GABON: SECURITY ISSUES FOR THE PRESIDENTIAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 LIBREVILLE 000398 SIPDIS A/C FOR LISA KORTE E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/28/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL GB SUBJECT: GABON: SECURITY ISSUES FOR THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION Classified By: Ambassador Eunice Reddick for Reasons 1.4(b) and (d). -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) Libreville is calm and will likely remain so in the leadup to the August 30 presidential election. For the first time in 41 years the Gabonese will not have Omar Bongo as the shoo-in candidate. Since the rules that applied under Omar Bongo's presidency are now in flux, security and peaceful transition are major concerns for the Gabonese people and government. Over the last month there has been an increased presence of security forces along major arteries and guarding important civilian installations in Libreville. This cable outlines the major security issues surrounding the election. END SUMMARY. -------------- Protests and Civil Unrest -------------- ¶2. (C) On August 7 the first (and only) sizeable political protest occurred in Libreville. The protest was led by numerous opposition candidates to demand the resignation of then Minister of Defense Ali Bongo Ondimba. Reports by local and international media claim wildly differing numbers of protesters, but Embassy sources tell us that the number was likely only a little over 1000 people. Other, much smaller marches and protests have occurred in the lead-up to the election, but no protest has numbered over a few hundred people and none have turned violent. ¶3. (C) The police, Gendarmerie and Republican Guard were all mobilized the morning of the August 7 protest (and in the case of the police, the night before) to cordon off the protest and ensure it did not reach its ultimate destination of the Presidential Palace. Only the police actually engaged the protestors. The police managed the crowd without resorting to beatings or the discharge of a weapon, though they did finally use teargas. No credible accusations of excessive violence or brutality were leveled against the police in the aftermath. ¶4. (C) RSO,s contacts in the Gendarmerie say that the Gendarmes will focus on protecting Gabonese infrastructure on election day. Powerlines and transformers, irrigation, and wireless repeaters will all be priorities, as will the roads. The Gendarmerie also say that their concerns for violence are low, but they will be on alert a &number8 of days before the election as well as afterwards. ¶5. (C) COMMENT: The opposition is unlikely to organize a protest or demonstration before the election any larger than the August 7 event. However, the post-election period when the opposition can contest the election may see an uptick in civil unrest depending on the reliability of the election results and allegations of fraud. Gabonese security forces passed a major test during the August 7 protest by professionally managing the protestors and keeping the demonstration contained to one small area of Libreville. Post expects the police to be the primary entity to deal with civil unrest, with the Gendarmerie, Republican Guard, and military only used during election day or on an &as needed8 basis and to protect sensitive areas. END COMMENT. -------------- Demographic Tensions -------------- ¶6. (C) Tensions normally associated with ethnicity or religion are taking a back seat to political rhetoric in Gabon. Ethnic issues and divides have not been primary issues for the candidates nor the voters. The Fang, who at 30 percent of the population comprise the largest ethnic group in Gabon, have been at the center of text message campaigns to promote Fang pride and candidates, but since the official campaign period on August 16, Fang-related issues have quieted. There are a number of factors that keep the Fang from dominating the political scene in Gabon, including the Omar Bongo legacy of dispersing government and business positions among all ethnic groups. Fang dominance has not been an overwhelming election factor because of the large number of Fang candidates (almost one half of all 23 candidates are Fang),and repeated requests by government officials and candidates to keep ethnicity out of the election. RSO reports that in meetings with Gabonese police leadership and French security counterparts, however, both have expressed concern about the potential for unrest based LIBREVILLE 00000398 002 OF 002 along ethnic lines. ¶7. (C) COMMENT: While ethnicity will certainly play a role in the decisions of voters, it has not served as a decisive element within Gabonese society thus far. Ethnicity is only one factor among many the voters in Gabon will use to make their choice on election day. Post feels issues with ethnicity will not worsen significantly in the aftermath of the election- no matter what the outcome. END COMMENT. ¶8. (C) Religious divides have only become an issue for one of the major candidates, Andre Mba Obame. Mba Obame used anti-Muslim rhetoric in a handful of public speeches. However, his anti-Muslim talking points did not resonate well with Gabonese of all religions and Mba Obame has steered away from any further comments. ¶9. (C) COMMENT: Like ethnicity, religion and the potential divides it can create, have only played a small role in the election process so far. Most Gabonese are Christian (Catholic majority),though there is a minority of Muslims in Gabon that includes the powerful Bongo family (and Ali Bongo Ondimba). Religious divides are even less likely to lead to widespread violence than ethnicity in Gabon. END COMMENT. -------------- Republican Guard Increased Presence -------------- ¶10. Since the death of Omar Bongo on June 8 security and police forces have been more present in the widely-traveled areas of Libreville. Republican Guard, in particular, now routinely maintain a presence at every major intersection and round-about along Libreville,s Bord de Mer. The Republican Guard stop traffic numerous times to allow Gabonese officials to travel the streets unimpeded, often leaving commuter traffic along the major artery a tangled mess. Other times, the Republican Guard step in to help snarled traffic by waving through exceptionally long lines of vehicles and managing traffic flow. French advisors to the Republican Guard are noticeably present at some of the larger intersections. ¶11. (C) COMMENT: Post expects the Republican Guard presence along the Bord De Mer to remain robust up until the election ) and likely well afterwards, as well. The Republican Guard,s primary concern will be to protect the Interim President, other high officials, symbolic infrastructure, as well as to secure the area around government buildings. END COMMENT. -------------- Students -------------- ¶12. (C) One fault line that increases the possibility of civil disorder are Gabon,s students. Two weeks removed from receiving their final test scores after a long school-year marred by repeated teacher strikes and abnormally low test results, Gabonese students are the main attendees of many political rallies. Presidential hopefuls encourage Gabon,s unemployed youth and students currently on summer break to attend rallies and bolster numbers with enticements of alcohol and free t-shirts. Students have historically been eager to create and join protests in Gabon, and with nothing besides the election to occupy them, they provide a potential fault line of civil unrest. ¶13. (C) September 6 anf 9 are key dates in the soccer calendar for Gabon, both dates involving matches with neighbor Cameroon. The matches are qualifiers for the World Cup and are crucial to both countries' chances to stay in the competition. The first match, scheduled for Libreville, was postponed once from the week following President Bongo's death. The potential for rowdy people, young and old, taking to the streets after the match ends (either happy or angry) will not be a small matter for police. REDDICK