SLOVENIA SEEKS ANOTHER ROUND OF "QUIET" TALKS WITH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 LJUBLJANA 000149

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/ERA, EUR/CE, EUR/SCE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/18/2019
TAGS: PREL EUN PGOV HR SI
SUBJECT: SLOVENIA SEEKS ANOTHER ROUND OF "QUIET" TALKS WITH
CROATIA, REHN

Classified By: CDA Brad Freden, Reasons 1.4 (b,d)

Summary
--------------


1. (C) Iztok Mirosic, the MFA Coordinator for Croatia and U/S
equivalent Director for Bilateral Affairs, briefed CDA on May
15 on Slovenia's response to the latest Rehn proposal, which
it formally submitted to Rehn on May 18. Mirosic explained
that the government was very concerned that there be a fair
process that it could sell to the public, and thus had
consulted intensively with parliamentary parties in order to
formulate a response that had a majority consensus behind it.
Mirosic deemed that Slovenia's response protected Slovenia's
redlines and ensured a fair process for arbitration, so that
no matter the eventual result of the arbitration, the
government could defeat a likely referendum about Croatia's
EU accession. However, we recognize that Slovenia's two
"vital amendments" to the Rehn proposal -- concerning
possible territorial contact with the high seas and inclusion
of the term "ex aequa et bono" -- are anathema to Croatia.
Embassy Ljubljana does not see any easy way out of the
current impasse, but we offer several interim recommendations
in para 7. End Summary.

Slovenia's Political Realities Lead to a Qualified Yes
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2. (C) Mirosic explained that the government was focused on
building a case it could sell to the Slovenian people to
ensure a positive Slovenian vote for Croatia's EU accession.
The government had held extensive consultations with the
parliamentary parties to ensure that there was a political
consensus for Slovenia's response. Mirosic emphasized that
the government needed to be able to sell it to the public and
Parliament. If it could assure them that it had done
everything possible to guarantee that Slovenia's interests
were taken into account in the process, then the majority
would accept the outcome of the arbitration, whatever it
might be. He acknowledged that Slovenia's response was not
unanimous. Two opposition parties, SLS and SNS, remained
against a positive response to Rehn and SNS leader Jelencic
had already warned to expect a referendum. However, the
government had on board Jansa and SDS, the largest opposition
party, and so believed that together they could defeat a
referendum. The government was looking at this in the
context of the end results: ratification of Croatia's EU
accession. If the mandate of the arbitration tribunal did
not take into account Slovenia's redlines, ratification would
fail.

Slovenia's Amendments
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3. (C) According to Mirosic, Slovenia had proposed "minimal"
changes to the text, but two of the changes were so vital
that Slovenia viewed them as redlines, and a third was
required by Slovenia's constitution. He reviewed Slovenia's
changes to the text with us:

Vital amendments:
-- territorial contact with the high seas moved to Art 3
(1)(a) regarding the border, not the regime for the maritime
area (Art. 3(1)(b)),plus adds the word "territorial";
-- Adding the term "ex aequa et bono" to Art. 4: Applicable
law.

Constitutionally required amendment:
-- Adding that Slovenia's reservations will be lifted after
ratification of both Parliaments. This could be done either
in Art. 9 or in the Joint Declaration. Mirosic noted that
the FM did not have the power to bind Slovenia to the
agreement through his signature, but it needed both
Parliaments' ratification.

Other Proposals:

Art 2: Composition of the Arbitral Tribunal - to discuss its
establishment and the application of the Optional Rules of
the ICJ Court in the Hague.

Art. 8: EU Accession negotiation documents - adding a
safeguard in case of future arbitrations.

Next Step: Hear from the EU ...
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4. (C) According to Mirosic, Slovenia had alerted Rehn as to
what its response would contain in advance of formally
submitting it on May 18. Slovenia would wait for a response
from Rehn and the Trio, but expected negotiations to
continue. Mirosic stressed that Rehn did not say his April
24 proposal was a "take it or leave it" proposal, and neither
was Slovenia's response. However, Slovenia's redlines would
have to be taken into account. Mirosic mentioned that he
understood that Rehn would be out of Brussels this week, so
he expected a meeting the week of May 25 or the following
week. After Rehn and the Trio respond, Slovenia would
determine whether there was still sufficient basis for broad
domestic political support, to include Jansa's SDS. On May
18, we discussed the situation with the Swedish and Czech
Ambassadors resident in Slovenia, who agreed that Rehn is
still the only game in town. They are even more concerned
than we are that pressuring Slovenia to accept a deal now
would very likely result in a "no" vote down the road on
Croatia's EU accession.

... And Keep Rhetoric Down
--------------


5. (C) Mirosic stated that Slovenia was "astonished" by
Sanader's recent rhetoric along the lines that "the Slovenian
people are good, the leadership is bad." Mirosic claimed the
language was identical to that used by Milosovic in 1989 when
threatening to force changes in the Slovenian leadership.
Mirosic commented that PM Pahor had shown restraint, noting
simply that Croatia was in a pre-election period and such
rhetoric should not be taken too seriously. He requested our
continued assistance in encouraging Zagreb to tone down its
public rhetoric.

Comment and Recommendations
--------------


6. (C/NF) When it comes to the Rehn proposal, Slovenia really
only cares about one issue: the maritime border. We
recognize that Slovenia's two "vital amendments" to the Rehn
proposal -- concerning territorial contact with the high seas
and inclusion of the term "ex aequa et bono" -- are anathema
to Croatia. We note, however, that Slovenia recognizes that
including reference to the above in the mandate of the
arbitration tribunal does not predetermine the tribunal's
decision regarding the maritime border. It simply leaves
open the possibility that Slovenia will get what it is
seeking. If both sides can agree in principle that they will
not foreclose in advance the possibility of an outcome that
meets Slovenia's perceived needs, then determining how to do
so should be a matter of straightforward negotiation. If,
however, Croatia feels that it must foreclose in advance the
possibility that the tribunal would decide to award Slovenia
some form of contact with the high seas, then we see little
hope of reaching an agreement in the near term.


7. (C) Recommendations:

The Rehn process is the only game in town and should not be
allowed to die, at least not yet. We should urge both sides
to engage in another round of closed-door negotiation with
Rehn, with the goal of reaching an acceptable agreement by
the time of the June 26 Intergovernmental Council (IGC).

Engage the Trio, and perhaps other member states, in Brussels
and capitals. The likelihood of success will increase if the
U.S. and the Trio have parallel (though not necessarily
identical) approaches to this issue.

Both sides should be encouraged look for opportunities to
reduce tensions by, for example, focusing public attention on
aspects of the relationship where interests coincide, e.g.,
economy, environment, culture, education, etc. The current
focus on a single issue is poisoning the atmosphere between
the two countries.

Both sides should seriously consider unilateral
"confidence-building measures." For example, we are urging
Slovenia to unilaterally lift its blockade on one or two
chapters of the acquis as a sign of good will. We look to
our colleagues in Washington, Brussels and Zagreb for
additional suggestions that could be taken unilaterally by
either side without compromising their basic negotiating
position.

Both sides need to dispense with the public bombast if they
are serious about finding a solution to this problem.

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FREDEN