FOREIGN MINISTER ON CIA, ERADICATION, HUMAN RIGHTS

C O N F I D E N T I A L LA PAZ 000303 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/26/2019 TAGS: PGOV KDEM PREL PHUM PINR ENVR ASEC BL SUBJECT: FOREIGN MINISTER ON CIA, ERADICATION, HUMAN RIGHTS REF: A. LA PAZ 294 ¶B. LA PAZ 176 Classified By: CDA Krishna Urs for reasons 1.4 (b, d) ¶1. (C) Summary: Charge d'Affaires Kris Urs met with Foreign Minister David Choquehuanca February 26 to refute President Evo Morales' accusations of CIA presence in state oil company YPFB, discuss joint counternarcotics eradication efforts, and review the newly-released human rights report. Choquehuanca agreed to share Charge's rejection of a CIA presence at YPFB with Morales and the cabinet, but said he could not contradict Morales and noted "if it were true, you couldn't admit it (having spies)." Choquehuanca seemed confused on details of the updated eradication agreement and emphasized the government would not wait for USG participation to begin eradication efforts. Saying the government had decided to seek improved relations, he broached the idea of wide-ranging discussions on all aspects of US assistance, but requested that some aid be funneled through the "Evo Cumple" program. Choquehuanca pledged that the government would not overreact to the human rights report, but heavy government criticism followed immediately. Although pleasant, Choquehuanca seems unable to affect Morales' behavior where it counts for the bilateral relationship. End summary. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - CIA Accusations Harming Relations - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶2. (C) Charge opened the meeting by explaining the Department had requested he meet with the Foreign Minister to discuss President Morales' accusations of CIA involvement in state oil company Yacimientos Petroliferos Fiscales Bolivianos (YPFB),the status of eradication efforts, and the annual human rights report. Charge said Assistant Secretary Thomas Shannon would discuss the same issues in the near future with Ambassador Pablo Solon. ¶3. (C) Charge recalled that the Foreign Minister and President Morales had sent letters to Secretary Clinton and President Obama, respectively, expressing their government's desire for better relations. Choquehuanca reported that in a recent cabinet meeting there had been agreement that Bolivia would seek better ties. Charge underlined that the USG also desires better relations but said continued baseless accusations -- such as Morales' statement that the CIA infiltrated YPFB to trap former company President Santos Ramirez and others into a corruption scandal (reftels) -- make such improvements very difficult. Charge emphasized that a change in tone by the government was a necessary precondition for improving ties. Noting the oft-mentioned desire by the government to exchange Ambassadors again, he said it would be difficult to assign a new Ambassador as long as there was a likelihood the new Ambassador would be treated as Ambassador Goldberg had been. (Note: Choquehuanca later suggested the opposite -- that an exchange of Ambassadors would be a necessary measure to avoid further harming bilateral relations. End note.) ¶4. (C) Choquehuanca noted Charge's statement regarding the precondition for improved ties, repeated it back, and said he would pass it on to President Morales and the cabinet. He responded to Charge's statement regarding the CIA by saying somewhat inscrutably "Well, even if it were true, you couldn't admit it." Charge again explained that the charge was baseless and ridiculous. Choquehuanca signaled he was not in a position to contradict Morales. He said if he was asked publicly about the allegations he would simply repeat that the USG cannot admit it has placed spies (in YPFB or anywhere else). He did not give any assurances that such attacks would stop. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Counternarcotics: USG "Unreliable Partner" - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶5. (C) Charge reported good news regarding recent counternarcotics negotiations. He recapitulated that since the last meeting with the Foreign Minister, there had been two technical meetings, which had led to an understanding that the US would continue to pay all costs other than bonus payments ("bonos"). Charge lauded the advances and raised the possibility of signing either a new agreement or a face sheet amendment to the existing letter of agreement. Choquehuanca seemed confused, as though he had not been briefed on the latest developments. Charge explained further that the number of eradicators would rise to 1,600 by the end of March and that we hoped to continue with our support, pending Congressional approval. Choquehuanca then recalled he had been told by Vice Minister Felipe Caceres that the USG had indeed agreed to "join up," which he welcomed, but added that the government was not going to wait for the USG's support. He said the government was going to spend USD 20 million of their own funds because it has realized the USG was an "unreliable partner," and that if they waited for the USG they would not reach their goals. ¶6. (C) To illustrate his point on our unreliability, Choquehuanca said the withholding of Millennium Challenge funds had shown the government that even supposedly apolitical programs were, in fact, political and that the government could not count on USG support. He said these kinds of actions contributed directly to the low state of bilateral relations. Charge patiently explained that while the Millennium Challenge program itself is a relatively apolitical development program, its funds come from the U.S. Congress and that it had been impossible to proceed given the poor state of bilateral relations. ¶7. (C) Choquehuanca did respond positively to Charge's suggestion of a new counternarcotics agreement, and built on this to suggest a larger, overall agreement to regulate bilateral relations. (Note: Choquehuanca seemed to be referring to the seven-point agenda proposed by the Bolivian government in July 2008. End note.) Choquehuanca proposed a three-day set of meetings to reach a "framework agreement," the first day to share ideas, the second to work through questions, with an agreement constructed by the third day. He said key representatives with decision-making authority would have to be present from both sides for each issue. He offered that the Planning Ministry could lead the effort. ¶8. (C) Choquehuanca then added his hope that such negotiations would include discussion of at least some aid being funneled through the Venezuelan-supported "Evo Cumple" program, saying the government was in similar negotiations with the Government of Japan. Charge demurred, instead referring to earlier efforts with the Planning Ministry to make our aid more transparent. Choquehuanca agreed transparency was a key point, and said he would discuss the negotiations with new Minister of Planning Noel Aguirre. - - - - - - - - - - Human Rights Report - - - - - - - - - - ¶9. (C) Charge also passed on a copy of the 2008 Human Rights Report for Bolivia, explaining that the report is congressionally mandated, that the USG prepares such a report for over 170 countries, and that it is factual, balanced, and based on multiple sources. He expressed his hope that the report and the forthcoming International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR) would not constitute an additional friction in our bilateral relationship. ¶10. (C) Choquehuanca said so long as the reports were prepared professionally, and were as balanced and fair as Charge maintained, the government would not react negatively. He agreed such reports needed to be read in an overall context, and not mined for prejudicial comments. (Note: Immediately after the meeting ended, Charge received word that Vice Ministers Sacha Llorenti and Wilfredo Chavez had already held a press release to label the report "politically motivated, poorly informed, immoral, unfair, inaccurate, and full of lies," among other terms. End Note.) ¶11. (C) Choquehuanca suggested a better way to avoid negative comments would be for the USG to submit a draft of the report to the Foreign Ministry for review and suggestions. He noted the UN had done this with their report, giving them about a week to make suggestions. According to Choquehuanca, "They do not have to take the suggestions, of course, but it makes discussion possible." - - - - Comment - - - - ¶12. (C) As usual, the meeting ended cordially, with Choquehuanca showing off the large number of mosquito bites he had received in the Yungas valley during his recent trip for Carnaval. He expressed his hope that he had not contracted dengue. Choquehuanca seems to dislike delivering bad news and prefers his role as a friendly go-between. However, by all appearances neither Choquehuanca nor other moderate members of the cabinet are able to influence Morales' decision-making. We have no reason to expect a diminution in the level of Morales' rhetoric, despite simultaneous (and confusing) calls for an improved bilateral relationship. End comment. URS