SLOVENIA-CROATIA: PM CLINGS TO REHN PROCESS,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 LJUBLJANA 000183 SIPDIS DEPT FOR D (S) E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/05/2019 TAGS: PREL EUN PGOV PINR HR SI SUBJECT: SLOVENIA-CROATIA: PM CLINGS TO REHN PROCESS, OFFERS SHORT-TERM SOLUTION TO UNBLOCK ACCESSION Classified By: CDA BFreden, reason 1.4(b,d) Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) In a July 3 meeting with CDA, a haggard-looking Prime Minister Pahor stated that he would like the process led by EU Commissioner Olli Rehn to resolve the Slovenia-Croatia impasse to continue as the two countries were "very close." He acknowledged, however, that it was an open question as to what the Presidency and the Commission would do. He offered an alternative proposal that would allow Slovenia to lift its reservations, but sidestepped the question of whether the Slovenian Parliament could garner the two-thirds necessary to ratify Croatia's accession treaty. The latter would likely require continued strong EU and U.S. engagement in support of a solution similar to the current Rehn proposal. Pahor noted that Slovenia was prepared to work on the issue over the summer, and that FM Zbogar would attend the Dubrovnik Summit to signal to Croatia that Slovenia would like to continue talks. CDA stressed that bilateral issues should not stand in the way of enlargement and offered USG engagement to support EU efforts. He also told the PM that the U.S. was urging both sides to negotiate quietly, outside the media. End Summary. The Rehn Process -------------- ¶2. (C) Pahor said he personally would accept as is the June 12 Rehn proposal that would set forth a path to resolve the Slovenia-Croatia border dispute. (Note: the dispute affected Croatia's EU accession when Croatia introduced documents and maps in its EU accession documents that Slovenia deemed prejudicial to the border leading it to block the opening and closing of 13 acquis chapters.) While he thought he could sell it to his coalition partners, he did not know the position of Jansa's SDS (the largest opposition party) because the latest draft did not contain an explicit reference to the principle of "ex aequa et bono." The two smaller opposition parties in parliament would definitely oppose it, and would likely be able to force a referendum. He would clearly need Jansa's support to prevail in a referendum, not to mention to gain the necessary two-thirds majority for ratification of the accession treaty. ¶3. (C) The PM questioned what role the Swedish Presidency would play. He noted that when he had last spoken with Swedish FM Carl Bildt, Bildt had said that time was needed for reflection and indicated that July and August provided that time. Pahor stressed, however, that Slovenia would like the process to continue as they were "very close," but acknowledged that it was a decision by the Commission. He added that if the Commission chose not to continue, it would be very difficult for Croatia to actually "pull the documents back" because many of them are part of Croatian legislation submitted to the Commission. An Alternative Proposal -------------- ¶4. (C) Pahor offered an alternative proposal consisting of three elements: -- A Commission position that it would not take into consideration any of the prejudicial documents submitted as part of the accession process. -- A unilateral statement by the Croatian parliament affirming that no document or action undertaken after June 25 1991 would prejudice the border. -- The Commission to "obligate" both parties to continue bilateral discussions on the basis of the June 12 Rehn proposal. Pahor noted that the Croatian Sabor had basically agreed to the second element, which was a parallel to Article 5 of the May Rehn proposal that the Sabor had approved. Though Pahor did not say so, the perceived lack of a binding political commitment by Croatia was what doomed the French letter last December. If the above three conditions were met, Slovenia would immediately lift its reservations on Croatia's accession talks. Pahor noted that this alternate proposal could be a short-term solution that could also ease bilateral relations. Pahor emphasized, however, the longer-term difficulty -- the problem from the beginning would remain: whether the Slovenian Parliament could get the two-thirds vote it needs to ratify Croatia's EU accession treaty. The Rehn process offered a way that addressed that major issue LJUBLJANA 00000183 002 OF 002 because it provided an international means that would resolve the border dispute. Prospects after Sanader's Resignation -------------- ¶5. (C) Pahor commented that Sanader's resignation would make it harder to reach agreement in the short term, because the new PM would have to find her bearings before moving ahead and it would also be difficult for a new government to change positions. He worried that Croatia might lack the political will, but he undertook to try to build political will on the Slovenian side. He said that Slovenia was ready to work on the alternate proposal this summer. He confirmed that Zbogar will go to Dubrovnik next week and hoped to have a productive discussion with Jandrokovic. Pahor added that this was a critical moment given Sanader's resignation, and that, by sending FM Zbogar to Dubrovnik, Slovenia was trying to send a signal to Croatia that it would like to go on with talks. U.S. Supports a Resolution -------------- ¶6. (C) CDA reiterated the U.S. position that bilateral disputes should not stand in the way of EU accession. He noted that the U.S. was urging both sides to continue working to find a solution that will allow Croatia's accession talks to resume as quickly as possible; and the two sides should negotiate quietly, outside of the media. He added that the U.S. supports EU efforts and the U.S. would remain actively engaged and would support both sides as they sought to reach a compromise. Pahor asked the U.S. to encourage Croatia to accept either the June 12 Rehn proposal or the alternative put forth above. CDA briefed Pahor on the status of our process of nominating an Ambassador to Slovenia, to which Pahor replied that he would not like to have any speculation that the lack of an Ambassador was some sort of punishment for Slovenia. Comment -------------- ¶7. (C) Pahor looked haggard, despite his perennial tan. He has lost weight and his pants were starting to bunch up around the waist. His presentation was uncharacteristically flat. His appearance is probably due as much to domestic political infighting as it is to the impasse with Croatia, but it is clear that he would like to find a way to put this issue behind him once and for all. We see the alternative proposal put forth by Pahor as a means to get Croatia's accession talks back on track, but it does little to address the question of Slovenia's eventual ratification of the accession treaty. The latter will still require U.S. and EU engagement in support of something similar to the most recent Rehn proposal. But at least Croatia's accession talks can move forward in parallel. FREDEN