Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09LISBON71
2009-02-03 07:35:00
UNCLASSIFIED
Embassy Lisbon
Cable title:
PORTUGAL: INFORMATION ON GOVERNMENT PRACTICES -
VZCZCXRO1411 RR RUEHAG RUEHDF RUEHIK RUEHLZ RUEHROV RUEHSR DE RUEHLI #0071/01 0340735 ZNR UUUUU ZZH R 030735Z FEB 09 FM AMEMBASSY LISBON TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7339 INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES RHMFIUU/FBI WASHINGTON DC RHEFHLC/HOMELAND SECURITY CENTER WASHINGTON DC RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 08 LISBON 000071
SIPDIS
S/CT KEN MCKUNE, NCTC, AND DHS
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: KVPR PTER PREL PGOV PINR CVIS ASEC KHLS PO
SUBJECT: PORTUGAL: INFORMATION ON GOVERNMENT PRACTICES -
INFORMATION COLLECTION, SCREENING, AND SHARING
REF: 07SECSTATE 133921
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 08 LISBON 000071
SIPDIS
S/CT KEN MCKUNE, NCTC, AND DHS
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: KVPR PTER PREL PGOV PINR CVIS ASEC KHLS PO
SUBJECT: PORTUGAL: INFORMATION ON GOVERNMENT PRACTICES -
INFORMATION COLLECTION, SCREENING, AND SHARING
REF: 07SECSTATE 133921
1. (U) This message responds to the reftel questions
concerning Portugal's information collection, screening, and
sharing practices.
A. Watchlisting:
-- If host government maintains a "watchlist," how many
records does the watchlist contain, and how many are
terrorist-related? Which ministry or office maintains the
watchlist?
The Ministries of Justice, Interior, and Defense keep such
records, however data on number of records and specific types
are not made readily available and considered sensitive
information not for distribution.
B. Traveler Information Collection:
-- What are the country's policies (legislation, mandates,
etc.) on collecting information from travelers arriving in
the country?
Decree Law 57/2007 from July 4, 2007 updates the border
control legislation and three addenda approve information
collection models for people entering Portugal, residing in
Portugal as refugees, and requesting an extended stay
(Portaria 395/2008, 396/2008, and 297/2008 respectively).
Portuguese Immigration (Servico de Estrangeiros e Fronteiras
- SEF) is responsible for all controls.
-- Are there different policies for air, sea, and land entry
and for domestic flights? Since Portugal is a Schengen
nation, there is no set border control for land entries. Air
and sea entry are treated as the same.
-- Who collects traveler information?
SEF is responsible for collecting and storing traveler
information from the airlines, port authorities, travel
agencies, and hotels. According to Portuguese Law 57/2007,
air transportation authorities are responsible for
transmitting their final flight manifest including the name,
travel documentation used, date of birth, entry point, and
hour of arrival to SEF. Sea transportation companies and
fishing vessels that enter Portuguese territory from
international waters are also required to submit their
manifest to SEF and must notify SEF of stowaways up to 48
hours before arriving and within two hours of departure.
-- What are the policies of the collecting agency to share
that information with foreign governments?
SEF may share the information, upon a foreign government
request, pursuant to the domestic law on international
judiciary cooperation.
-- Does the host government collect Passenger Name Record
(PNR) data on incoming commercial flights or vessels? Is
this data used for intelligence or law enforcement purposes
to screen travelers? Does host government have any existing
treaties to share PNR data?
Yes, the Portuguese government does collect this data for
intelligence and law enforcement purposes. Portugal is
included in the EU regulations on PNR data.
-- If applicable, have advance passenger information systems
(APIS),interactive advanced passenger information systems
(IAPIS),or electronic travel authority systems been
effective at detecting other national security threats, such
as wanted criminals?
Yes, we do not have statistical information on this issue,
but believe the systems have been effective in screening
passengers.
C. Border Control and Screening:
-- Does the host government employ software to screen
travelers of security interest?
The host government employs software to screen all
non-Schengen travelers and the GOP recently requested CODIS
software to enhance screening abilities. However, Portugal
is a member of the EU's Schengen Agreement, and under its
provisions, Portugal, as well as the other Schengen
participants, abolished routine immigration controls for
persons traveling by air, sea or land between signatory
States. Portugal's only land border is with Spain, and
border checkpoints between the two countries are normally no
longer operational.
-- Are all travelers tracked electronically, or only
non-host-country nationals? What is the frequency of
travelers being "waived through" because they hold up what
LISBON 00000071 002 OF 008
appears to be an appropriate document, but whose information
is not actually recorded electronically? What is the
estimated percentage of non-recorded crossings, entries and
exits?
All arrivals at airports and seaports are reviewed by SEF,
but only foreigners from non-Schengen nations are recorded.
At international ports of entry, SEF officers have access to
computerized databases that contain information regarding
outstanding warrants, criminal convictions, lost and stolen
passports, and stolen blank passport data and persons who
were previously denied Schengen visas or admission to a
Schengen country. Portugal's international airports are
monitored by SEF and Customs officials. A minimum check (a
quick, straightforward verification of the validity of the
document and an examination for signs of falsification or
counterfeiting) is the rule for EU citizens and other persons
enjoying the Community right of free movement (such as the
family members of an EU citizen).
Portuguese airports use an automated passport control system
called "RAPID" for EU citizens over 18 years old holding
biometric e-passports. RAPID uses facial recognition
technology and performs the same checks as a human
immigration officer including check a database for stolen,
misappropriated, lost and invalidated documents, review the
validity of the travel document, and flag the presence of
signs of falsification or counterfeiting.
SEF controls entry and exit via Portugal's external borders
and its operations follow guidelines from the Community Code
on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders
(Schengen Borders Code) established by the European
Parliament and the EU Council on 15 March 2006. External
borders may be crossed only at border crossing-points.
Operational cooperation is coordinated by the European Agency
for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External
Borders of the Member States (FRONTEX).
We cannot estimate the percentage of non-recorded crossings
of the total entries because of the unrecorded land crossings
due to the Schengen agreement.
-- Do host government border control officials have the
authority to use other criminal data when making decisions on
who can enter the country? If so, please describe this
authority (legislation, mandates, etc).
Yes. Under the Schengen Borders Code, the control of
movement of persons across borders includes the mandatory
check of all national and international criminal and police
databases especially the SEF database and the national and
Interpol fugitive intelligence database and the entry refusal
Schengen Information System, which has information about
individuals who are considered to be a threat to public
policy, internal security, public health.
-- What are the host government's policies on questioning,
detaining and denying entry to individuals presenting
themselves at a point of entry into the country? Which
agency would question, detain, or deny entry?
Portugal's policy on denying entry is outlined in Article 32
of Portugal's Decree Law 57/2007. In particular, the GOP
reserves the right to deny entry to those who do not meet the
legal entry requirements, who are on the Schengen "do not
admit" list, who are on Portugal's national "do not admit
list," are considered a danger or threat to public order,
national security, public health, or against diplomatic
interests. SEF is the responsible agency for detentions and
denied entries.
Pursuant to the provisions of the Portuguese immigration law,
Portuguese Immigration (SEF) has the authority to question
and deny entry into the country of any non-Portuguese
nationals. Additionally, SEF has the authority to detain an
individual for the maximum period of 48 hours. Detention
will be subject to the scrutiny of a judicial authority
within that 48 hour holding period. During the review, the
judicial authority hears the reasons for the detention,
informs the person detained thereof and questions the
detainee to allow him or her to present a defense.
-- How well does information sharing function within the host
government, e.g., if there is a determination that someone
with a valid host-government visa is later identified with
terrorism, how is this communicated and resolved internally?
Information sharing seems to work well, however the Judicial
Police (FBI equivalent),the intelligence services, and SEF
all report to different ministries in the Portuguese
government. In 2008, the Portuguese government established a
new Secretary General to coordinate the various domestic
security efforts.
Additional background information: The Intelligence System of
LISBON 00000071 003 OF 008
the Portuguese Republic (SIRP) coordinates the two separate
Portuguese intelligence services. The Security Intelligence
Service (SIS) guarantees Portugal's security against
sabotage, terrorism, espionage and the practice of acts who,
by their nature, could disrupt the rule of law. The Defense
Strategic Intelligence Service (SIED) focuses externally to
guarantee Portugal's national independence, national
interests, and security. Both intelligence services report
to the Prime Minister.
D. Biometric Collection:
-- Are biometric systems integrated for all active POEs?
What are the systems and models used?
Yes, international airports in Portugal use an automated
passport control system called "RAPID." The system is
available only to EU citizens over 18 and holders of
biometric e-passports. RAPID uses facial recognition
technology and performs the same checks as a human
immigration officer, such as data base checks for stolen,
misappropriated, lost and invalidated documents, reviewing
the validity of the document authorizing the legitimate
holder to cross the border, and flagging the presence of
signs of falsification or counterfeiting.
RAPID (Automatic Identification of Passengers Holding
Traveling Documents) combines the operations of reading and
checking electronic passports with an innovating feature for
assessing biometric data which operates an automatic gate
opening device. This device checks whether the electronic
passports is genuine, and validates the data stored on the
chip. It then appraises the passenger's identification by
establishing a comparison between the photo stored on the
chip and the information of the passenger in loco,
automatically opening the border gate when the features of
both images are coincident. RAPID was made secure by an
intelligent system that allows the entry of a single
passenger each time and automatically adjusts the reading
camera to his or her height.
-- Are all passengers screened for the biometric or does the
host government target a specific population for collection
(i.e. host country nationals)? Do the biometric collection
systems look for a one to one comparison (ensure the
biometric presented matches the one stored on the e-Passport)
or one to many comparison (checking the biometric presented
against a database of known biometrics)?
All EU citizens with e-passports over eighteen years old are
screened. Portugal uses a system of one-to-many comparisons.
-- If biometric systems are in place, does the host
government know of any countermeasures that have been used or
attempted to defeat biometric checkpoints?
No, it is not aware of any.
-- What are the host government's policies on collecting the
fingerprints of travelers coming into the country?
One program exists. Portugal has started in Dakar, Senegal a
pilot program conducted on a voluntary basis only, called
BIODEV. BIODEV includes the capture of biometrics data (2D
face, 10 fingerprints) of a visa applicant at a Portuguese
consular post, forwarding the captured data to be stored and
searched in a central AFIS, and the verification of the
biometrics data of the visa holder at the port of entry.
Portugal recently went live based on the complete biometric
visa application process in Dakar, Senegal, with participants
arriving at Lisbon airport.
-- Which agency is responsible for the host government's
fingerprint system?
Portuguese Immigration, SEF
-- Are the fingerprint programs in place NIST, INT-I, EFTS,
UK1 or RTID compliant?
The fingerprint program in place is the finger image data
interchange format standard: ISO 19794-4 (code WSQ).
-- Are the fingerprints collected as flats or rolled? Which
agency collects the fingerprints?
The fingerprints are collected digitally as flats.
E. Passports:
-- If the host government issues a machine-readable passport
containing biometric information, does the host government
share the public key required to read the biometric
information with any other governments? If so, which
governments?
We attempted to contact authorities from the Portuguese Mint
in charge of this program, but were unable to confirm at this
LISBON 00000071 004 OF 008
time. It is likely that Portugal shares information with its
Schengen partners.
-- Does the host government issue replacement passports for
full or limited validity (e.g. the time remaining on the
original passports, fixed validity for a replacement, etc.)?
The government issues a new passport for full validity.
-- Does the host government have special
regulations/procedures for dealing with "habitual" losers of
passports or bearers who have reported their passports stolen
multiple times?
Yes. The adjudicators report the situation to the police for
possible investigation and, if necessary, judicial action.
-- Are replacement passports of the same or different
appearance and page length as regular passports (do they have
something along the lines of our emergency partial duration
passports)?
There are no replacement passports. In exceptional
circumstances, namely, the adjudicating entity has no
authority to issue regular passports (as is the case of
Portuguese consular offices overseas) or the electronic
passport system is down, a temporary passport may be issued
to the applicant. This passport is an eight-page document
valid for six months only, and is neither biometric nor
machine readable.
-- Do emergency replacement passports contain the same or
fewer biometric fields as regular-issue passports?
Emergency passports do not contain biometric information.
-- Where applicable, has Post noticed any increase in the
number of replacement or "clean" (i.e. no evidence of prior
travel) passports used to apply for U.S. visas?
No, we have not seen any increase.
-- Are replacement passports assigned a characteristic number
series or otherwise identified?
No, they do not have any special numbers or identification.
F. Fraud Detection
-- How robust is fraud detection and how actively are
instances of fraud involving documents followed up?
Portuguese Immigration (SEF) is responsible for the
investigation and detection of fraudulent documents. Fraud
detection is taken very seriously and instances involving
recent bank fraud cases and large company malfeasance have
been aggressively pursued. The fraud detection department
and forensic lab conduct highly sensitive investigations.
Once an investigation is completed, it is turned over to the
courts for prosecution. The Embassy has visited the
facilities and finds it both professionally run and capable
of handling sensitive investigations.
-- How are potentially fraudulently issued documents taken
out of circulation, or made harder to use?
Portugal is one of the better EU nations in making its
documents safer and more difficult to forge by way of various
up to date security document features (i.e. holographic,
light latent imagery, etc.). SEF is also involved in the
process of establishing document security features. Whenever
fraudulent documents are found, they are confiscated and
voided.
G. Privacy and Data Security
-- What are the country's policies on records related to the
questioning, detention or removal of individuals encountered
at points of entry into the country?
Pursuant to Portuguese immigration law, Portuguese
Immigration (SEF) has the authority to question and deny
entry into the country of any non-host country nationals. If
admission into the country is denied on grounds of fraudulent
documents, the document is confiscated and the individual is
immediately returned pursuant to the Chicago Convention. If
the individual cannot be deported within 48 hours, he or she
must appear before a judicial authority for a hearing.
SEF will question and interview the individual and where
necessary, will call the Judicial Police (PJ) to intervene
and interrogate the more serious cases. An illegal entry
into Portugal often requires repatriation of the individual
by the same airline. These individuals are often held at
detention centers at the airport.
Aliens removed from Portuguese territory by SEF are banned
from returning to the country for a minimum of five years.
-- How are those records stored, and for how long?
LISBON 00000071 005 OF 008
The Portuguese government stores records in the National
Integrated Information System. Personal information is kept
in a temporary file by SEF for 48 hours unless needed for
legal reasons, as outlined in law 67/1998 governing personal
information. Transportation companies must delete the
information within 24 hours of transmitting the data to SEF.
Personal data entered into the Schengen Information System
for the purposes of tracing persons is kept only for the time
required to meet the purposes for which they were supplied
and/or for legal proceedings. Alerts inserted by any EU
Schengen member state must be reviewed after three years of
entry of the alert in order to evaluate the need for
continuing storage of such data.
-- What are the country's restrictions on the collection or
use of sensitive data?
Only cleared law enforcement personnel may access the data.
The name and official purpose from the officer are required
as well to view any records. Collection or use of sensitive
data relating to the movement of persons using information
from the European Union's Schengen Information System was
established by law in 1994, pursuant to the Schengen
Convention. The law created the control and monitoring
mechanisms for the Schengen Information System. A central
Schengen database facility operates under the direction of
Portuguese Immigration Service (SEF) and a designated
official at the Ministry of Internal Administration (MAI).
The Data Protection National Commission (Comissao Nacional de
Proteccao de Dados, or CNPD) is the national control
authority entrusted with the supervision of the national part
of the Schengen Information System, and with the verification
that the processing and use of the data does not violate the
rights of the person. The rights to access, alter records,
and delete information shall be exercised by a person
demonstrating a legitimate, direct and personal interest, as
provided in the Schengen Convention, by means of the national
control authority.
-- What are the requirements to provide notice to the public
on the implementation of new databases of records?
The Portuguese Constitution has extensive provisions on
protecting privacy, secrecy of communications and data
protection. The law on personal data protection established
the conditions applicable to automatic processing,
connection, transmission and use of databases and guarantees
its protection by means of an administrative body, the
National Data Protection Commission (Comissao Nacional de
Proteccao de Dados, or CNPD). The Commission is an
independent agency that is directly responsible to
Parliament. Its must register existing databases with
private data, authorize and control such databases, issue
directives, and oversee the Schengen Information System
(SIS).
Implementation of new databases of records is sent by the
executive branch to the Portuguese Parliament for approval.
When the new database is authorized, it becomes public
through the publication of the law in the Government Official
Gazette.
-- Are there any laws relating to security features for
government computer systems that hold personally identifying
information?
There are varied levels of access to security features and
these are normally held in government protected computer
systems.
-- What are the rules on an individual's ability to access
data that homeland security agencies hold about them?
The Schengen Convention itself recognizes the rights of
individuals. These include the right to access information
in the Schengen Information System (SIS); the right to
correct data where there is a de jure or de facto mistake;
the right to apply to the courts or competent authorities to
demand that data be corrected, deleted or that damages be
awarded; the right to ask that data to be checked and to
question the reason for data collection. Since Portugal is a
signatory to the Schengen Convention, all requests for access
to personal data must follow the provisions of the Schengen
Convention's article 109, article 6 of Portuguese Law 2/94,
and/or article 11 of Portuguese Law 67/98. Any citizen or
alien may request verification on whether there is an alert
in his or her name in the Schengen database. In addition,
he/she may request a correction or deletion of personal data,
in accordance with article 110 of the Schengen Convention.
-- Are there different rules for raw data (name, date of
birth, etc.) versus case files (for example, records about
LISBON 00000071 006 OF 008
enforcement actions)?
No, all records fall within the same database. Cases under
investigation or considered highly confidential will be kept
in a separate database only with written agreement from the
prosecutor's office.
-- Does a non-citizen/resident have the right to sue the
government to obtain these types of data?
Yes, in accordance with data protection principles,
individuals have specific rights under the Schengen
Convention, whether they are nationals of Schengen nations or
not. The rights include the right of access to personal data
stored in the SIS, the right to a rectification when data are
factually inaccurate or unlawfully stored, the right to bring
before the courts or competent authorities an action to
correct or delete incorrect data or to obtain compensation.
H. Immigration Data Bases:
-- What computerized immigration databases are used to track
entries and exits?
The Schengen Information System and national Portuguese
databases are used to track entries and exits.
-- Is the immigration database available at all ports of
entry (POEs)? If immigration databases are available at some
POEs, but not all, how does the host government decide which
POEs will receive the tool?
Databases are available at all ports of entry but not at all
potential land border crossings.
-- What problems, if any, limit the effectiveness of the
systems? For example, limited training, power brownouts,
budgetary restraints, corruption, etc.?
No problems.
-- How often are national immigration databases updated?
Databases are updated daily with new information.
I. Watchlist and Information Sharing:
-- Is there a name-based watchlist system used to screen
travelers at POEs?
Yes, at border checkpoints and in the general watchlist
computer database that only police can access.
-- What domestic sources of information populate the
name-based watchlist, i.e. names of deported persons,
terrorist lookouts, criminal wants/warrants?
Name and date/place of birth are included. Other identifiers
include: parents' names, marital status, home address,
national identity card number, social security number, Prior
criminal offense records, traffic offense data (to include
unpaid tickets, DUIs),non-compliance with court-related
summons, wants/warrants and some child predator information
at a different access level.
-- What international watchlists does the host government use
for screening individuals, e.g. Interpol or TSA No Fly lists,
UN, etc.?
INTERPOL, EUROPOL and other international intelligence
sources.
-- What bilateral/multilateral watchlist agreements exist
between host government and its neighbors?
Agreements exist with all EU nations as well as others with
the US, Spain, and Brazil. Agreements with Spain and Brazil
are in response to Spanish terrorist group ETA and North
African terrorists transiting the area and drug
producing/transiting in the case of Brazil.
J. Biometrics:
-- Are biometric systems in place at ports of entry (air,
land, sea)? If no, does host government have plans to
install such a system?
Biometric systems are in place for air and sea entries as
outlined above.
-- If biometric systems are available at some POEs, but not
all, how does the host government decide which POEs will
receive the tool?
All but land entries are in use as a result of the Schengen
agreement.
-- What biometric technologies, if any, does the host
government use, i.e. fingerprint identification, facial
recognition, iris recognition, hand geometry, retinal
identification, DNA-based identification, keystroke dynamics,
gait analysis? Are the systems ICAO compliant?
LISBON 00000071 007 OF 008
At this time, Portugal uses facial recognition and
fingerprint identification in Senegal only.
-- Does the host government issue a machine-readable passport
containing biometric information? If e-Passports are issued,
what biometric information is included on the document, i.e.
fingerprint, iris, facial recognition, etc? If not, does
host government plan to issue a biometric document in the
future?
Yes, Portugal issues a machine-readable passport with
biometric information. E-passports have been issued since
2006 with facial recognition techology.
K. Identifying Appropriate Partners:
-- Department would appreciate post's assessment of whether
host government would be an appropriate partner in data
sharing. Considerations include whether host government
watchlists may include political dissidents (as opposed or in
addition to terrorists),and whether host governments would
share or use U.S. watchlist data inappropriately, etc.
Post recommends sharing information with Portugal. Portugal
has professional, capable, and well-trained law enforcement
officials who would use the information to locate and detain
terrorist suspects. We have no reason to believe that
Portugal would include political dissidents in any listing or
use the list inappropriately.
-- Are there political realities which would preclude a
country from entering into a formal data-sharing agreement
with the U.S?
No, none.
-- Is the host country's legal system sufficiently developed
to adequately provide safeguards for the protection and
nondisclosure of information?
Yes, the legal system is well developed and able to handle
the information, as outlined above.
-- How much information sharing does the host country do
internally? Is there a single consolidated database, for
example? If not, do different ministries share information
amongst themselves?
Ministries and law enforcement agencies do share information
with each other upon official request, or in accordance with
the laws governing that criminal offense. Law enforcement is
particularly willing to share information about major crimes,
terrorism, and narcotics suspects. There is no single
information sharing hub. Different agencies have access to
information that relates to their area.
-- How does the country define terrorism? Are there legal
statutes that do so?
In broad terms, Portuguese Law 52/2003 defines terrorism as,
"All the acts that aim to facilitate, either directly or
indirectly, any act committed for terrorism purposes." In
this context, it penalizes terrorist acts themselves and any
instrumental offenses, such as theft or document forgery,
connected with a terrorist act.
Before 2003, the Penal Code had a couple of provisions with
respect to terrorism and terrorist association crimes. Those
provisions were partly revoked by Law 52/2003 (Law on
Combating Terrorism) which transposed European Union
Framework Decision 75/JAI/2002 into the Portuguese legal
system.
The added value of this new Law is making individuals liable
and criminalizing so-called "instrumental crimes" such as
theft or document forgery, regardless of where it occurs. It
also punishes the activities of groups, terrorist
organizations and terrorist associations and criminalizes
terrorist acts perpetrated in country as well as abroad.
Additionally, the law contains some exceptions to the
principle of territoriality, established in the Penal Code.
Portuguese penal law may therefore be applied to acts that
occur outside Portuguese territory, unless otherwise stated
in an international treaty or convention, when the crimes
constitute terrorist offenses committed by individuals,
domestic or international organizations, provided that the
agents are found on Portuguese territory and cannot be
extradited to the requesting state.
Another important aspect of the law is that it envisages the
criminal liability of legal persons or their equivalent
(corporate and mere de facto associations) for offenses
connected to terrorism when carried out on their behalf and
in the interest of their organs or representatives.
LISBON 00000071 008 OF 008
Apart from Law 52/2003, there are several other laws aiming
at combating terrorism:
Law 5/2002 ) Special regime of proof collecting and breach
of professional silence regarding serious crimes;
Law 101/2001 ) Infiltrated agents -Juridical regime of
undercover actions regarding prevention and criminal
investigation;
Law 104/2001 ) Interception of communications; controlled
deliveries; undercover actions;
Law 144/99 of 31 August (Law of International Judicial
Cooperation in Criminal Matters) applies to cooperation in
criminal matters. It governs extradition, transfer of
proceedings in criminal matters, enforcement of criminal
judgments, transfer of persons sentenced to any punishment or
imprisonment, supervision of conditionally sentenced or
conditionally released persons, and mutual legal assistance
in criminal matters.
Law 65/2003 regarding the European Arrest Warrant regime. The
European Arrest Warrant is an important cooperation tool
between European Union countries and it is applicable in
terrorism cases.
Law 10/2002 ) Monitoring mechanisms of money laundering and
financing of terrorism.
Law 11/2004 ) Prevention and repression of money laundering
law, which establishes penalties for the laundering of assets
from an illicit source. This law also establishes control
mechanisms to prevent crimes and terrorism.
International Instruments: In addition to the legislation
cited above, Article 8 of the Portuguese Constitution states
that the rules and principles of general international law
are an integral part of Portuguese law. Rules provided for
in international conventions that have been duly ratified or
approved, shall apply in national law, following their
official publication, so long as they remain internationally
binding with respect to the Portuguese state. Portugal is
therefore bound to the international legal instruments, which
serve as a reference to the international community in its
combat against terrorism. The following are several of the
multilateral and international agreements that Portugal has
signed and ratified:
- UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (2003)
- International Convention for the Suppression of the
Financing of Terrorism (2002)
- International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist
Bombings (2001)
- Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation
of the Proceeds from Crime (1993)
- International Convention against Taking of Hostages (1983)
-Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes
against Internationally Protected Persons, including
Diplomatic Agents (1973)
Portugal also signed, but not yet ratified, the following:
- Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and
Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and
Ammunition, supplementing the United Nations Convention
against Transnational Organized Crime (2001) signed in 2002
- International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of
Nuclear Terrorism (2005). Signed in 2005.
STEPHENSON
SIPDIS
S/CT KEN MCKUNE, NCTC, AND DHS
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: KVPR PTER PREL PGOV PINR CVIS ASEC KHLS PO
SUBJECT: PORTUGAL: INFORMATION ON GOVERNMENT PRACTICES -
INFORMATION COLLECTION, SCREENING, AND SHARING
REF: 07SECSTATE 133921
1. (U) This message responds to the reftel questions
concerning Portugal's information collection, screening, and
sharing practices.
A. Watchlisting:
-- If host government maintains a "watchlist," how many
records does the watchlist contain, and how many are
terrorist-related? Which ministry or office maintains the
watchlist?
The Ministries of Justice, Interior, and Defense keep such
records, however data on number of records and specific types
are not made readily available and considered sensitive
information not for distribution.
B. Traveler Information Collection:
-- What are the country's policies (legislation, mandates,
etc.) on collecting information from travelers arriving in
the country?
Decree Law 57/2007 from July 4, 2007 updates the border
control legislation and three addenda approve information
collection models for people entering Portugal, residing in
Portugal as refugees, and requesting an extended stay
(Portaria 395/2008, 396/2008, and 297/2008 respectively).
Portuguese Immigration (Servico de Estrangeiros e Fronteiras
- SEF) is responsible for all controls.
-- Are there different policies for air, sea, and land entry
and for domestic flights? Since Portugal is a Schengen
nation, there is no set border control for land entries. Air
and sea entry are treated as the same.
-- Who collects traveler information?
SEF is responsible for collecting and storing traveler
information from the airlines, port authorities, travel
agencies, and hotels. According to Portuguese Law 57/2007,
air transportation authorities are responsible for
transmitting their final flight manifest including the name,
travel documentation used, date of birth, entry point, and
hour of arrival to SEF. Sea transportation companies and
fishing vessels that enter Portuguese territory from
international waters are also required to submit their
manifest to SEF and must notify SEF of stowaways up to 48
hours before arriving and within two hours of departure.
-- What are the policies of the collecting agency to share
that information with foreign governments?
SEF may share the information, upon a foreign government
request, pursuant to the domestic law on international
judiciary cooperation.
-- Does the host government collect Passenger Name Record
(PNR) data on incoming commercial flights or vessels? Is
this data used for intelligence or law enforcement purposes
to screen travelers? Does host government have any existing
treaties to share PNR data?
Yes, the Portuguese government does collect this data for
intelligence and law enforcement purposes. Portugal is
included in the EU regulations on PNR data.
-- If applicable, have advance passenger information systems
(APIS),interactive advanced passenger information systems
(IAPIS),or electronic travel authority systems been
effective at detecting other national security threats, such
as wanted criminals?
Yes, we do not have statistical information on this issue,
but believe the systems have been effective in screening
passengers.
C. Border Control and Screening:
-- Does the host government employ software to screen
travelers of security interest?
The host government employs software to screen all
non-Schengen travelers and the GOP recently requested CODIS
software to enhance screening abilities. However, Portugal
is a member of the EU's Schengen Agreement, and under its
provisions, Portugal, as well as the other Schengen
participants, abolished routine immigration controls for
persons traveling by air, sea or land between signatory
States. Portugal's only land border is with Spain, and
border checkpoints between the two countries are normally no
longer operational.
-- Are all travelers tracked electronically, or only
non-host-country nationals? What is the frequency of
travelers being "waived through" because they hold up what
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appears to be an appropriate document, but whose information
is not actually recorded electronically? What is the
estimated percentage of non-recorded crossings, entries and
exits?
All arrivals at airports and seaports are reviewed by SEF,
but only foreigners from non-Schengen nations are recorded.
At international ports of entry, SEF officers have access to
computerized databases that contain information regarding
outstanding warrants, criminal convictions, lost and stolen
passports, and stolen blank passport data and persons who
were previously denied Schengen visas or admission to a
Schengen country. Portugal's international airports are
monitored by SEF and Customs officials. A minimum check (a
quick, straightforward verification of the validity of the
document and an examination for signs of falsification or
counterfeiting) is the rule for EU citizens and other persons
enjoying the Community right of free movement (such as the
family members of an EU citizen).
Portuguese airports use an automated passport control system
called "RAPID" for EU citizens over 18 years old holding
biometric e-passports. RAPID uses facial recognition
technology and performs the same checks as a human
immigration officer including check a database for stolen,
misappropriated, lost and invalidated documents, review the
validity of the travel document, and flag the presence of
signs of falsification or counterfeiting.
SEF controls entry and exit via Portugal's external borders
and its operations follow guidelines from the Community Code
on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders
(Schengen Borders Code) established by the European
Parliament and the EU Council on 15 March 2006. External
borders may be crossed only at border crossing-points.
Operational cooperation is coordinated by the European Agency
for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External
Borders of the Member States (FRONTEX).
We cannot estimate the percentage of non-recorded crossings
of the total entries because of the unrecorded land crossings
due to the Schengen agreement.
-- Do host government border control officials have the
authority to use other criminal data when making decisions on
who can enter the country? If so, please describe this
authority (legislation, mandates, etc).
Yes. Under the Schengen Borders Code, the control of
movement of persons across borders includes the mandatory
check of all national and international criminal and police
databases especially the SEF database and the national and
Interpol fugitive intelligence database and the entry refusal
Schengen Information System, which has information about
individuals who are considered to be a threat to public
policy, internal security, public health.
-- What are the host government's policies on questioning,
detaining and denying entry to individuals presenting
themselves at a point of entry into the country? Which
agency would question, detain, or deny entry?
Portugal's policy on denying entry is outlined in Article 32
of Portugal's Decree Law 57/2007. In particular, the GOP
reserves the right to deny entry to those who do not meet the
legal entry requirements, who are on the Schengen "do not
admit" list, who are on Portugal's national "do not admit
list," are considered a danger or threat to public order,
national security, public health, or against diplomatic
interests. SEF is the responsible agency for detentions and
denied entries.
Pursuant to the provisions of the Portuguese immigration law,
Portuguese Immigration (SEF) has the authority to question
and deny entry into the country of any non-Portuguese
nationals. Additionally, SEF has the authority to detain an
individual for the maximum period of 48 hours. Detention
will be subject to the scrutiny of a judicial authority
within that 48 hour holding period. During the review, the
judicial authority hears the reasons for the detention,
informs the person detained thereof and questions the
detainee to allow him or her to present a defense.
-- How well does information sharing function within the host
government, e.g., if there is a determination that someone
with a valid host-government visa is later identified with
terrorism, how is this communicated and resolved internally?
Information sharing seems to work well, however the Judicial
Police (FBI equivalent),the intelligence services, and SEF
all report to different ministries in the Portuguese
government. In 2008, the Portuguese government established a
new Secretary General to coordinate the various domestic
security efforts.
Additional background information: The Intelligence System of
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the Portuguese Republic (SIRP) coordinates the two separate
Portuguese intelligence services. The Security Intelligence
Service (SIS) guarantees Portugal's security against
sabotage, terrorism, espionage and the practice of acts who,
by their nature, could disrupt the rule of law. The Defense
Strategic Intelligence Service (SIED) focuses externally to
guarantee Portugal's national independence, national
interests, and security. Both intelligence services report
to the Prime Minister.
D. Biometric Collection:
-- Are biometric systems integrated for all active POEs?
What are the systems and models used?
Yes, international airports in Portugal use an automated
passport control system called "RAPID." The system is
available only to EU citizens over 18 and holders of
biometric e-passports. RAPID uses facial recognition
technology and performs the same checks as a human
immigration officer, such as data base checks for stolen,
misappropriated, lost and invalidated documents, reviewing
the validity of the document authorizing the legitimate
holder to cross the border, and flagging the presence of
signs of falsification or counterfeiting.
RAPID (Automatic Identification of Passengers Holding
Traveling Documents) combines the operations of reading and
checking electronic passports with an innovating feature for
assessing biometric data which operates an automatic gate
opening device. This device checks whether the electronic
passports is genuine, and validates the data stored on the
chip. It then appraises the passenger's identification by
establishing a comparison between the photo stored on the
chip and the information of the passenger in loco,
automatically opening the border gate when the features of
both images are coincident. RAPID was made secure by an
intelligent system that allows the entry of a single
passenger each time and automatically adjusts the reading
camera to his or her height.
-- Are all passengers screened for the biometric or does the
host government target a specific population for collection
(i.e. host country nationals)? Do the biometric collection
systems look for a one to one comparison (ensure the
biometric presented matches the one stored on the e-Passport)
or one to many comparison (checking the biometric presented
against a database of known biometrics)?
All EU citizens with e-passports over eighteen years old are
screened. Portugal uses a system of one-to-many comparisons.
-- If biometric systems are in place, does the host
government know of any countermeasures that have been used or
attempted to defeat biometric checkpoints?
No, it is not aware of any.
-- What are the host government's policies on collecting the
fingerprints of travelers coming into the country?
One program exists. Portugal has started in Dakar, Senegal a
pilot program conducted on a voluntary basis only, called
BIODEV. BIODEV includes the capture of biometrics data (2D
face, 10 fingerprints) of a visa applicant at a Portuguese
consular post, forwarding the captured data to be stored and
searched in a central AFIS, and the verification of the
biometrics data of the visa holder at the port of entry.
Portugal recently went live based on the complete biometric
visa application process in Dakar, Senegal, with participants
arriving at Lisbon airport.
-- Which agency is responsible for the host government's
fingerprint system?
Portuguese Immigration, SEF
-- Are the fingerprint programs in place NIST, INT-I, EFTS,
UK1 or RTID compliant?
The fingerprint program in place is the finger image data
interchange format standard: ISO 19794-4 (code WSQ).
-- Are the fingerprints collected as flats or rolled? Which
agency collects the fingerprints?
The fingerprints are collected digitally as flats.
E. Passports:
-- If the host government issues a machine-readable passport
containing biometric information, does the host government
share the public key required to read the biometric
information with any other governments? If so, which
governments?
We attempted to contact authorities from the Portuguese Mint
in charge of this program, but were unable to confirm at this
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time. It is likely that Portugal shares information with its
Schengen partners.
-- Does the host government issue replacement passports for
full or limited validity (e.g. the time remaining on the
original passports, fixed validity for a replacement, etc.)?
The government issues a new passport for full validity.
-- Does the host government have special
regulations/procedures for dealing with "habitual" losers of
passports or bearers who have reported their passports stolen
multiple times?
Yes. The adjudicators report the situation to the police for
possible investigation and, if necessary, judicial action.
-- Are replacement passports of the same or different
appearance and page length as regular passports (do they have
something along the lines of our emergency partial duration
passports)?
There are no replacement passports. In exceptional
circumstances, namely, the adjudicating entity has no
authority to issue regular passports (as is the case of
Portuguese consular offices overseas) or the electronic
passport system is down, a temporary passport may be issued
to the applicant. This passport is an eight-page document
valid for six months only, and is neither biometric nor
machine readable.
-- Do emergency replacement passports contain the same or
fewer biometric fields as regular-issue passports?
Emergency passports do not contain biometric information.
-- Where applicable, has Post noticed any increase in the
number of replacement or "clean" (i.e. no evidence of prior
travel) passports used to apply for U.S. visas?
No, we have not seen any increase.
-- Are replacement passports assigned a characteristic number
series or otherwise identified?
No, they do not have any special numbers or identification.
F. Fraud Detection
-- How robust is fraud detection and how actively are
instances of fraud involving documents followed up?
Portuguese Immigration (SEF) is responsible for the
investigation and detection of fraudulent documents. Fraud
detection is taken very seriously and instances involving
recent bank fraud cases and large company malfeasance have
been aggressively pursued. The fraud detection department
and forensic lab conduct highly sensitive investigations.
Once an investigation is completed, it is turned over to the
courts for prosecution. The Embassy has visited the
facilities and finds it both professionally run and capable
of handling sensitive investigations.
-- How are potentially fraudulently issued documents taken
out of circulation, or made harder to use?
Portugal is one of the better EU nations in making its
documents safer and more difficult to forge by way of various
up to date security document features (i.e. holographic,
light latent imagery, etc.). SEF is also involved in the
process of establishing document security features. Whenever
fraudulent documents are found, they are confiscated and
voided.
G. Privacy and Data Security
-- What are the country's policies on records related to the
questioning, detention or removal of individuals encountered
at points of entry into the country?
Pursuant to Portuguese immigration law, Portuguese
Immigration (SEF) has the authority to question and deny
entry into the country of any non-host country nationals. If
admission into the country is denied on grounds of fraudulent
documents, the document is confiscated and the individual is
immediately returned pursuant to the Chicago Convention. If
the individual cannot be deported within 48 hours, he or she
must appear before a judicial authority for a hearing.
SEF will question and interview the individual and where
necessary, will call the Judicial Police (PJ) to intervene
and interrogate the more serious cases. An illegal entry
into Portugal often requires repatriation of the individual
by the same airline. These individuals are often held at
detention centers at the airport.
Aliens removed from Portuguese territory by SEF are banned
from returning to the country for a minimum of five years.
-- How are those records stored, and for how long?
LISBON 00000071 005 OF 008
The Portuguese government stores records in the National
Integrated Information System. Personal information is kept
in a temporary file by SEF for 48 hours unless needed for
legal reasons, as outlined in law 67/1998 governing personal
information. Transportation companies must delete the
information within 24 hours of transmitting the data to SEF.
Personal data entered into the Schengen Information System
for the purposes of tracing persons is kept only for the time
required to meet the purposes for which they were supplied
and/or for legal proceedings. Alerts inserted by any EU
Schengen member state must be reviewed after three years of
entry of the alert in order to evaluate the need for
continuing storage of such data.
-- What are the country's restrictions on the collection or
use of sensitive data?
Only cleared law enforcement personnel may access the data.
The name and official purpose from the officer are required
as well to view any records. Collection or use of sensitive
data relating to the movement of persons using information
from the European Union's Schengen Information System was
established by law in 1994, pursuant to the Schengen
Convention. The law created the control and monitoring
mechanisms for the Schengen Information System. A central
Schengen database facility operates under the direction of
Portuguese Immigration Service (SEF) and a designated
official at the Ministry of Internal Administration (MAI).
The Data Protection National Commission (Comissao Nacional de
Proteccao de Dados, or CNPD) is the national control
authority entrusted with the supervision of the national part
of the Schengen Information System, and with the verification
that the processing and use of the data does not violate the
rights of the person. The rights to access, alter records,
and delete information shall be exercised by a person
demonstrating a legitimate, direct and personal interest, as
provided in the Schengen Convention, by means of the national
control authority.
-- What are the requirements to provide notice to the public
on the implementation of new databases of records?
The Portuguese Constitution has extensive provisions on
protecting privacy, secrecy of communications and data
protection. The law on personal data protection established
the conditions applicable to automatic processing,
connection, transmission and use of databases and guarantees
its protection by means of an administrative body, the
National Data Protection Commission (Comissao Nacional de
Proteccao de Dados, or CNPD). The Commission is an
independent agency that is directly responsible to
Parliament. Its must register existing databases with
private data, authorize and control such databases, issue
directives, and oversee the Schengen Information System
(SIS).
Implementation of new databases of records is sent by the
executive branch to the Portuguese Parliament for approval.
When the new database is authorized, it becomes public
through the publication of the law in the Government Official
Gazette.
-- Are there any laws relating to security features for
government computer systems that hold personally identifying
information?
There are varied levels of access to security features and
these are normally held in government protected computer
systems.
-- What are the rules on an individual's ability to access
data that homeland security agencies hold about them?
The Schengen Convention itself recognizes the rights of
individuals. These include the right to access information
in the Schengen Information System (SIS); the right to
correct data where there is a de jure or de facto mistake;
the right to apply to the courts or competent authorities to
demand that data be corrected, deleted or that damages be
awarded; the right to ask that data to be checked and to
question the reason for data collection. Since Portugal is a
signatory to the Schengen Convention, all requests for access
to personal data must follow the provisions of the Schengen
Convention's article 109, article 6 of Portuguese Law 2/94,
and/or article 11 of Portuguese Law 67/98. Any citizen or
alien may request verification on whether there is an alert
in his or her name in the Schengen database. In addition,
he/she may request a correction or deletion of personal data,
in accordance with article 110 of the Schengen Convention.
-- Are there different rules for raw data (name, date of
birth, etc.) versus case files (for example, records about
LISBON 00000071 006 OF 008
enforcement actions)?
No, all records fall within the same database. Cases under
investigation or considered highly confidential will be kept
in a separate database only with written agreement from the
prosecutor's office.
-- Does a non-citizen/resident have the right to sue the
government to obtain these types of data?
Yes, in accordance with data protection principles,
individuals have specific rights under the Schengen
Convention, whether they are nationals of Schengen nations or
not. The rights include the right of access to personal data
stored in the SIS, the right to a rectification when data are
factually inaccurate or unlawfully stored, the right to bring
before the courts or competent authorities an action to
correct or delete incorrect data or to obtain compensation.
H. Immigration Data Bases:
-- What computerized immigration databases are used to track
entries and exits?
The Schengen Information System and national Portuguese
databases are used to track entries and exits.
-- Is the immigration database available at all ports of
entry (POEs)? If immigration databases are available at some
POEs, but not all, how does the host government decide which
POEs will receive the tool?
Databases are available at all ports of entry but not at all
potential land border crossings.
-- What problems, if any, limit the effectiveness of the
systems? For example, limited training, power brownouts,
budgetary restraints, corruption, etc.?
No problems.
-- How often are national immigration databases updated?
Databases are updated daily with new information.
I. Watchlist and Information Sharing:
-- Is there a name-based watchlist system used to screen
travelers at POEs?
Yes, at border checkpoints and in the general watchlist
computer database that only police can access.
-- What domestic sources of information populate the
name-based watchlist, i.e. names of deported persons,
terrorist lookouts, criminal wants/warrants?
Name and date/place of birth are included. Other identifiers
include: parents' names, marital status, home address,
national identity card number, social security number, Prior
criminal offense records, traffic offense data (to include
unpaid tickets, DUIs),non-compliance with court-related
summons, wants/warrants and some child predator information
at a different access level.
-- What international watchlists does the host government use
for screening individuals, e.g. Interpol or TSA No Fly lists,
UN, etc.?
INTERPOL, EUROPOL and other international intelligence
sources.
-- What bilateral/multilateral watchlist agreements exist
between host government and its neighbors?
Agreements exist with all EU nations as well as others with
the US, Spain, and Brazil. Agreements with Spain and Brazil
are in response to Spanish terrorist group ETA and North
African terrorists transiting the area and drug
producing/transiting in the case of Brazil.
J. Biometrics:
-- Are biometric systems in place at ports of entry (air,
land, sea)? If no, does host government have plans to
install such a system?
Biometric systems are in place for air and sea entries as
outlined above.
-- If biometric systems are available at some POEs, but not
all, how does the host government decide which POEs will
receive the tool?
All but land entries are in use as a result of the Schengen
agreement.
-- What biometric technologies, if any, does the host
government use, i.e. fingerprint identification, facial
recognition, iris recognition, hand geometry, retinal
identification, DNA-based identification, keystroke dynamics,
gait analysis? Are the systems ICAO compliant?
LISBON 00000071 007 OF 008
At this time, Portugal uses facial recognition and
fingerprint identification in Senegal only.
-- Does the host government issue a machine-readable passport
containing biometric information? If e-Passports are issued,
what biometric information is included on the document, i.e.
fingerprint, iris, facial recognition, etc? If not, does
host government plan to issue a biometric document in the
future?
Yes, Portugal issues a machine-readable passport with
biometric information. E-passports have been issued since
2006 with facial recognition techology.
K. Identifying Appropriate Partners:
-- Department would appreciate post's assessment of whether
host government would be an appropriate partner in data
sharing. Considerations include whether host government
watchlists may include political dissidents (as opposed or in
addition to terrorists),and whether host governments would
share or use U.S. watchlist data inappropriately, etc.
Post recommends sharing information with Portugal. Portugal
has professional, capable, and well-trained law enforcement
officials who would use the information to locate and detain
terrorist suspects. We have no reason to believe that
Portugal would include political dissidents in any listing or
use the list inappropriately.
-- Are there political realities which would preclude a
country from entering into a formal data-sharing agreement
with the U.S?
No, none.
-- Is the host country's legal system sufficiently developed
to adequately provide safeguards for the protection and
nondisclosure of information?
Yes, the legal system is well developed and able to handle
the information, as outlined above.
-- How much information sharing does the host country do
internally? Is there a single consolidated database, for
example? If not, do different ministries share information
amongst themselves?
Ministries and law enforcement agencies do share information
with each other upon official request, or in accordance with
the laws governing that criminal offense. Law enforcement is
particularly willing to share information about major crimes,
terrorism, and narcotics suspects. There is no single
information sharing hub. Different agencies have access to
information that relates to their area.
-- How does the country define terrorism? Are there legal
statutes that do so?
In broad terms, Portuguese Law 52/2003 defines terrorism as,
"All the acts that aim to facilitate, either directly or
indirectly, any act committed for terrorism purposes." In
this context, it penalizes terrorist acts themselves and any
instrumental offenses, such as theft or document forgery,
connected with a terrorist act.
Before 2003, the Penal Code had a couple of provisions with
respect to terrorism and terrorist association crimes. Those
provisions were partly revoked by Law 52/2003 (Law on
Combating Terrorism) which transposed European Union
Framework Decision 75/JAI/2002 into the Portuguese legal
system.
The added value of this new Law is making individuals liable
and criminalizing so-called "instrumental crimes" such as
theft or document forgery, regardless of where it occurs. It
also punishes the activities of groups, terrorist
organizations and terrorist associations and criminalizes
terrorist acts perpetrated in country as well as abroad.
Additionally, the law contains some exceptions to the
principle of territoriality, established in the Penal Code.
Portuguese penal law may therefore be applied to acts that
occur outside Portuguese territory, unless otherwise stated
in an international treaty or convention, when the crimes
constitute terrorist offenses committed by individuals,
domestic or international organizations, provided that the
agents are found on Portuguese territory and cannot be
extradited to the requesting state.
Another important aspect of the law is that it envisages the
criminal liability of legal persons or their equivalent
(corporate and mere de facto associations) for offenses
connected to terrorism when carried out on their behalf and
in the interest of their organs or representatives.
LISBON 00000071 008 OF 008
Apart from Law 52/2003, there are several other laws aiming
at combating terrorism:
Law 5/2002 ) Special regime of proof collecting and breach
of professional silence regarding serious crimes;
Law 101/2001 ) Infiltrated agents -Juridical regime of
undercover actions regarding prevention and criminal
investigation;
Law 104/2001 ) Interception of communications; controlled
deliveries; undercover actions;
Law 144/99 of 31 August (Law of International Judicial
Cooperation in Criminal Matters) applies to cooperation in
criminal matters. It governs extradition, transfer of
proceedings in criminal matters, enforcement of criminal
judgments, transfer of persons sentenced to any punishment or
imprisonment, supervision of conditionally sentenced or
conditionally released persons, and mutual legal assistance
in criminal matters.
Law 65/2003 regarding the European Arrest Warrant regime. The
European Arrest Warrant is an important cooperation tool
between European Union countries and it is applicable in
terrorism cases.
Law 10/2002 ) Monitoring mechanisms of money laundering and
financing of terrorism.
Law 11/2004 ) Prevention and repression of money laundering
law, which establishes penalties for the laundering of assets
from an illicit source. This law also establishes control
mechanisms to prevent crimes and terrorism.
International Instruments: In addition to the legislation
cited above, Article 8 of the Portuguese Constitution states
that the rules and principles of general international law
are an integral part of Portuguese law. Rules provided for
in international conventions that have been duly ratified or
approved, shall apply in national law, following their
official publication, so long as they remain internationally
binding with respect to the Portuguese state. Portugal is
therefore bound to the international legal instruments, which
serve as a reference to the international community in its
combat against terrorism. The following are several of the
multilateral and international agreements that Portugal has
signed and ratified:
- UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (2003)
- International Convention for the Suppression of the
Financing of Terrorism (2002)
- International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist
Bombings (2001)
- Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation
of the Proceeds from Crime (1993)
- International Convention against Taking of Hostages (1983)
-Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes
against Internationally Protected Persons, including
Diplomatic Agents (1973)
Portugal also signed, but not yet ratified, the following:
- Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and
Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and
Ammunition, supplementing the United Nations Convention
against Transnational Organized Crime (2001) signed in 2002
- International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of
Nuclear Terrorism (2005). Signed in 2005.
STEPHENSON