BOLIVIA: NEGATING "DEFAMATION OF RELIGION" RESOLUTION

C O N F I D E N T I A L LA PAZ 001611

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019/12/23
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM PHUM PINR KISL OPDC BL
SUBJECT: BOLIVIA: NEGATING "DEFAMATION OF RELIGION" RESOLUTION

REF: 09 STATE 128320

DERIVED FROM: DSCG 05-1 B, D


1. (C) Summary: Bolivia regularly votes for the Organization of the
Islamic Conference's UN resolutions against "defamation of
religions," most recently on December 18 in the UNGA plenary
session. Given our thorny bilateral relationship, the GOB's ALBA
membership, and its growing ties with Iran, it is unlikely we can
quickly change Bolivia's stance -- especially if we are perceived
as dictating our position to the GOB without regional support.
Still, human rights is one of the less politicized issues within
the GOB, and by engaging directly with the Foreign Minister, GOB
Charge to the UN Pablo Solon, and key deputies, we may be able to
progress over time toward GOB abstention on similar resolution
votes. End summary.


2. (C) Embassy La Paz is working to help defeat future UNGA
resolutions by the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC)
that could lead to persecution of minority religious groups under
the guise of punishing defamation of religions, but gaining
Bolivia's support will be difficult. In recent years, Bolivia has
increasingly defined its foreign policy goals as opposing whatever
it perceives as in our interests, often doing so in concert with
Cuba, Venezuela, and other members of the ALBA (Bolivarian
Alternative for the Americas) group. ALBA members consistently
support OIC's resolutions. In addition, as these countries deepen
their relationships with Iran, there will be pressure on the GOB to
continue to vote in favor of the "defamation of religions"
resolution.


3. (C) The GOB is also sensitive to any suggestion that the USG is
dictating its foreign policy. Headlines in the Bolivian press
regularly address GOB statements -- often by President Morales
himself -- on the perceived lack of USG respect for Bolivian
sovereignty, and contacts within the GOB leadership advance this
argument with us as well.


4. (C) Ongoing bilateral talks may provide a way to engage
constructively. We hope to reach agreement on a bilateral
framework agreement in early 2010 that would establish ad hoc
working groups on areas of concern. Two of our key interlocutors
in these discussions are FM David Choquehuanca and GOB Charge to
the UN Pablo Solon. By engaging them, we may be able to reach
President Morales indirectly and frame this issue as one of
supporting oppressed minority groups -- an approach that could find
some traction with the country's first indigenous president.


5. (C) We have also found human rights to be one of the less
politicized elements within the GOB. We will discuss the
"defamation of religions" concept in greater detail with the
leadership of the legislature's standing Human Rights Commission,
many of whom have direct contact with President Morales and could
make the argument without being tied to the USG.


6. (C) Firm support by friendly governments in South America would
also help our cause. Chile voted against the resolution on
December 18. If Brazil and Argentina, which also both abstained,
were to turn solidly against the "defamation of religions" concept,
the GOB would likely receive our arguments more warmly. An OAS- or
UNASUR-hosted discussion could help South American countries take
ownership of the issue and avoid the perception that the USG is
dictating our preferred position.


7. (C) Any progress will likely take time, and expectations for
change in what has been fairly steady GOB support for the
"defamation of religions" concept should remain low. Still, if we
coordinate our efforts with partner countries and frame the issue
as one of minority rights, we might eventually achieve an
abstention by the GOB in future votes.
Creamer