SLOVENIA READY TO REENGAGE IN REHN PROCESS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 LJUBLJANA 000173 NOFORN SIPDIS STATE FOR EUR/ERA, EUR/CE, EUR/SCE E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/18/2019 TAGS: PREL EUN PGOV HR SI SUBJECT: SLOVENIA READY TO REENGAGE IN REHN PROCESS Classified By: ADCM Grace Shelton, Reasons 1.4 (b,d) Summary -------------- ¶1. (C/NF) MFA State Secretary Dragoljuba Bencina requested to see CDA on June 19 to review the recent developments with the Rehn process. CDA urged Slovenia to continue its efforts in the Rehn process and assured Slovenia we were passing this message in Zagreb as well. CDA conveyed Embassy Zagreb's views that Croatia had not walked away from negotiations. Bencina stressed that Slovenia remained committed to the process and was ready to continue the negotiations at any time. Bencina and head of the legal department Simona Drenik explained that Slovenia was basically at yes, although it would suggest (but likely not insist) on one small change to satisfy parliamentarians and Slovenian legal experts. They also stated that for domestic political reasons Slovenia would like to have some guarantees in the joint declaration that would then enable Slovenia to greenlight resumption of negotiations upon signature, rather than ratification. They welcomed our support for the process, which they view as very close to agreement. We suggest that Washington encouragement to all sides to reach a deal under the Rehn process could be the fastest way to assure the resumption of Croatia's EU accession negotiations. End Summary. Reviving Rehn Process - Slovenia Ready to Say Yes -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) Bencina explained that she had just briefed the EU Ambassadors and was aware that Croatian FM Jandrokovic was briefing the diplomatic corps in Zagreb on the June 18 Trilateral talks in Brussels with EU Commissioner Rehn. She said that Jandrokovic had stated Croatia would not accept the latest Rehn proposal from June 15, and so Slovenia concluded that Croatia was withdrawing from the process. Slovenia regretted this decision, and saw parallels to the Drnovsek-Racan agreement; she speculated that perhaps Croatia was unable to muster enough strength to conclude the process. She emphasized that Slovenia was ready to return to the table and continue talks. She noted that Rehn had stated that he did not see negotiations continuing and would inform the Presidency. Drenik noted that although Rehn said he did not see any reason to continue, she thought he had left the door open were circumstances to change. 
 ¶3. (C/NF) Bencina pointed out that the MFA and government had put a lot of effort into swaying public opinion to accept the latest Rehn proposal as the best possible compromise for Slovenia (although they labeled the agreement a "lose-lose agreement" it was what could be acceptable to both sides). As a result of their consultations and pulsing the political atmosphere, Slovenia was prepared to accept the Rehn proposal as is, with one suggestion: in Article 4(b): add the clause "including historical" to modify "relevant circumstances." The clause would then read: "(b) international law, equity and the principle of good neighborly relations in order to achieve a fair and just result by taking into account all relevant, including historical, circumstances for the determinations referred to in Article 3(1)(b) and (c)." Drenik explained that this addition was to convince the parliament, and the public, that Slovenia's interests were protected even though the principle of "ex aequa et bono" was not explicitly mentioned. She indicated that this was negotiable and could be part of an exchange and that Slovenia could be flexible to a degree if Croatia proposed a change to Article 2: Composition of the Arbitral Tribunal to include a reference to an arbitration member being a former member of the ICJ. ¶4. (C) CDA noted that the U.S. did not think there was much space left to negotiate, but if Slovenia was at yes, we would like to be helpful. Bencina welcomed the offer and undertook to pass it along to the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister. Choreography If Reach Agreement in Rehn Process -------------- -- ¶5. (C) Drenik stated that Slovenia had wanted to talk about the possibility of lifting the blockade upon signature. She commented that this would be a very tough decision for Slovenia because of its experience under the Drnovsek-Racan agreement, which Slovenia's Parliament ratified and Croatia's did not. Slovenia would be ready to take the risk of lifting its reservations upon signature if guarantees could be included in the joint declaration. If the joint declaration LJUBLJANA 00000173 002 OF 002 contained an understanding that if the states did not act with bona fides, e.g. if Croatia did not move toward ratification or concluding negotiations, there could be consequences. Drenik noted that Slovenia needed approval by Parliament's Committee on EU Relations before it could agree to open or close chapters, thus some sort of guarantee was essential. Bencina underscored that PM Pahor would like to avoid a referendum and thought that such guarantees would decrease the likelihood. Domestic Political Considerations -------------- ¶6. (C) Pahor's public statements at the beginning of the week can be taken as a clear indication he was preparing the public for Slovenia to say yes. FM Zbogar confirmed this in a June 18 press conference saying that the government had been meeting with the parliamentary parties and gearing up to the solution. After the June 16 discussion in the Parliamentary Foreign Policy Commission, we spoke to Commission members from both the Coalition (Franco Juri) and the largest opposition party, SDS (Jerovsek, Deputy Chair Milenko Ziherl). Juri said Slovenia should accept Rehn newest proposal as is. SDS MPs were favorably inclined but non-committal, pending, no doubt, a decision from Jansa. We made the point that this might be Slovenia's last chance for a long time to create a mechanism to resolve the border dispute, and urged them to put this issue above politics. CDA also sent a personal note to Jansa, basically saying the same thing and urging him to give the proposal - which we had not seen - very serious consideration. If No Rehn Process - Need a "Reflection Pause" -------------- - ¶7. (C) Bencina predicted that if Croatia did not want to discuss the latest Rehn proposal, then Slovenia would likely pause to reflect on the situation. She lamented that Croatian PM Sanader had gone to the press while the trilateral meeting was going on and made two new proposals that he had never raised with Slovenia. She questioned Croatia's good faith in negotiating the Rehn process given Sanader's launch of alternative proposals in the midst of the Rehn negotiations. She recalled previous GOS statements that Croatia would be able to continue EU accession negotiations only if there were a change in circumstances regarding the documents prejudicing the border that Croatia introduced in its accession documents. CDA shared Embassy Zagreb's views that Croatia had not walked away from the negotiations, which the MFA officials welcomed. He noted that public posturing was not helping the negotiating process and that it did not help to characterize Croatia as walking away from negotiations. Comment -------------- ¶8. (C) The Rehn process still seems to be the fastest and most likely way to enable Croatia's EU accession negotiations to resume. While Slovenia has problems with the current Rehn proposal, it recognizes, and has started its campaign to persuade politicians and the public, that this is the best possible compromise. As the FM noted, the two sides have come much closer over the past six months and are now very, very close. Both sides will likely require some hand-holding and moderate U.S. engagement to reach an agreement. FREDEN