SLOVENIAN MOD PREPARING TO WHIP UP AN OMLT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 LJUBLJANA 000142 SIPDIS EUR/CE, EUR/RPM E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/13/2019 TAGS: PREL NATO MARR MOPS AF SI SUBJECT: SLOVENIAN MOD PREPARING TO WHIP UP AN OMLT REF: A. STATE 31102 ¶B. LJUBLJANA 124 ¶C. LJUBLJANA 120 Classified By: CDA Brad Freden, reasons 1.4(b,d) Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) Brigadier Branimir Furlan, newly named Deputy Chief of Defense, told us on May 12 in response to our request (ref A) that Slovenia plans to lead an Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team (OMLT) in Afghanistan, with its state partner Colorado Army National Guard (CO ARNG) augmenting the OMLT. Furlan explained that there was "clear political guidance" and orders would go to Force Command by the end of May to begin preparations for taking over an OMLT around September ¶2010. CO ARNG responded to Furlan with a commitment of CO ARNG support. Government and possibly parliamentary approval will still be required, but this is the most forward-leaning proposal we have seen from the Slovenians on Afghanistan. End Summary. New Leadership, New Direction -------------- ¶2. (C) Primoz Savc, the new acting director for the Ministry of Defense's defense policy directorate, opened the May 12 meeting with DATT, ODC bilateral affairs officer, emboff, and two CO ARNG colonels by stating that Slovenia's "ambition is to take over an OMLT as soon as possible." Furlan explained that, until recently, there was "no clear political guidance" on the possibility of leading an OMLT. With the recent changes on the general staff at the Ministry of Defense (ref B) and CO ARNG support confirmed, however, he said that "it is very likely" that the new Chief of Defense and the Minister of Defense would support the plan. Dilemmas: Caveats, Force Size, Infantry or Combat Support -------------- -------------- ¶3. (C) Furlan outlined some of the dilemmas that the Slovene Armed Forces (SAF) need resolve prior to deployment. He said that he had already advised leadership that current caveats would not work with rules of engagement for leading an OMLT, and Savc concurred, noting that caveats on an OMLT essentially result in caveats on Afghan National Army capabilities. Furlan noted that caveats were a political creation of other NATO countries, and he was working on getting political leadership to understand that political caveats severely damage the capacity of a multinational force to function effectively. ¶4. (C) Slovenia previously announced a contribution of an additional 15 troops for election security (ref C),but Furlan said there was no further political guidance on enlarging Slovenia's contingent in ISAF. He explained that Slovenia would shift some troops from their current force protection role in Herat to make up the OMLT. Furlan also noted that the Slovenes, after several years of working in Herat, are comfortable there and any transition to leading an OMLT would be easier in a region they know well. ¶5. (C) As for the type of OMLT, either combat support or infantry, Furlan stated that the SAF favors an infantry OMLT because it fits better with available forces and their experience and capabilities. He highlighted the cooperation with ODC as one of the key factors in the progress of Slovenia's capabilities, and the prevalence of IMET alumni in the upper ranks reflects the importance of our assistance; this cooperation has enabled SAF to reach the point where it can lead an OMLT. CO ARNG representative noted that infantry suited CO ARNG better as well, due to availability of forces, and that CO ARNG would cooperate in Herat or wherever the Slovenes end up. CO ARNG representative outlined the training process required for a September 2010 deployment, saying that the CO ARNG soldiers would start the process in the U.S., then come to train together in Slovenia (which would start the 1-year clock on deployment for CO ARNG soldiers),and finally head to Hohenfels for final predeployment training certification. Furlan mentioned the possibility of including Partnership for Peace countries in the OMLT after Slovenia gains the experience and capacity to LJUBLJANA 00000142 002 OF 002 run it without CO ARNG augmentation. Comment -------------- ¶6. (C) The recent changes on the general staff and in civilian MOD leadership (starting with the Minister herself, state secretary Uros Krek, and other key figures such as Savc) give Slovenia a much more forward-leaning and agile defense policy than under prior leadership. We have discussed the OMLT idea for years with the Slovenes, but it took the right mix in the civilian and uniformed leadership to change the status quo. The final decision will likely require the Prime Minister's approval, and neither Savc nor Furlan would speculate on that decision. In our view, the MOD may be out in front of the rest of the government, not because there is strong opposition in the cabinet, but because no one else is focusing on Afghanistan at the moment. At the political level, anything that increases the likelihood of Slovenian casualties will be the subject of vigorous debate. We will have another opportunity to influence that debate when a briefing team from another USG agency meets with Slovenian officials, including the Prime Minister's top advisors, later this month. The CO ARNG's cooperation, as well as the precedent of other state partnership programs that are already augmenting OMLTs has alleviated many of the MOD's previous concerns about its ability to fully staff an OMLT. The plan for an OMLT is a major piece of the ongoing strategic review, and we expect the full results in the next few weeks (ref C). The biggest hurdle still remaining is public perception and support. Savc acknowledged this challenge, saying the ministry is "very sensitive" to public opinion and is thus ramping up public diplomacy/relations efforts. Post plans to facilitate that effort. FREDEN