BOLIVIA: POLITICAL VIEWS FROM TARIJA STATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L LA PAZ 000698 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10 YEARS AFTER CHANGE OF GOVERNMENT TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PINR BL SUBJECT: BOLIVIA: POLITICAL VIEWS FROM TARIJA STATE REF: A. LA PAZ 695 ¶B. LA PAZ 659 ¶C. LA PAZ 635 ¶D. LA PAZ 578 ¶E. 08 LA PAZ 1460 Classified By: A/EcoPol Chief Joe Relk for reasons 1.4 (b)(d) ¶1. (C) Summary: A/DCM and PolOffs met with Tarija Department (state) leaders during a May 7-8 outreach trip (reftel a). Prefect (governor) Mario Cossio told us the GOB's investigation into an alleged terror cell was a "show." He said he would be the next prefect to be arrested largely because the GOB has an eye on controlling Tarija's rich natural gas resources. Cossio and Tarija business leaders were generally pessimistic about the opposition's chances in the December 6 national elections and look only to do well enough in congressional contests to fight another day. The MAS contacts we spoke to were universally supportive of USG efforts in Bolivia and critical of President Morales, belying the MAS' lack of true believers in Tarija. All contacts reported support for greater Tarija autonomy and no contacts expressed the view that the time was right for a U.S.-Bolivian rapprochement. End Summary. Cossio: Terror Investigation as Political Witch Hunt -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) Opposition-aligned Prefect Mario Cossio grimly predicted to A/DCM that he would be the next opposition prefect to be jailed. He dismissed the government's investigation of an alleged terror cell, in which three alleged terrorists were killed (refetels b and c),as "pure political show" to create a pretext to "decapitate" the already weak and fractured opposition. He claimed to have no information on the alleged terror cell. Cossio said the government has "no authority" to charge others with terrorism after the Palace and Venezuelan Embassy were implicated in the June 21 bombing of a Tarija television affiliate on the eve of the 2008 Tarija autonomy vote (reftel e). Cossio: Opposition Relegated to Damage Control in 2009 -------------- -------------- ¶3. (C) Cossio lamented that President Evo Morales would be reelected in December 6 national elections and that the opposition would need to support unity candidates for congress to maintain any brake on Morales' power. Although hopeful, Cossio was less than sanguine, however, about the opposition's ability to decide on single candidates. He was also noncommittal about his intent to run for reelection, although other Tarija contacts contend he will run if for no other reason to maintain prefectual legal immunity (Note: These immunities have not protected ex-Pando Prefect Leopoldo Fernandez, jailed since September. End Note.). Cossio said the opposition would participate in the December elections regardless of the degree of fraud or intimidation because "there is nothing else we can do. If we do not participate we will just be worse off in the end." Ultimately, Cossio said the opposition needed to focus on staying politically relevant and keep enough power in Congress to stay in the game until after 2009, when opposition prospects might improve. Cossio emphasized that legal democratic means were the only option to oppose MAS advances. Tarija Model as Opposition Alternative -------------- ¶4. (C) Cossio added that Bolivians would eventually tire of continued conflict and a worsening economy he associated with the Morales Administration and would look to Tarija, where "people are tranquil" and "we are growing." He proposed the opposition use Tarija as a model for success nationally by stressing equality (as opposed to special indigenous rights proposed by Morales),government effectiveness, and economic growth. Cossio used as an example Tarija Department's universal health care, particularly aimed at new mothers and small children, which offers "the same access to services and benefits to everyone." Cossio stated that the opposition "won't succeed unless we create a clear alternative agenda" to Morales' "change agenda." "We need to show Bolivians that there is more than one way to change the country." Carter, Bilat, and Chaco -------------- ¶5. (C) Cossio claimed despite requests from many other areas, including within government-led departments, the voting law passed April 14 (reftel d) only allows a December vote on regional autonomy to the pro-MAS Chaco area, which straddles opposition-controlled Tarija, Chuquisaca, and Santa Cruz states. "This is clearly an attempt to weaken the opposition," said Cossio, adding the government is using a campaign against indentured servitude in the region as public relations cover to achieve their real goal: control of Chaco gas reserves. Cossio did not offer specifics regarding the May 2 meeting between former President Jimmy Carter and opposition prefects. "He (President Carter) seemed to be uninformed about some things. We tried to inform him. He was polite, but nothing will come of it." Cossio opined that the U.S. was unlikely to "get anything" from a bilateral rapprochement and that the timing was unfortunate for the opposition, as they hoped to leverage generally high regard for the United States in Bolivia to criticize Morales' perceived botching of the relationship. He said any positive recognition of Morales or "political gifts" by the Obama Administration would be devastating to the opposition. Tarija's Off-Script MAS Leaders: Pro-Autonomy and pro-U.S.? -------------- -------------- ¶6. (C) Tarija's MAS leaders appear to either not have received the anti-U.S. "empire" speaking points from the Morales Administration or have chosen to ignore them. Rodolfo Hugo Vargas, head of the MAS' Tarija caucus, told PolOff, "We love the United States and we love USAID. Thank you for everything you do and please keep doing it." MAS Deputy Simon Zurita told PolOff many MAS leaders were in disagreement with Morales' anti-U.S. posturing. Zurita said in mixed company that "we thought Morales would be a Mandela, but he has turned into a Mugabe." ¶7. (C) Marco Antonio Lema (strictly protect),an advisor to four MAS congressmen and staffer on the Bolivian Congress' Hydrocarbons Committee, explained the MAS never really gained a foothold of true believers in Tarija, thus many MAS leaders are "opportunists just in it for the jobs," as he conceded he was. Lema said Tarija has largely escaped the violent tensions in the rest of the country because MAS leaders are moderate and hail from "the most pro-business department in Bolivia." MAS Advisor Advice to Morales: Don't Tread on Tarija -------------- -------------- ¶8. (C) When asked if he was concerned if his pro-U.S. sentiments could put him at risk, Lema angrily retorted that no one had a right to question his integrity, adding that Morales would do well not go on a public witch-hunt of MAS dissidents, least he "loose Tarija completely." Lema noted that when he was an advisor to Morales when he was a congressman, "I tried to teach him about the gas industry but he did not want to listen and he has continued with this willful ignorance as President." Lema and petroleum industry leader Fernando Villanueva (strictly protect) complained that Morales' preference for Iranian investment in the gas industry to Western direct investment was taking a toll on Tarija's gas industry. "Policies that hurt our gas industry and the government's position on autonomy will make it difficult for any MAS gains here in December," said Villanueva. Lema added that support for greater departmental autonomy dates back decades, is "universal," and crosses party lines in Tarija. He claimed Tarijenos were looking for a third autonomy option, perhaps through a new referendum, to bridge the impasse between the departmental autonomy statutes passed in 2008 (deemed illegal by the federal government) and the government's offer of autonomy through the new constitution. Lema characterized Morales' newly established Ministry of Autonomies as an attempt co-opt the autonomy issue and "just another way to control Tarija that no Tarijeno believes is a real option." Cossio said much the same: "It is a ministry to prevent real autonomies." Tarija Businessmen Bracing for Another Morales Term -------------- -------------- ¶9. (C) A/DCM met with a group of 12 leading Tarija businessmen who told us they fear donating to opposition candidates in the wake of the government consideration of a decree legalizing the seizure of assets of Bolivians linked to terrorism or treason. "They are using the events in Santa Cruz as an excuse to intimidate anyone they consider a threat to their agenda," said Tarija Business Federation President Manual Cuevas (strictly protect). The group was pessimistic about the opposition's ability to select unity candidates ("In the end, we'll all vote for five different people.") and its ability to mobilize voters based on issues. They contended Bolivians are generally motivated to vote based on identity (for candidates from similar backgrounds),even "at the expense of their own interests." They contended the worsening economy, a key opposition focus in 2008 recall referendum, would only gain traction with voters in 2010, when they believed the Bolivian economy would hit bottom. They also perceived sharp increase in narcotics trafficking through Tarija to Argentina, lamenting the complacency, if not support, of law enforcement. Cuevas told PolOff a truck full of coca leaves was stopped at the border in early May, but the next day the truck was empty and consequently released. "The media used to report on these things, but these days no one says a word." URS