CHARGE MEETING WITH FORMER VP CARDENAS

C O N F I D E N T I A L LA PAZ 000743 SIPDIS WHA FOR KEVIN WHITAKER E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/19/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM PHUM PINR ASEC PTER BL SUBJECT: CHARGE MEETING WITH FORMER VP CARDENAS Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Kris Urs for reasons 1.4 (b, d) ¶1. (C) Summary: In a wide-ranging conversation on May 15, Charge d'Affaires met with former Vice President and leading opposition presidential candidate Victor Hugo Cardenas and discussed Cardenas' campaign prospects, recent attacks against political opponents by ruling Movement Toward Socialism (MAS) party supporters, MAS tactics to leave the Supreme Court without a quorum, a MAS plan to preempt opposition on its left by setting up an "artificial" opposition, the Santa Cruz "terrorism" case, the development of a new electoral roll before December 6 elections, and election monitoring. End summary. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Cardenas Candidacy: On the Rise - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶2. (C) Cardenas said private polling done by polling guru Stanley Greenberg's firm regarding the upcoming December 6 presidential elections shows Cardenas on the rise and President Evo Morales falling. While publicly available Ipsos polls over the last month have placed Morales between 43 and 52 percent, Cardenas says Greenberg's private polling shows support for Morales as low as 34 percent. Cardenas went so far as to say Ipsos "was paid" by the MAS to bump up Morales' numbers. In contrast, Greenberg's polls show Cardenas cresting 20 percent, gaining momentum, and comfortably ahead of any other opposition candidate. With former President Carlos Mesa now out of the race, Cardenas expects the next round of polls to show a further jump in his support levels. ¶3. (C) Cardenas showed Charge a copy of CASH magazine, a Santa Cruz-based publication, which called Cardenas the most popular presidential choice in the country (including Morales) and included a city-by-city popularity rating. The breakdown showed Morales' main strength in the West and Cardenas' in the East, as expected, but Cardenas pointed out that in La Paz department the two were running neck and neck. Interestingly, Cardenas asserted that the magazine cannot be found on newsstands, because administration representatives bought every copy they could find to keep the news from circulating. "The government is very nervous -- very nervous," Cardenas emphasized. ¶4. (C) Cardenas discussed his campaign strategy, saying he was gaining even in the western, Altiplano part of the 
country, where many traditionally associate him (negatively) with former President Gonzalo "Goni" Sanchez de Lozada and thus view him as a traitor. (Note: Cardenas was vice president during Goni's first term and was the first indigenous person to hold this office. End note.) Cardenas said he was reaching out successfully in Aymara, via radio broadcasts, to segments of the population that would otherwise support President Morales and the MAS. He conceded that there is a core group of rural poor that he may never reach, but rattled off a long list of unions, social groups, neighborhood associations, university groups, and micro-business associations that are joining his cause. Cardenas said despite MAS' predictions that the campo would react violently to his presence in the campo, he and his family traveled peacefully throughout small Altiplano villages. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Communitarian Justice = Mob Rule - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶5. (C) Beginning May 20, Cardenas is traveling to Washington, DC and potentially several European countries to make political contacts, fundraise, and to file a case with the Inter-American Court of Human Rights regarding the Morales' administration's continued inaction on the invasion of his home and subsequent attack on his wife and son, all of which occurred under the pretext of "communitarian justice." Cardenas mentioned that he had been part of the resistance movement decades ago against dictators such as Generals Hugo Banzer and Luis Garcia Meza and that their security forces had tortured him. However, he said, neither group had gone so far as to attack his wife, children, and relatives. "In some ways the MAS is worse, more authoritarian than these dictators were," he concluded. ¶6. (C) Cardenas later referred to the recent whipping of former indigenous leader Marcial Fabricano for proposing legislation that displeased Beni social groups aligned with the MAS. Cardenas underlined that such beatings had nothing to do with community justice, and were solely a pretext for officially-sanctioned political "gang" violence designed to pressure the opposition. He then somewhat gloomily added, "there will be more." - - - - - - - - - - - Bare Knuckle Fighting - - - - - - - - - - - ¶7. (C) Cardenas has several legal cases pending against members of the Morales administration, including one regarding Government Minister Rada's inaction in defending his property, and he commented that the cases are costing him dearly. However, the cases bring significant benefits as well, including keeping pressure on the MAS and keeping the story of the attack circulating in the popular consciousness. Referring to the recent MAS-driven case against Supreme Court President Eddy Fernandez (which has left the Supreme Court without a quorum and halted much of its activity), Cardenas said the Morales administration was acting to cover up its corruption, particularly Rada. Eddy Fernandez, Cardenas said, was just "one step," with other MAS-driven cases pending against several other justices. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Building a (Very) Loyal Opposition - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶8. (C) In an aside to Poloff, Cardenas expressed his belief that the recent distancing between MAS co-founder Roman Loayza and the Morales administration, including Loayza's pledge to start a new party and run against Morales for the presidency, was a hoax. Cardenas explained that the MAS was concerned about challenges arising from its left and sought to launch its own, controllable opposition instead. By occupying this political space for several months, he said, Loayza would prevent other "real" opposition from arising. Then, in perhaps November, Cardenas predicted that Morales would make a gesture such as adding more indigenous representation to his cabinet and Loayza would return to the fold, all sins forgiven. With the MAS reunited just weeks before the election, there would be no time for other leftist groups to launch a serious campaign, preserving the MAS' electoral base. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - "Terrorism" Costing Santa Cruz Dearly - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶9. (C) Regarding the alleged terrorist cell in Santa Cruz, Cardenas said while all the details may never fully emerge, the Morales administration wasted no time in using "terrorism" as an excuse to "silence" and "paralyze" opposition Cruceno leadership, who fear they may be detained or incarcerated indefinitely at the government's whim. He said the government's actions had led to a kind of "self-censorship" on the part of many business leaders. (Note: On May 20, President Morales announced he asked his cabinet to develop a supreme decree allowing him to confiscate assets of businesses or media suspected of collaborating with terrorist groups, without a trial. End note.) Cardenas said several Cruceno leaders were making deals with the MAS, paying money to be left out of an expected roundup of suspects. Cardenas affirmed that there is a reactionary faction in Santa Cruz that could well have recruited such a group, calling it a "grave error" and one that would result in a "loss of legitimacy." - - - - - - - - - - - - - MAS Attacks on USG Down? - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶10. (C) Cardenas asked Charge if he had noticed a lowering in the level of MAS belligerency against the U.S. in recent weeks. Charge responded that this did seem to be the case and noted that the election of President Obama has made it somewhat harder for the MAS to go on the attack. Cardenas agreed but cautioned that the MAS' modus operandi was to find internal and external enemies and then link them. He cited the alleged terrorist cell as an example of an internal enemy and urged caution, lest the USG be tied to this group as an external partner. Given the lack of any other potential external foe on the horizon, he said, he assumed the MAS would at some point have to turn its sights on the USG again. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Electoral Roll and Monitoring - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶11. (C) Regarding the agreement to construct an entirely new electoral roll ("padron") before December elections, Cardenas expressed his doubts about the project's feasibility and said he thought the MAS would try to pressure the opposition to accept a "partially reconstructed" padron instead. He emphasized that no electoral roll had ever been constructed out of whole cloth in such a compressed timeframe and said he thought the padron deficiencies would resurface as a campaign issue in the coming months. While third justice Amalia Oporto is closely aligned with the MAS, he said the National Electoral Court as reconstituted with Jose Antonio Costa as president and Roxana Ibarnegaray as the newest justice seemed likely to be relatively impartial and professional. ¶12. (C) Cardenas expressed his respect for former President Jimmy Carter's recent visit to Bolivia and his long experience in promoting human rights, and said he would not be adverse to the Carter Center participating in election monitoring. Cardenas said length of time in country would be an important element in any election monitoring program, noting that in monitoring the January 25 constitutional referendum both the European Union and Organization of American States teams became more critical over time, which was reflected in their final reports. - - - - Comment - - - - ¶13. (C) Cardenas ended the meeting by asking for funding or any other help the Embassy could provide. Charge explained our need to remain impartial, while wishing Cardenas the best of luck in the December elections. Cardenas' campaign backers have estimated it will take up to USD ten million to make a credible charge at the presidency. While such figures pale in comparison to US elections, it will be difficult for Cardenas to raise this level of financing, especially with financial leaders anxious to distance themselves from being associated too closely with the opposition. Cardenas may have momentum, but Morales and the MAS are still in a commanding position and have a history of beating Western polling estimates. End comment. URS