BOLIVIA: PANDO REPORT CONCERNS; OHCHR RESPONSE

C O N F I D E N T I A L LA PAZ 000175 SIPDIS STATE FOR IO/RHS AMY OSTERMEIER AND GAYATRI PATEL, DRL/MLGA CHRIS SIBILLA, IO/PSC DEBORAH ODELL E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/29/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM PHUM PINR BL SUBJECT: BOLIVIA: PANDO REPORT CONCERNS; OHCHR RESPONSE CABLE REF: A. 08 LAPAZ 2178 ¶B. 08 LAPAZ 2374 ¶C. 08 LAPAZ 2483 ¶D. 08 LAPAZ 2543 ¶E. SECSTATE 02023 ¶F. LAPAZ 38 Classified By: A/EcoPol Chief Brian Quigley for reasons 1.4 (b, d) ¶1. (C) Summary: PolOff met with Denis Racicot, representative in Bolivia for the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) January 26, to assess OHCHR activities as per request (Reftel E). Relations between the OHCHR and both the government and civil society actors appear to be generally quite good. Post sees potential for collaboration between the USG and the OHCHR in Bolivia. However, Post is concerned OHCHR is not sufficiently investigating (Reftel F) potential violations of human rights that occurred during and after the September 2008 conflict in Pando department (state),in which an estimated 13 to 17 people died (Reftels A - D). Contradicting a January 13 meeting with Charge, in which UN Chief of Mission Yoriko Yasukawa stressed there was a need for a "deeper investigation" into the events in Pando, Mr. Racicot told PolOff the report would not be a "true investigation" and would rely on government information for its analysis. We are concerned the local OHCHR office is too afraid to lose government access to do its job properly. End summary. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - OHCHR Background in Bolivia - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶2. (SBU) The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and the Bolivian government signed a cooperation agreement to establish OHCHR presence in Bolivia in early 2007, which was ratified by the Bolivian congress on July 13, 2007. Initially, the OHCHR was led by an interim representative, who was only recently replaced by Representative in Bolivia Denis Racicot on November 20, 2008. Racicot comes with several years of experience, primarily in Haiti, where he focused on judicial reform issues. The office maintains a staff of five people. - - - - - - - - OHCHR Activities - - - - - - - - ¶3. (SBU) As part of its mandate, the OHCHR monitors the state of human rights in Bolivia and tracks government adherence to UN recommendations and decisions. It also assists the government in developing education programs to promote human rights. The office works with the government's executive branch, the National Police, and the country's armed forces to deliver basic training on respecting human rights. It also helps educate members of the judicial branch and other public ministries on legal issues related to human rights. When necessary, the OHCHR investigates specific cases of human rights abuses, and it informs relevant authorities about abuses or violations of human rights with an eye toward adopting preventive or corrective legislation. ¶4. (SBU) The OHCHR works in a similar capacity with a range of civil society groups, including NGOs and human rights lawyers, offering courses on human rights and advice on how to utilize national and international mechanisms of protection. Over the past year, the office worked with human rights-related groups such as the government's ombudsman's office, the Catholic church, and several NGOs to plan a major campaign to promote peace in Bolivia. - - - - - - - - - - OHCHR Relationships - - - - - - - - - - ¶5. (C) In a January 26, Racicot told PolOff that the situation with respect to human rights in Bolivia was "quite tranquil," especially in comparison with his experiences in other countries. He said that the OHCHR was present at the invitation of the government and characterized their relationship as "cordial" and "normal." He noted the government had not blocked any office activity. In terms of the office's relationship within the larger UN field presence, contacts within the OHCHR indicate relations are good. - - - - - - - - - - - USG Support for OHCHR - - - - - - - - - - - ¶6. (SBU) In general, the OHCHR has good relationships with the Bolivian government and civil society actors. The USG could leverage these relationships by cooperating on public diplomacy events, such as appropriately-themed film festivals, photography exhibitions, discussion fora, and/or lecture series. USAID could also benefit from coordinating with the OHCHR more to increase awareness of its projects in Bolivia. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Major Challenge: Pando Report - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶7. (C) Despite Racicot's relatively rosy characterizations of the OHCHR's relationship with the Bolivian government, Post is concerned the OHCHR is backing down from an earlier intent to fully investigate human rights violations arising from the September 2008 Pando conflict, in which an estimated 13 to 17 people died (Reftels A - D). While the office is doing a scaled-back "analysis" of potential human rights violations, according to Racicot, it has reduced its efforts significantly and is relying on government-provided information rather than doing its own formal investigation. ¶8. (C) Contrary to Racicot's claims, the UN had previously planned to do a much tougher report. A source within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) first told PolOff January 7 senior OHCHR officials were taking a more critical look at the government's role in the violence and their version of events (Reftel F). The MFA source said senior OHCHR officials (i.e. outside of Bolivia) were displeased with the Unasur report on Pando, had grilled the Bolivian UN Ambassador in September meetings about the conflict, and subsequently announced they were going to do their own report. ¶9. (C) In a January 13 meeting with Charge, and PolOff, UN Chief of Mission Yoriko Yasukawa confirmed that the UN report was spurred by a need for a "deeper investigation" in the Pando events than offered by Unasur report, noting the Unasur effort "totally disqualified the opposition." Yasukawa said both sides in the conflict were shamelessly picking and choosing "parts of the conflict that favored them as the victims" at the expense of the truth. She added that although the UN report would differ from the Unasur report, neither report should be considered "the last word" on the subject. Yasukawa told us whenever the UN encountered two conflicting versions of events and could not independently determine which was correct, it would simply "highlight areas of contention." Concerning the post-conflict arrests, Yasukawa said the report would refrain from making potentially counterproductive legal recommendations, as the "Bolivian government has jurisdiction" over legal concerns, but that it might emphasize in vague terms the need to increase capacity in Bolivia,s judiciary, as the Unasur report did. ¶10. (C) Ministry of Foreign Affairs Legal Advisor Paula Melendres (strictly protect) told PolOff January 24 that the MFA had convinced the UN to give it an extension for comments to the report by leveraging its review of UN officials tax free status in Bolivia, which happened to be up for review. She claimed Foreign Minister David Choquehuanca had called UN Mission Chief Yasukawa during the second week of January to tell her that the MFA would not be able to resolve the tax-exempt status issue until after the January 25 constitutional referendum and if the review of the UN Pando report could also wait until after the referendum. Yasukawa apparently agreed. ¶11. (C) PolOff's meeting with Racicot January 26 confirmed the impression that the report had been scaled back considerably, but he added his own spin. Having recently arrived, Racicot said the Pando analysis would be the office's first report, but not a "true investigation." He noted there were very specific rules to be followed, especially for investigations, and that his office was still unfamiliar with them. He noted that Unasur had a staff of 25 to 27 people and claimed they had deep technical experience in such investigations, while his own office, while broadly experienced, contained no more than five people and was not equipped to do such work. Instead, he said his office had done an analysis using the government prosecutor's information. He said a first draft of the analysis was delivered to the MFA during the Christmas season, but that they had requested more time to review the draft. When questioned, he confirmed the MFA still had the report a month later and that he had yet to receive comments. (Note: By not returning comments on the report, the government delayed its publication until after the January 25 constitutional referendum. End note.) ¶12. (C) Racicot said his office could contribute more by focusing on the events after the Pando violence, specifically the legally questionable detentions of then-Prefect Leopoldo Fernandez and dozens of other Pandinos, many connected with the opposition regional government or civic groups. He said he thought their report would come out "in two or three weeks," but could not be more specific. Racicot also indicated his team would be more careful than the Unasur team, especially in discussing the number of deaths that occurred; he said they would rely on the number of documented deaths, which was no more than 13, while Unasur reported 22 deaths. (Note: Since the January 26 meeting with Racicot, local news media have reported at least three of the people listed as dead in the Unasur report have re-appeared and are very much alive. End note.) - - - - Comment - - - - ¶13. (C) Just as in our October meeting with OHCHR staff, Racicot seemed all too willing to accept government sources and accounts at the expense of independent investigation in order to maintain their "cordial" relationship. While our discussion with Yasukawa gives us some hope the UN report will provide an improvement to the Unasur report, per Reftel F there appear to be conflicts regarding the content of the report not just between the government and the UN, but also between local OHCHR staff and their New York office. End Comment. URS