PORTUGUESE ELECTION RESULTS PORTEND UNCERTAINTY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 LISBON 000532 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/07/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL SCUL SOCI PO SUBJECT: PORTUGUESE ELECTION RESULTS PORTEND UNCERTAINTY REF: A. LISBON 516 ¶B. LISBON 529 ¶C. LISBON 88 Classified By: PolEconOff Lucy Chang for reasons 1.4(b,d) ¶1. (C) Summary: The Socialists resumed power in the September 27 Portuguese elections but lost their absolute majority in Parliament, losing 24 seats to the far-left Left Bloc and the conservative Popular Party (CDS/PP). With the loss of their majority, the Socialists must now either form a coalition government, which is unlikely given ideological differences with potential coalition partners and Prime Minister Socrates' distaste for sharing power, or negotiate with the left and the right to pass legislation on a case-by-case basis. A cabinet reshuffle is anticipated, with controversial and/or ineffective ministers likely to be replaced. The 2010 budget is likely to pass, with the abstention of opposition parties, but the long-term stability of a Socialist minority government is uncertain. End Summary. VICTORY WITHOUT A MANDATE -------------- ¶2. (C) Portuguese voters returned the Socialist Party to power in the September 27 election without much enthusiasm (ref A). Although the Socialists were re-elected with 37 percent of the vote, they lost their previous absolute majority in Parliament by losing 24 seats, dropping to 97 in the 230-seat assembly. They now must rely on adroit parliamentary maneuvering to govern. This "victory" marked the first time in Portuguese constitutional history that a second-term government won with less support than during its first term. This loss of support has been largely attributed to voters' disillusionment over Socrates' unfulfilled campaign promises and controversial reforms, Portugal's high unemployment, and Socrates' alleged involvement in a kickback scandal (ref C) that tarnished his image. Many voters appeared to be simply weary of what they perceived to be Socrates' aggressive, authoritarian, and arrogant approach to governing. ¶3. (U) During his first term as prime minister, Socrates pursued aggressive reforms in various sectors under a progressive platform. Among the most controversial was his education sector reform, which introduced a meritocracy-based peer review system for promotion of public school teachers (ref B). This initiative prompted angry protests from teachers and calls for the removal of Education Minister Maria de Lurdes Rodrigues. Teachers' unions demanded a return to a seniority-based promotion system and job protection. ¶4. (U) Among other promises in the 2005 campaign, Socrates had pledged to create 200,000 new jobs, but fell short of his promise. Currently, with more than 500,000 unemployed, Portugal has the second highest unemployment rate in Europe, after Spain. While the official figure is 9.1 percent, the real unemployment rate could be as high as 13 or 14 percent due to "hidden unemployment," including seasonal laborers, part-time employees, and workers who have recently been laid off but continue to be counted as employed. Although the weakness in the economy reflects the worldwide recession, the Socialists inevitably were blamed by voters. SOCIAL DEMOCRATS RUN A WEAK CAMPAIGN -------------- ¶5. (C) Key to the Socialist victory was the failure by the main opposition Social Democratic Party (PSD) to mount an effective campaign of its own. The right-of-center Social Democrats promised "politica de verdade" (politics of truth), but did not provide voters with a clear vision of the future. PSD leader Manuela Ferreira Leite ran a negative campaign, focusing attacks on Socrates rather than proposing new ideas, and criticizing the Socialists for "democratic asphyxia," claiming that the Socialists were controlling the press and suppressing freedom of expression. Her attacks and criticisms did not resonate with voters. ¶6. (C) Ferreira Leite was especially criticized for political ineptitude in citing the autonomous region of Madeira, governed by the same authoritarian president since 1974, as a model of democracy. She was also dinged for hypocrisy in characterizing Socrates as dishonest while including Antonio Preto, who had been accused of corruption, on the PSD slate. Her lackluster performance in the debates, her austere image and lack of charisma, and the PSD's unpopular conservative moral discourse against same-sex marriage and abortion have also been cited for the PSD's weak performance. ¶7. (C) Another, though less significant, factor in the PSD's LISBON 00000532 002 OF 003 poor performance may have been the refusal by Portuguese President Cavaco Silva (who led the PSD government from 1985 to 1995) to clarify statements made to the press by his press advisor alleging wiretapping of the offices of the presidency by the Socialists. While the details of this episode remain unclear, it cast the president in a negative light and undermined the PSD campaign. FUTURE OF SOCIALIST GOVERNMENT UNCERTAIN -------------- ¶8. (C) While some have a pessimistic view of the future of the Socialists' second-term government, predicting its dissolution as early as 2011, others have more confidence that the minority government will persevere by cooperating on legislation with smaller parties. The ability of the Socialists to govern with a minority could be hindered, however, by Socrates' preference to exercise tight control and his disinclination to share power. ¶9. (C) The Socialists could form a quiet pact with the conservative CDS/PP in which the CDS/PP would agree to vote for the budget, abstain from the vote on the Socialist government program, and vote in favor of one or two priority reforms. Alternatively, Manuela Ferreira Leite could relinquish the PSD leadership in favor of someone who could reach a pact with the Socialists under which the PSD would abstain from the budget vote in exchange for PSD influence in cabinet selections. A more far-fetched possibility is one in which Ferreira Leite would stay and vote against the budget and the Socialist program, forcing the government to fall and the president to call parliamentary elections in spring 2010, in the hope that the PSD would win. In the event of new elections that soon, however, the Socialists would likely win a plurality again. ¶10. (C) A Socialist minority government could fail under any of three circumstances: if an absolute majority rejects the government; if a vote of confidence is not approved; or if the opposition presents a censure motion (a motion that can be presented only one time per party during the four-year legislative mandate). It appears that the Socialist program will be approved if President Cavaco Silva is assured that Socrates has the necessary floor support. If the four opposition parties were to reject the Socialist program, they would run the risk of being blamed by the voters during a time of economic crisis. The Way Forward -------------- ¶11. (C) Many predict that the friction lingering from the election campaign will dissipate and that opposition parties will compromise with the government on essential legislation. It is likely that Socrates will talk with opposition parties on cabinet choices and will incorporate in his program some of their proposals, while abandoning for now his controversial education reform. Socrates will probably seek the support of the CDS/PP on the budget in exchange for naming independent or moderate ministers acceptable to the CDS/PP. Influential in the Portuguese Agricultural Confederation, the CDS/PP will likely want a voice in naming the new minister of agriculture or minister of economy. Cabinet Reshuffle Anticipated - Speculation Begins -------------- -------------- ¶12. (C) Socrates promised during the campaign that there would be a "new government with new ministers." He did not specify how many would be replaced, but political analysts estimate that just 40 percent will remain. Currently, about 40 percent of his ministers are technocrats and 60 percent are career politicians. Among those likely to retain their portfolios is Foreign Minister Luis Amado, who is widely regarded as a competent, non-controversial, solid figure within the GOP and a good friend of the U.S. He was lauded for the success of the EU-Africa Summit in Lisbon in 2007 during Portugal's EU presidency. If Amado decides to leave the cabinet (as has been rumored),Manuel Lobo Antunes, former MFA Secretary of State for European Affairs who negotiated the EU Lisbon Treaty, could be named new Foreign Minister. Other names are also rumored. ¶13. (C) Among those likely to be replaced are Education Minister Maria de Lurdes Rodrigues, widely viewed as the inflexible, strong-willed architect of Socrates' controversial education sector reform, and Minister of Agriculture Jaime Silva, who has been criticized for failing to disburse EU agricultural funds to farmers and for suggesting that fishermen should leave the fishing industry and open up sandwich shops. (Silva is a strong supporter of GMOs domestically and in the EU.) At one point, he publicly acknowledged that 40 percent of his staff was redundant. Also likely to be replaced is Defense Minister Nuno Severiano LISBON 00000532 003 OF 003 Teixeira, who has announced he wants to return to academia. While in office, he was plagued by problems with military unions over pension benefits and the reform of the military health system. He could be replaced by Julio Miranda Calha, current chairman of the Defense Committee in Parliament and a close friend of the Parliament president. ¶14. (C) The Minister of Finance could be replaced by current Minister of Labor and Social Security Jose Vieira da Silva, who was responsible for the Socialists' rural electoral campaign. Regarded as intelligent and leftist, he would be the second most important person in the government if named Finance Minister. The new Minister of Economy could be Basilio Horta, current president of the Portuguese Agency for Investment and Foreign Trade (AICEP) and former CDS/PP presidential candidate. To be appointed, he would have to suspend his CDS/PP party membership and be named as an independent. COMMENT -------------- ¶15. (C) The Socialists are hanging on to power, but the new government will lack the sweeping mandate given the previous government, and Socrates could be hamstrung by the need to muster support from parties both to the left and right to enact his program. While his personal style may not lend itself to crafting the temporary alliances required to govern and demands for concessions by his partners could stifle new reforms, Socrates' political instincts should lead him to compromise with other parties to ensure the stability of his government. Governing as a minority will require a careful middle course to satisfy all partners, which could breed dissatisfaction among the more activist elements of the party, and further bleed support. In our view, it is not likely that the opposition parties will reject the government's program and 2010 budget and bring down the government, at least not in 2010. The opposition recognizes the need for stability given the current economic crisis, and will likely give the Socialist government some breathing space, provided Socrates, likewise, is willing to make accommodations. For more reporting from Embassy Lisbon and information about Portugal, please see our Intelink site: http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/portal:port ugal BALLARD