SLOVENIA-CROATIA: PM WILLING TO COMPROMISE ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 LJUBLJANA 000275 SIPDIS DEPT FOR EUR/CE AND EUR/SCE E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/30/2019 TAGS: PREL EUN HR SI SUBJECT: SLOVENIA-CROATIA: PM WILLING TO COMPROMISE ON BORDER, BUT "TIME IS RUNNING OUT" REF: LJUBLJANA 259 Classified By: CDA Brad Freden, Reasons 1.4(b,d) Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) Slovenian Prime Minister Borut Pahor informed DAS Stuart Jones on August 30 that he was willing to be flexible on the language of the June 15 Rehn proposal (Rehn 2) despite the political risks, but he needed a public statement from the Government of Croatia (GoC) agreeing to the Rehn 2 framework. Pahor said several times that without such a public reference to the Rehn process, "it is impossible to proceed". He warned that there was a very short window of opportunity to move forward on the border issue, and asked for U.S. support in closing the deal. It was also clear from Jones' discussions with Pahor that other politically-sensitive foreign policy initiatives would remain on hold as long as there is near-term hope for resolving the dispute with Croatia. END SUMMARY. Showing Flexibility -------------- ¶2. (C) Pahor made a surprise request to meet with DAS Stu Jones on August 30 to discuss the Slovenia-Croatia border issue. During a 15 minute walk in the forest around Lake Bled, Pahor confided to DAS Jones that he was willing to "make concessions and show flexibility" if Croatia agreed to proceed "on the basis of Rehn" and make a public statement to that effect. Without such a public reference to the Rehn process, "It is impossible to proceed", Pahor said. He reiterated this point forcefully several times. Pahor informed DAS Jones that he was willing to face the Parliament and public opinion if he had a public statement from the GoC. He said he could be flexible regarding the precise text so long as Rehn 2 formed the basis of any agreement. He expressed willingness to insert language into the Rehn proposal that would clarify the clause dealing with Slovenia's "junction" with the high seas, ensuring that it did not prejudge one way or the other a Slovenian maritime border with the high seas. Time Is Of The Essence -------------- ¶3. (C) Pahor insisted there was only a two-week window of opportunity for reaching an agreement with Croatia. He did not provide a reason for the deadline but warned that if there is no agreement in the next two weeks, the moment would be lost and it could take years to come to a mutually acceptable framework, or an agreement might never be reached. Pahor said emphatically that no Slovenian government could allow Croatia's accession talks to proceed without an agreement on the way forward with regards to the border. Slovenian Resolution is Close -------------- ¶4. (C) Other GoS officials at the Bled Forum echoed Pahor's position on flexibility and the need for Rehn 2 to be the basis for any process to resolve the border issue. MFA Director General Iztok Mirosic spoke at great length with DAS Jones about previous attempts to resolve the border issue. As the highest ranking diplomat working on the border issue on a day-to-day basis, Mirosic repeated that without a public reference to Rehn 2, PM Pahor could not go to the Slovenian Parliament to seek their approval on a process to resolve the issue. Mirosic believed that the GoC had not been "serious" during the last 6 months, but he was optimistic about the chances of resolution with Croatian PM Kosor. How to Break the Log Jam -------------- ¶5. (C) The PM's foreign policy Marko Markovec informed CDA Freden on September 2 that Slovenia would lift a blockade on Croatia's EU accession once Croatia sends a letter to the EU Presidency that contains the following: a declaration that none of the documents submitted by the EU or any of the unilateral acts taken since June 21, 1991 will be used to prejudice the outcome of the border dispute and; a commitment by both sides to negotiate based on Rehn 2, although some creativity can be used regarding the precise language. ¶6. (C) Markovec confirmed our theory that the sense of urgency was due to the legislative calendar. Some MPs are already demanding an update on the status of negotiations as LJUBLJANA 00000275 002 OF 002 soon as Parliament comes back into session. Pahor feels that he must have an agreement in hand when he goes to Parliament if he is to keep the process from going off the rails. He is certain he can get ratification of the agreement from Parliament and has the support of the President of Slovenia as long as Rehn 2 is mentioned in the agreement. The Six Step Process -------------- ¶7. (C) Markovec emphasized that Slovenia does not seek to resolve the border dispute before Croatia joins the EU, but an agreement on arbitration is necessary before Slovenia ratifies Croatia's accession. Markovec envisioned the following sequence of events: 1) A preliminary agreement that takes into account the two redlines mentioned in paragraph 5; 2) EU Presidency acknowledges the agreement; 3) Slovenia immediately lifts the blockade on Croatia's EU accession talks; 4) The two parliaments endorse the agreement and negotiators work to come to a mutually acceptable language for the final arbitration agreement; 5) Ratification by both sides of the final arbitration agreement and; 6) Slovenia's ratification of Croatia's EU membership. Under this scenario, a decision by the arbitration panel regarding the border would likely come after Croatia becomes a member of the EU. Comment -------------- ¶8. (C) Although DAS Jones said that we regard the European Commission and the Swedish presidency as the key intermediaries, Slovenia clearly looks to the U.S. as an honest broker. Markovec went so far as to say in a subsequent conversation that the PM was disillusioned by the EU's ineffectiveness and looked to the U.S. to help bring negotiations to a successful conclusion. ¶9. (C) Noting that Jones would travel to Zagreb the following day, Pahor asked Jones for U.S. support in convincing Croatia of his sincerity. Lowering his voice to a whisper, he asked that we also convey our support for an agreement to former Prime Minister Janez Jansa, the leader of the largest opposition party in parliament. Jones noted that we had been in touch with Jansa through our embassy in Ljubljana, and that we were confident that Jansa could be convinced not to make a partisan issue out of any agreement with Croatia. In closing, Pahor thanked the Charge d'Affaires for helping him "see the way forward" after the apparent breakdown of the Rehn process in early July. ¶10. (C) Pahor wants an agreement with Croatia, and he believes the sooner he gets it in front of Parliament, the more likely it is to be approved. This issue is clearly his number-one foreign policy priority. Moreover, it is clear from Jones' discussion with Pahor of Guantanamo detainees that other politically-sensitive foreign policy initiatives will remain on hold as long as there is near-term hope for resolving the dispute with Croatia. END COMMENT. ¶11. (U) DAS Jones has cleared this message. FREDEN