Peru: 2009 Country Reports on Terrorism

UNCLAS LIMA 001723 SIPDIS S/CT: RHONDA SHORE AND NCTC E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PTER ASEC PE SUBJECT: Peru: 2009 Country Reports on Terrorism REF: STATE 109980; STATE 122733 Peru ¶1. (U) Peru's primary counterterrorism concern remained fighting remnants of the militant Maoist Sendero Luminoso (SL or Shining Path),a designated Foreign Terrorist Organization that wreaked havoc on the country in the 1980s and 1990s at a cost of more than 69,000 lives. SL elements in the Upper Huallaga River Valley (UHV) sought to regroup and replenish their ranks following significant setbacks suffered in 2007 and 2008. Separately, the rival SL organization in the Apurimac and Ene River Valley (VRAE) maintained its influence in the area. Both factions continued to engage in drug trafficking, and during the year carried out more than 100 terrorist acts in remote coca-growing areas and surrounding areas that killed at least 3 police, 26 civilians (mostly individuals perceived by SL in the UHV as police informants or collaborators), and 19 members of the military. ¶2. (U) Although the Fujimori government nearly eliminated SL in the 1990s, the organization, now entwined with narcotics trafficking, remained a threat in 2009. The two SL organizations combined were thought to number several hundred armed combatants. While today's SL is shorter on revolutionary zeal than in the past, analysts believed leaders in both the UHV and the VRAE continued to use Maoist philosophy to justify their illicit activities. Involvement in drug production and trafficking provided SL with funding to conduct operations, allowing it to improve relations with local communities in remote areas and to recruit new members. While SL in the UHV worked during the year to recuperate from losses suffered in 2007 and 2008, insufficient government presence in the more remote VRAE allowed the organization there to continue operating: * On April 9, SL terrorists ambushed two military patrols in the Vizcatan region of the VRAE (Ayacucho department) and killed 13 soldiers. SL launched the ambush by remotely detonating an improvised explosive device (IED),causing a rockslide, which crushed some soldiers. The SL column then attacked the survivors with gunfire and grenades. * On August 1, a group of about 40 SL terrorists attacked a police station in San Jose de Secce, in the highlands of Ayacucho, outside the VRAE, killing three police and two civilians. Official reports indicated a highly coordinated attack with explosives and military grade weaponry. * On September 2, SL forces downed a Peruvian air force MI-17 helicopter near the town of Sinaycocha in Junin department, killing its pilot, co-pilot, and one crewman. (In various other attacks in 2009 SL had damaged helicopters with ground fire, but this was the first instance of a downed helicopter since 1999.) * On November 5, one soldier was killed and four others wounded when SL terrorists attacked a provisional military base located near where the Vizcatan and Mantaro rivers meet. ¶3. (U) The Army's 2008 offensive in the Vizcatan region, called "Operation Excellence 777," continued haltingly in 2009, with the military maintaining a number of small provisional "bases" established in the area. Confrontations in 2009 generally consisted in SL elements attacking Peruvian armed forces patrols or incoming supply helicopters, but in several cases SL attacked a military base. Several of the significant attacks perpetrated by the VRAE faction of the SL occurred in highland areas outside of the VRAE. Some analysts believed the attacks marked SL's attempts at expansion, while others said they were strictly aimed at controlling drug and chemical routes. ¶4. (U) Implementation of the Garcia government's "Plan VRAE," which called for, among other things, 2,000 troops and 19 counterterrorism bases operated under a central command was still evolving. In August, the Garcia administration named Fernan Valer as the civilian head of Plan VRAE. Plans for new health, education, and infrastructure investment in these isolated communities where the state lacked presence were not fully implemented, but authorities made some improvements to roadways and rural electrification. ¶5. (U) Government efforts to improve interagency cooperation, especially in intelligence, and to strengthen prosecutorial capacity were somewhat successful. Police units specializing in counterterrorism and counter-narcotics conducted some joint operations with the Peruvian Army in the UHV. Police captured one high-ranking SL terrorist in the UHV. ¶6. (U) President Garcia continued reauthorizing a 60-day state of emergency in parts of four departments where SL operates, suspending some civil liberties, and giving the armed forces additional authority to maintain public order. There was no movement on President Garcia's 2006 proposal calling for the death penalty for those convicted of acts of terrorism, but in October Congress passed a law removing parole and other benefits for convicted terrorists. ¶7. (U) The Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA) has not conducted terrorist activities since the 1996 hostage taking at the Japanese Ambassador's residence in Lima. Efforts to reconstitute an organizational structure were not in evidence in 2009, though former MRTA members established a political party called the Free Fatherland Party ("Partido Patria Libre") to compete in future elections, and sought alliances with other political parties. ¶8. (U) SL founder and leader Abimael Guzman and key accomplices remained in prison serving life sentences on charges stemming from crimes committed during the 1980s and 1990s. In September, Guzman's attorney published a book of Guzman's handwritten manuscripts as compiled by Guzman's common-law wife, Elena Iparraguirre, who is also incarcerated for terrorism charges. ¶9. (U) The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) continued to use remote areas along the Colombian-Peruvian border to rest, regroup, and make arms purchases. Experts believed the FARC continued to fund coca cultivation and cocaine production among the Peruvian population in border areas. ¶10. (U) There is no known presence in Peru of Middle Eastern, South Asian, or other extra-regional terrorist groups. ¶11. (U) Embassy Lima POC is Jessica Huaracayo, huaracayojm@state.gov, +511-618-2514. MCKINLEY