S/WCI AMB. WILLIAMSON DISCUSSES GUANTANAMO WITH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 LISBON 000094 NOFORN SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/11/2019 TAGS: PREL PTER PGOV EUN PO SUBJECT: S/WCI AMB. WILLIAMSON DISCUSSES GUANTANAMO WITH PORTUGAL Classified By: POL/ECON COUNSELOR RICHARD REITER, FOR 1.4 B,D . ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. Ambassador Clint Williamson of S/WCI visited Lisbon February 10 and met with PolDir Nuno Brito and other Portuguese MFA officials to discuss resettlement of Guantanamo detainees. Ambassador Williamson described the importance placed on this issue by the new US administration and the time pressure of closing Guantanamo by next January. He provided an overview of the 240 detainees, with a focus on the 24 low-threat detainees who have been the subject of previous resettlement discussions with the GOP. He added that an additional 25-30 have been identified for resettlement but that final decisions on all of these individuals will be contingent on the review process mandated by the Executive Order. He indicated that the US would almost certainly have to take responsibility for those detainees at the highest threat level, as these individuals were likely to be prosecuted in US courts. Brito reported that the January 26 GAERC had gone well, but that the Czech/EU Presidency seemed "tentative" on detainees. He predicted that the EU position will ultimately allow final decisions to be made by member states, so that some countries can accept detainees while others choose not to. Brito reaffirmed Portugal's commitment to accepting some detainees, but said the GOP would need more information and would not accept certain nationalities, including Uighurs. The Portuguese requested our support in four areas: detailed files on the detainees, pushing the Czechs to be more ambitious leading the EU, paying attention to policy daylight between European foreign ministries and interior ministries, and being sensitive to the need for each European government to manage its own process to avoid domestic blowback. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues (S/WCI) Clint Williamson visited Lisbon February 10 and with Ambassador Stephenson met with Nuno Brito, Political Director of the Portuguese Foreign Ministry, and other MFA officials. Williamson expressed thanks on behalf of Secretary Clinton for Portugal's leadership within the EU on the issue of resettlement of Guantanamo detainees. NEW ADMINISTRATION APPROACH -------------- ¶3. (C) Ambassador Williamson said that the new US administration sees Guantanamo as a top priority and has made DOJ the lead US agency for determinations of detainees' status. A review process is now underway, chaired by the Attorney General, to organize the files on each detainee. This process will assess the threat posed by each detainee and whether the USG has evidence sufficient to prosecute. It will yield decisions for each individual: whether they are to be tried in the US, transferred to their home countries, or transferred to a third country. Guantanamo is to be closed by January 22, 2010, and some 22 detainees have already been ordered released by US courts, so there is considerable urgency to make progress. He reinforced the point that this is an extremely high priority for the Administration. ¶4. (C) Williamson also provided breakdowns on the current population of 240 detainees, including the 24 "lowest threat" detainees (including 17 Uighurs) who are eligible for transfer but cannot be returned to their home countries because of concerns about whether they will be treated humanely. In response to questions from GOP officials as to whether the US would accept detainees for resettlement, Williamson said it is probable that the US will prosecute or otherwise take responsibility for those detainees who pose the highest threats. The USG, then, is seeking assistance from friends and allies on those assessed to be at the lower end of the threat spectrum. PORTUGAL AND THE EU -------------- ¶5. (C) Ambassador Nuno Brito explained that Portuguese FM Amado's decision to help find solutions for Guantanamo is not new, but that his effort to energize the EU's discussions has new life. Portugal, Brito said, is motivated by a desire to strengthen the transatlantic relationship and to make a humanitarian gesture. He said the January 26 GAERC discussion had gone well, a fact that was not well-reported in the press. The Czechs (EU Presidency),he commented several times, are a bit "tentative" and "shy" on the detainee issue. Amb. Williamson replied that the Czechs may not be as familiar with the issue as other EU countries, and he will stop in Prague this week to consult with them. ¶6. (C) Brito stated that the current process in the EU "does LISBON 00000094 002 OF 003 not restrict" action by individual members, but that Portugal hopes for more, i.e., a common platform that will provide more legal reassurance to the GOP. He predicted that the ultimate EU position will allow "final decisions to be made in member states", so that reluctant members such as Denmark, the Netherlands, and Austria can maintain their refusal to accept detainees. He commented that the February 4 resolution by the European Parliament (inviting member states to assist the US in closing Guantanamo) was a helpful gesture. ¶7. (C) Paulo Lourenco, Senior Diplomatic Advisor to FM Amado, stated that achieving an EU consensus would be good, but "it should not be overvalued", because Portugal can move forward without it. The process is already underway, he noted, and the GAERC discussion and subsequent EU process make the point that Portugal and others want to help on Guantanamo. ¶8. (C) Rui Macieira, Brito's deputy for security affairs, commented that the EU process to date has been driven by Foreign Ministers, who are focused on the regional and transatlantic impact of the detainee issue, but it will now be turned over to Interior Ministers, who will be more reluctant because they are concerned with how to safeguard their populations from resettled detainees. Macieira urged Amb. Williamson to engage with EU Interior Ministers ahead of their February 26 ministerial, and particularly with the Czech Interior Minister. He added that in Lisbon the MFA and MOI are cooperating well, but the same cannot be said in every EU capital. ¶9. (C) Francisco Alegre, the MFA's North America Desk Officer, noted that an EU common position was reached in the case of the Palestinians who were resettled after the 2002 clashes at Bethlehem's Church of the Nativity (one of whom was resettled in Portugal). Ambassador Williamson responded that the urgency and short fuse in that case prevented European governments from having a clear view of who they were being asked to resettle, but in the current case there is more time for transparency and deliberation. PORTUGAL'S APPROACH -------------- ¶10. (C) Brito affirmed that at the political level, the GOP has committed to resettling detainees and will abide by that commitment. But, he said, the GOP needs more details, specifically it requires a dossier on each detainee. Brito asserted that "nationalities matter", and that Portugal will not accept individuals "from our immediate neighborhood", which he defined as Algeria and Morocco. (Comment: Brito's list of nationalities that Portugal will not accept is considerably shorter than a list earlier passed to post by MFA officials which included: Moroccans, Algerians, Libyans, Palestinians, Syrians, Afghans, Pakistanis, Uighurs, and any detainee who had transited Portugal on the way to Guantanamo; the MFA is likely to raise the longer list again as discussions progress.) Brito asked about previous releasees who had returned to extremism, and Amb. Williamson responded that some 40-65 of the 550 releasees may have done so, but added that these were all in higher threat categories than those who would be resettled in Europe. ¶11. (C) Brito would not commit to a timetable or speculate on whether Portugal's receiving detainees would become linked to its autumn electoral calendar, but he repeated that Portugal would meet its commitment to accept detainees. He concluded, "I am not pessimistic about the EU framework, and I do not believe that there is a problem at this stage". UIGHUR SENSITIVITY -------------- ¶12. (C) Brito noted that Portugal would be reluctant to accept Uighurs, for fear of upsetting relations with China at a time when Portugal seeks to maintain some influence over affairs in its former colony of Macao. Ambassador Williamson responded that, because Uighurs are the majority of the "low threat" cases, choosing not to accept them creates a tradeoff in terms of accepting detainees who will require more long-term attention from the host country. Williamson also noted that Albania, the only country that has accepted Uighurs to date, suffered minor negative responses from China, but no long-term or serious damage to its bilateral ties. WHO'S ASKING -------------- ¶13. (C) Diplomatic Advisor Lourenco indicated that the GOP and other EU governments were saying publicly that they had not received an "official request" from the USG for LISBON 00000094 003 OF 003 resettlement of detainees. He explained that, in this way, they were endeavoring to better control the public discourse on the issue, and he expressed hope that the US would be understanding of this approach. Williamson responded that while the US was sensitive to the GOP's concerns and had not disputed the public statement, the fact remained that the USG had indeed made official requests in the past and that this current visit, made at the direction of the Secretary, was for the purpose of again conveying an "official request." Williamson added that if European governments continued to maintain that they had not received "official requests," this could raise questions in the US as to why the Administration was not making such requests, and would put the State Department in the position of having to explain that we had in fact made such requests. Lourenco acknowledged that the USG had demarched the GOP on this matter. Brito, considering aloud how this might be spun for the public and parliament, commented that "yes, we have been demarched by the US, but there has not been an explicit request to take specific individuals." HOW WE CAN HELP -------------- ¶14. (C) The Portuguese made four requests in this meeting: a) As noted, Brito asked for detailed files on the detainees. Amb. Williamson responded that we will provide information on those who are eligible for transfer (currently numbering 24),explaining that with the review process now underway, the files are being updated. Williamson also offered to provide Portuguese officials access to Guantanamo if they wish to interview individual detainees. b) Brito asked the USG to urge the Czechs to be more ambitious in driving the EU process, to be more active in sidelining naysayer member states, and to make sure the issue keeps a prominent place on meeting agendas (i.e. more than the discussion over lunch at the last GAERC). c) As noted, the Portuguese urged the US to be aware of policy differences that are beginning to emerge between EU foreign ministries and interior ministries. d) Finally, Diplomatic Advisor Lourenco highlighted that the US would help by being sensitive to the need for Portugal and other forward-leaning EU states to dictate the process and pace both in Brussels and in their own capitals. No domestic opposition has yet coalesced against resettling detainees, and the European governments need the scope to manage carefully their domestic processes. This cable has been cleared by Ambassador Williamson. STEPHENSON