SLOVENIA READY TO REENGAGE IN REHN PROCESS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 LJUBLJANA 000173

NOFORN
SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/ERA, EUR/CE, EUR/SCE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/18/2019
TAGS: PREL EUN PGOV HR SI
SUBJECT: SLOVENIA READY TO REENGAGE IN REHN PROCESS

Classified By: ADCM Grace Shelton, Reasons 1.4 (b,d)

Summary
--------------


1. (C/NF) MFA State Secretary Dragoljuba Bencina requested to
see CDA on June 19 to review the recent developments with the
Rehn process. CDA urged Slovenia to continue its efforts in
the Rehn process and assured Slovenia we were passing this
message in Zagreb as well. CDA conveyed Embassy Zagreb's
views that Croatia had not walked away from negotiations.
Bencina stressed that Slovenia remained committed to the
process and was ready to continue the negotiations at any
time. Bencina and head of the legal department Simona Drenik
explained that Slovenia was basically at yes, although it
would suggest (but likely not insist) on one small change to
satisfy parliamentarians and Slovenian legal experts. They
also stated that for domestic political reasons Slovenia
would like to have some guarantees in the joint declaration
that would then enable Slovenia to greenlight resumption of
negotiations upon signature, rather than ratification. They
welcomed our support for the process, which they view as very
close to agreement. We suggest that Washington encouragement
to all sides to reach a deal under the Rehn process could be
the fastest way to assure the resumption of Croatia's EU
accession negotiations. End Summary.

Reviving Rehn Process - Slovenia Ready to Say Yes
-------------- --------------


2. (C) Bencina explained that she had just briefed the EU
Ambassadors and was aware that Croatian FM Jandrokovic was
briefing the diplomatic corps in Zagreb on the June 18
Trilateral talks in Brussels with EU Commissioner Rehn. She
said that Jandrokovic had stated Croatia would not accept the
latest Rehn proposal from June 15, and so Slovenia concluded
that Croatia was withdrawing from the process. Slovenia
regretted this decision, and saw parallels to the
Drnovsek-Racan agreement; she speculated that perhaps Croatia
was unable to muster enough strength to conclude the process.
She emphasized that Slovenia was ready to return to the
table and continue talks. She noted that Rehn had stated
that he did not see negotiations continuing and would inform
the Presidency. Drenik noted that although Rehn said he did
not see any reason to continue, she thought he had left the
door open were circumstances to change.


3. (C/NF) Bencina pointed out that the MFA and government
had put a lot of effort into swaying public opinion to accept
the latest Rehn proposal as the best possible compromise for
Slovenia (although they labeled the agreement a "lose-lose
agreement" it was what could be acceptable to both sides).
As a result of their consultations and pulsing the political
atmosphere, Slovenia was prepared to accept the Rehn proposal
as is, with one suggestion: in Article 4(b): add the clause
"including historical" to modify "relevant circumstances."
The clause would then read: "(b) international law, equity
and the principle of good neighborly relations in order to
achieve a fair and just result by taking into account all
relevant, including historical, circumstances for the
determinations referred to in Article 3(1)(b) and (c)."
Drenik explained that this addition was to convince the
parliament, and the public, that Slovenia's interests were
protected even though the principle of "ex aequa et bono" was
not explicitly mentioned. She indicated that this was
negotiable and could be part of an exchange and that Slovenia
could be flexible to a degree if Croatia proposed a change to
Article 2: Composition of the Arbitral Tribunal to include a
reference to an arbitration member being a former member of
the ICJ.


4. (C) CDA noted that the U.S. did not think there was much
space left to negotiate, but if Slovenia was at yes, we would
like to be helpful. Bencina welcomed the offer and undertook
to pass it along to the Prime Minister and the Foreign
Minister.

Choreography If Reach Agreement in Rehn Process
-------------- --


5. (C) Drenik stated that Slovenia had wanted to talk about
the possibility of lifting the blockade upon signature. She
commented that this would be a very tough decision for
Slovenia because of its experience under the Drnovsek-Racan
agreement, which Slovenia's Parliament ratified and Croatia's
did not. Slovenia would be ready to take the risk of lifting
its reservations upon signature if guarantees could be
included in the joint declaration. If the joint declaration

LJUBLJANA 00000173 002 OF 002


contained an understanding that if the states did not act
with bona fides, e.g. if Croatia did not move toward
ratification or concluding negotiations, there could be
consequences. Drenik noted that Slovenia needed approval by
Parliament's Committee on EU Relations before it could agree
to open or close chapters, thus some sort of guarantee was
essential. Bencina underscored that PM Pahor would like to
avoid a referendum and thought that such guarantees would
decrease the likelihood.

Domestic Political Considerations
--------------


6. (C) Pahor's public statements at the beginning of the week
can be taken as a clear indication he was preparing the
public for Slovenia to say yes. FM Zbogar confirmed this in
a June 18 press conference saying that the government had
been meeting with the parliamentary parties and gearing up to
the solution. After the June 16 discussion in the
Parliamentary Foreign Policy Commission, we spoke to
Commission members from both the Coalition (Franco Juri) and
the largest opposition party, SDS (Jerovsek, Deputy Chair
Milenko Ziherl). Juri said Slovenia should accept Rehn
newest proposal as is. SDS MPs were favorably inclined but
non-committal, pending, no doubt, a decision from Jansa. We
made the point that this might be Slovenia's last chance for
a long time to create a mechanism to resolve the border
dispute, and urged them to put this issue above politics.
CDA also sent a personal note to Jansa, basically saying the
same thing and urging him to give the proposal - which we had
not seen - very serious consideration.

If No Rehn Process - Need a "Reflection Pause"
-------------- -


7. (C) Bencina predicted that if Croatia did not want to
discuss the latest Rehn proposal, then Slovenia would likely
pause to reflect on the situation. She lamented that
Croatian PM Sanader had gone to the press while the
trilateral meeting was going on and made two new proposals
that he had never raised with Slovenia. She questioned
Croatia's good faith in negotiating the Rehn process given
Sanader's launch of alternative proposals in the midst of the
Rehn negotiations. She recalled previous GOS statements that
Croatia would be able to continue EU accession negotiations
only if there were a change in circumstances regarding the
documents prejudicing the border that Croatia introduced in
its accession documents. CDA shared Embassy Zagreb's views
that Croatia had not walked away from the negotiations, which
the MFA officials welcomed. He noted that public posturing
was not helping the negotiating process and that it did not
help to characterize Croatia as walking away from
negotiations.

Comment
--------------


8. (C) The Rehn process still seems to be the fastest and
most likely way to enable Croatia's EU accession negotiations
to resume. While Slovenia has problems with the current Rehn
proposal, it recognizes, and has started its campaign to
persuade politicians and the public, that this is the best
possible compromise. As the FM noted, the two sides have
come much closer over the past six months and are now very,
very close. Both sides will likely require some hand-holding
and moderate U.S. engagement to reach an agreement.
FREDEN