with civilian experience in
Afghanistan in front of the public would significantly
enhance any PD efforts. Both acknowledged that Slovene
audiences, public and official, needed to see the context of
general development, of which security is the essential first
step. Benedejcic specifically cited women's rights as a
topic that would resonate in Slovenia. He also outlined the
MFA's plan to hold some PD events around the November 13 NATO
Strategic Concept meeting in Slovenia, with Madeleine
Albright to possibly headline the event as the chair of the
group of experts.

Comment
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7. (C) The Government of Slovenia's upcoming decision to
possibly lift caveats and approve an OMLT will be an
important test of the Pahor administration's resolve to
continue Slovenia's active engagement in Afghanistan,
especially given Defense Minister Jelusic's recent
announcement of projected budget cuts that will decrease the
number of Slovene troops deployed abroad. With Prime
Minister Pahor already taking a political beating over
negotiations to resolve the Slovenia-Croatia border dispute,
an OMLT offers a more concrete timeframe that can help dispel
public qualms over an endless commitment in Afghanistan, thus
avoiding yet another potential landmine for the embattled
government. If the PM is able to win over skeptical
coalition partners to support the OMLT, he could likely find
uneasy common ground with opposition leader Janez Jansa, who
as leader of the previous government sent four Slovene
soldiers to Iraq as trainers. Committing to an OMLT would
also earn Slovenia greater credibility within NATO, as ISAF
is looking to increase the number of both military and police
OMLTs in Afghanistan. Public diplomacy efforts will be
critical in the government's efforts; Post will work closely
with both the MFA and MOD to shape an effective PD strategy.
FREDEN