AMAZON PROTESTS AND VIOLENCE: GOVERNMENT MISTAKES,

C O N F I D E N T I A L LIMA 001010 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/13/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR PTER SOCI ETRD ELAB PE SUBJECT: AMAZON PROTESTS AND VIOLENCE: GOVERNMENT MISTAKES, NOT REPRESSION REF: A. LIMA 1124 ¶B. LIMA 1380 ¶C. LIMA 875 ¶D. LIMA 830 Classified By: Pol/C Alexis Ludwig for reasons 1.4b and d. ¶1. (C) Summary: Nationally and internationally, the Peruvian government has suffered a serious public relations blow as a result of the June 5 violence in Bagua in which 24 police and 10 protesters were killed. The prevailing perception in part reflects distorted information and even disinformation while failing to distinguish between intentional repression and a series of errors of escalating gravity. To many observers, the government's errors can be traced back to its issuing legislative decrees without adequately consulting affected communities and, connected to this, failing to energetically defend the laws as providing improved protections for indigenous communities and the environment. Many critics also believe the government's early effort to discredit decree opponents backfired, inflaming passions and increasing the risk of violence. But the government may have made its most serious error on June 5, when it dispatched an underequipped and unprepared police in insufficient numbers to disperse thousands of protesters at the "Devil's Curve". Independent organizations have now largely confirmed the official casualty figures, but it is clear there is blame to go around (refs) and the government deserves its share -- mostly due to mistakes and miscalculation rather than the willful desire to do harm. End Summary. Blame the GOP -------------- ¶2. (C) There is little doubt that the Peruvian government has suffered a debilitating public relations blow, inside and outside of Peru, as a result of the June 5 violence in Bagua in which 24 police and 10 protesters were killed. Inside Peru, the results are clear. Recent national urban polling by the respected firm Ipsos Apoyo shows that a majority of Peruvians blame the government for its handling of the protests. President Garcia's personal approval rating fell from 34% in March - after six months of relative political calm - to 30% in May and 21% in June. Ninety-two percent of respondents said the GOP should have consulted more with indigenous communities, 53% agreed with the repeal of the decrees, and 57% said the indigenous were on the right side of the conflict. Fifty-one percent said they approved of the indigenous communities' perspectives on the conflict, compared to only 13% for Garcia. Seventy-three percent of respondents said the Minister of the Interior should resign, and 63% said the Prime Minister should resign. But the toll on Peru's international reputation may be even more severe. From news outlets in the U.S. and Europe to the transnational blogosphere, the story line is predominantly a variation on a recurring Goliath vs. David theme: a repressive government machinery attacks without provocation innocent indigenous community protesters who were seeking peacefully to protect their Amazon lands from exploitation by government-enabled predatory outsiders. This story line has engendered international public condemnations and letter-writing campaigns witheringly critical of the Government of Peru. Unrecognizable Story Line -------------- ¶3. (C) In our view, the real story is somewhat different -- more complicated and confusing -- while the prevailing perception in part reflects distorted information and even outright disinformation. For example, somehow absent from the received scenario is the fact that protesters had been blocking important national roadways for almost two months, causing several midsized provincial cities such as Tarapoto and Yurimaguas and other smaller Amazonian towns to begin running out of food, fuel, medicines and electricity. As the roadblocks dragged on, the negotiating position and public rhetoric of the protesters hardened and their stated aims expanded, which suggested they were prepared to take things all the way and to call the government's bluff (refs). It was then that a rising national discussion about the state's explicit responsibility to protect public security and to impose order began in earnest, presaging the government's decision to take action to remove the long-standing roadblocks. ¶4. (C) Moreover, to the extent that government actions were to blame, the Goliath vs. David story line fails to distinguish between supposed intentional state repression and a series of errors and miscalculations of escalating gravity that we believe more accurately describes the reality. However much one tries -- and efforts have included falsely reporting missing people as dead and citing rumors of mass graves that no credible institution has been able to confirm -- it is hard to reconcile the claim of a state-sponsored massacre with the fact that more than twice as many police than protesters were killed on June 24. Echoing the earlier observations of the UN Special Rapporteur for Indigenous People after a brief visit to Peru in mid June, the highly respected Human Rights Ombudsman's office recently published the preliminary results of its ongoing investigation, emphasizing that no state-sponsored massacre occurred in Bagua. Below, we seek to clarify the nature of the government's role in -- and responsibility for -- the decisions and events leading up to the June 5 violence. A Precipitous Flood of Decrees -------------- ¶5. (C) Many critics begin by faulting the Garcia government for the precipitous way the decrees affecting the Amazon and indigenous lands were issued. The nine disputed decrees first appeared in mid-2008 as part of a larger package of nearly 100 decrees issued by the government using powers granted him by Congress to implement provisions of the US-Peru Free Trade Agreement (ref A). The GOP issued 64 of these decrees in the week before the executive's powers expired, including 37 published on the last day, June 28th, ¶2008. Some congressional opponents and legal analysts faulted the bundled package for going well beyond the requirements of the trade agreement. Although Congress was unable to muster enough votes to repeal any of them at the time, the decrees -- whatever their substantive merits -- lost early credibility for the manner in which they came to be. ¶6. (C) Laws affecting indigenous lands received particular criticism for appearing to facilitate the sale of community holdings. Government opponents also argued that the GOP failed to present the decrees to indigenous communities for consultation, as required by ILO Convention 169. One informed contact asserted that the authors of the decrees did all the drafting feverishly in their offices with no time to consult with representatives of communities from the affected areas, partly in response to the accelerated timetable. (Comment: If the government failed to consult adequately in this case, and even President Garcia has publicly acknowledged this was the case, "adequate" consultation is a shifting target, subject to interpretation and ultimately difficult to define -- septel. End Comment.) Although the government later sought to address the main concerns raised by opponents, its credibility was already damaged, and the first Amazonian protest erupted in August 2008. (Note: See ref B. The GOP ended the first Amazonian protest by agreeing to revoke two laws and to review others while acknowledging that there had been insufficient consultation. End Note.) Failing to Define the Message -------------- ¶7. (C) By the time the second Amazonian protest began in April 2009, the GOP had already eliminated the most controversial decrees, but in the meantime had not widely and energetically defended the remaining ones as providing improved protections for indigenous communities. Garcia instead focused on defending the government's right to act in the interests of the entire nation, even in the teeth of a tiny numerical minority's clamorous demands. This argument led opponents to decry the government's "arrogance" ("soberbia") and did little to build a constituency for the laws. Garcia's cabinet only began publicly highlighting the fact that the decrees offered increased protection to millions of hectares of rainforest -- including a special 11 million hectare set-aside for indigenous territories -- after the violent June 5 clashes. Garcia himself finally raised this argument in a June 17 speech to the nation (ref C) when he acknowledged that he had not believed it was necessary to consult broadly with local communities on the decrees because they actually increased protection for indigenous groups. But by that time, government opponents had already successfully (if inaccurately) portrayed the decrees in domestic and international opinion as opening up the rainforest to unfettered exploitation. Discrediting Decree Opponents -------------- ¶8. (C) Many critics also accuse the government of seeking to discredit decree opponents, thereby inflaming protester passions. Whatever the truth of the claims, observers say the government's dismissal of protests as manipulated by radicals, NGOs, and foreign governments angered the great majority of protesters, who sincerely believed they were fighting to protect indigenous rights and lands. Garcia's accusation that protesters committed "savage" acts led to counter-accusations of racism and more cries of "arrogance". Television spots placed by the Interior Ministry calling protest leaders terrorists further polarized political sentiments. The administration eventually softened its rhetoric and removed the TV spots, but not before creating the impression among many observers that it was indifferent to the legitimate aspirations of indigenous Peruvians. Underequipped, Insufficient, Unprepared Police -------------- - ¶9. (C) The government made perhaps its most serious mistake when it sent underequipped, unprepared police in insufficient numbers to disperse protesters and remove roadblocks from the "Devil's Curve". On June 5, by all accounts, the thousands of protesters vastly outnumbered the security services the GOP had sent to dislodge them. In the first clash of the day, reports said that hundreds, if not thousands, of protesters surprised and surrounded a detachment of some fifty police that were attempting to take control of a hill overlooking the highway. This clash resulted in the deaths of twelve police and several protesters. In his weekly political essay, one noted journalist with no reservoir of sympathy for the Garcia government expressed sympathy for police personnel sent into harm's way with insufficient (or inappropriate) crowd dispersal equipment and no political cover. (By contrast, many observers highlight a successful operation in June 2007 when the GOP used a massive force of police to remove thousands of squatters - including some with arms - from a central market in Lima, without sparking violence.) ¶10. (C) Poor communication between police in the field also appears to have exacerbated the situation, say critics. Photographs from another incident near the "Devil's Curve," which reportedly occurred several hours after the first violent clash, showed police in a loose formation, taking few visible precautions to defend themselves against violence when they were apparently ambushed by snipers (ref D). A police contact told us the officers had no excuse for being so unprepared after the violence earlier that morning. Others reported that the police had no radios and that their cell phones were out of range, and so were unable to communicate with and warn their colleagues nearby. ¶11. (C) Finally, many of our contacts criticize the government for failing to resolve the ongoing hostage crisis at "Substation 6" - where protesters had been holding over three dozen police for more than a month - before acting to clear the highways. According to these critics, the government should have known that actions against protesters on the highway would lead protesters to take revenge on the hostages. (Note: Protesters tortured and murdered ten police at Substation 6 reportedly in revenge for the deaths of protesters that morning. End Note.) Protesters at Substation 6 reportedly even had an agreement with police that allowed the GOP to rotate an equal number of hostages into the base to replace hostages that had been there for a long time. Comment: No Deliberate Repression, But Blame to Go Around -------------- -------------- ¶12. (C) In our view, a number of elements contributed to the combustible situation that produced the June 5 conflict: radicals seeking to exploit genuine indigenous concerns for political purposes; protesters who blocked roads, took over public and private installations and willingly resorted to violence; community leaders who rejected repeated opportunities for dialogue offered by the government to resolve the protests without resorting to force; and not necessarily least, a series of government errors and miscalculations, enumerated above, that unnecessarily exacerbated an inherently volatile situation. If government mistakes and miscalculation was clearly in play, however, there is no credible evidence to date that the GOP intentionally and systematically used violence to repress protests. Whatever happened in Bagua that day, government authority was undermined and police morale and willingness to defend public security severely eroded by its aftermath. This has clearly emboldened protesters elsewhere in the country (refs) to take advantage of a weakened government still reeling from the blow by extracting concessions on growing lists of demands or by goading it into further clumsy reaction. MCKINLEY