SENDERO LUMINOSO AND THE RECENT SPIKE IN VIOLENCE

C O N F I D E N T I A L LIMA 000007 E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/06/2018 TAGS: PGOV PTER SNAR PINR PE SUBJECT: SENDERO LUMINOSO AND THE RECENT SPIKE IN VIOLENCE REF: A. 08 LIMA 1678 ¶B. 08 LIMA 1809 ¶C. 08 LIMA 1876 ¶D. 08 LIMA 196 ¶E. 08 LIMA 1640 Classified By: DCM James Nealon. Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: The increase in deadly attacks attributed to Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso, SL) remnants in recent months suggests a change is afoot. Some observers maintain the violence is SL's response to a military incursion into its territory. Others believe the terrorist group is rebuilding and expanding. Still others see a more complex mix of turf battles, revenge killings, and official corruption in a drug trafficking environment that involves many actors, including SL. The truth probably reflects a mix of factors, and even the hypothesis of a resurgent SL must take into account the group's fading ideological goals and expanding involvement in the drug-trafficking chain. End Summary. Increase in Violence -------------- ¶2. (C) Violent acts attributed to remnants of the Sendero Luminoso terrorist organization in Peru have been more deadly in recent months. Since August, attacks attributed to Sendero in the Apurimac and Ene River Valley (VRAE) and the Upper Huallaga Valley (UHV) (refs A-C) have killed at least 25 people and wounded dozens more. Prior to August, such attacks had been, at least during the previous year, generally less lethal. This apparent spike in Sendero violence suggests that significant changes may be taking place in the terrorist organization and/or its operating environment. Two SL Organizations -------------- ¶3. (C) Remnants of Sendero Luminoso have long operated east of the Andes in two distinct factions in remote and separate locations. The UHV faction (also known as the Huallaga Regional Committee),under the command of "Artemio", appears to have been substantially weakened over the past 18 months. Peruvian National Police Gen. Edwin Palomino, commander of the Upper Huallaga Front, told Emboffs in early December that security forces had killed or captured two of the top three SL leaders in the area and dozens of their troops. The VRAE group (also known as the Principal Regional Committee),under the command of "Alipio", is part of a militant SL faction called "Proseguir" (or "Onward") that explicitly advocates continued armed revolutionary struggle. According to analysts, Proseguir is under the leadership of SL elements still incarcerated in Peru's Castro Castro prison and at odds with SL leader Abimael Guzman, the nominal head of the "Acuerdista" faction advocating an eventual negotiated political settlement with the Government of Peru. Violence: Response to Military Operations?... -------------- ¶4. (C) Some observers explain the VRAE faction's recent increase in activity both as a result of the group's communication with its leadership in prison and as a response to the Peruvian military incursion into SL territory. According to this view, the spike in violent SL attacks in the Vizcatan area of Ayacucho department since late August coincides with the launching of a Peruvian military anti-subversive operation in the area (ref E),and reflects a tactical counter-response by the terrorist group. In this reading, SL has reacted fiercely to the military offensive partly out of economic interest -- Vizcatan is an important drug trafficking hub as well as one of Sendero's historical havens -- and the ferocity of the response is a measure of the importance SL attaches to its continuing control over strategic and economically valuable terrain. Resurgent SL?... -------------- ¶5. (C) A related view is that the increased violence indicates a more general resurgence of the Shining Path organization. Proponents of this view hold that Sendero is nearing completion of its phase of "strategic rebuilding" -- after having been largely dismantled in the 90s and its remnants chased into virtual exile in two of Peru's most geographically remote and forbidding jungle areas. In this view, the group's rebuilding has been reinforced by the scores of former Senderistas released from prison in the last 6-8 years (ref D) as well as by new recruiting. There are also reports of recent incipient attempts of the two geographical factions to re-connect which, if true, could be significant. Some observers are concerned that, left unchecked, SL could again expand its geographical area of influence and operations outward in Peru's national territory, and even form connections with other Latin American radical organizations, ultimately acquiring a regional sweep. (Comment: At present, this concern is largely hypothetical. End Comment.) Or Multiple, Overlapping Sources? -------------- ¶6. (C) A competing explanation puts the recent increased violence in the broader context of Peru's burgeoning cocaine trade. According to this analysis, a heterogenous mix of turf battles, revenge killings, and official corruption lies behind the worrying surface statistics. In this context, SL -- whose participation in drug trafficking has evolved from providing security to traffickers and charging fees for the use of its "territory" to actually cultivating coca and producing cocaine in its own labs -- is among the groups responsible for the violence, but not the only or even necessarily the principal one. Others include informal gangs taking advantage of the prevailing lawlessness in emergency zones, corrupt security officials involved in trafficking or selectively turning a blind eye to it (sometimes paying the price for failing to follow through on commitments),as well as narco-trafficking groups competing for control of production zones and trafficking routes. Especially worrying to government officials is evidence of the increasing presence and activity of foreign drug interests, including Mexico's ultra-violent Sinaloa cartel, within the coca production zones, along major trafficking routes and elsewhere. Comment: The New SL -------------- ¶7. (C) These different perspectives are not mutually exclusive, and there may be some truth in each. Even the hypothesis of a resurgent Sendero Luminoso must take into account the differences between the fervently ideological Maoist organization of the 80s and 90s that deployed the deliberate killing of civilians as an instrument of revolutionary terror and today's SL, which appears to have adapted to the changed circumstances of the early 21st century. Today's SL has sought to cultivate ties of respect with surrounding communities (eg, paying for goods rather than stealing from local communities),to target security forces rather than civilians in their violent attacks, and to downplay ideology -- all while deepening its ties to coca-growing organizations and expanding its participation in the narcotics-trafficking chain. This has led some observers to compare today's SL with Colombia's FARC organization during the 1990s. ¶8. (U) We will continue to closely monitor SL and related activity, attempting to separate fact from rumor and speculation, and to asses its potential consequences for Peru. MCKINLEY