OBASANJO ON AMNESTY: QUALIFIED SUCCESS BUT NOW

C O N F I D E N T I A L LAGOS 000369 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR AF, AF/W, AND INR/AA E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/17/2019 TAGS: PGOV KCOR KCRM ECON SOCI NI SUBJECT: OBASANJO ON AMNESTY: QUALIFIED SUCCESS BUT NOW WHAT? REF: A. LAGOS 362 AND PREVIOUS ¶B. ABUJA 1669 Classified By: Consul General Donna M. Blair; Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary. Former President Obasanjo deems the GON's amnesty for Niger Delta militants a "qualified success," but he is uncertain of what comes next. Per Obasanjo, all interested parties (governmental, community, NGO, and business) need to forge a comprehensive development program to address economic and social needs in the Delta. Tracing historical antecedents for today's Delta dilemma, Obasanjo said the issue needs to be dealt with by "carrot and/or stick." He said he did not know if the government would extend the amnesty post-10/4, but he hopes it does "what is right" to prevent a resumption of violence and a new quagmire in the swamps. End Summary. ¶2. (C) On September 15, former President Olusegun Obasanjo called on CG to discuss topical events. He characterized the GON's amnesty for Niger Delta militants, which expires October 4, as a "qualified success," but he is uncertain what will come next. Obasanjo said that all interested parties -- the federal and state governments as well as local communities, NGOs, the international oil companies (IOCs), and the disgruntled militants themselves, need to come together to forge a comprehensive development plan or program that addresses the economic and social needs of the Delta. ¶3. (C) Obasanjo said there are four key elements to the Niger Delta conundrum -- the criminality, economic, and social aspects and, to a lesser extent, the political dimension. The genesis for today's problem in the Delta, he said, traces back to colonial days. He discounted the political, placing more emphasis on the first three elements, because the militants are not now seeking separation as others were during the time of Biafra, 1967-70. ¶4. (C) Obasanjo said that when he was military head of state, 1976-79, the Delta situation did not have the criminality component it does now. Yet when he returned to office in 1999, the Niger Delta had a new, dark dimension of criminality and militancy. What had happened in between? Obasanjo said that Delta communities had been neglected by the federal, state, and community levels, and the IOCs (primarily Shell). One of the first things he did in 1999 was to enact legislation to enable 13 percent of production revenue to be allocated to oil producing states. Yet, this action did not work, as there was substantial "leakage" and only Ondo state made a good-faith effort to invest in development in oil producing communities. ¶5. (C) Obasanjo added that amnesty for the militants in itself will not work, nor will buying out the "35 (militant) Big Boys." Other militant leaders will emerge and, besides, they are just extorting outrageous sums of money. He added that buying up weapons is not working well, as most real weapons and arms caches "are not coming out." He said a Rivers State scheme was indicative of this failure, where USD 100 has been offered for each weapon. Entreprenerial militants turn in a gun (or machete) for this cash, then turn around to buy four more guns on the street for USD 25 apiece. ¶6. (C) Returning to his four elements, Obasanjo said the government must address the militancy's criminality with "carrot and stick," with "carrots" for the economic, social, and (lesser) political imperatives. Yet Obasanjo doubted that the GON has given enough "carrots. He did not know if President Yar'Adua was willing to extend the amnesty beyond October 4, but he hopes his successor will "do what is right." Obasanjo expressed concern that if the amnesty is not extended or a comprehensive development plan/package is not forthcoming, then the GON could revert to a military "big stick." ¶7. (U) This cable has been coordinated with Embassy Abuja. BLAIR