NIGER DELTA: AMNESTY, TOM POLO'S DILEMMA AND THE

C O N F I D E N T I A L LAGOS 000356 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/03/2019 TAGS: PGOV KCOR KCRM NI SUBJECT: NIGER DELTA: AMNESTY, TOM POLO'S DILEMMA AND THE MORNING AFTER Classified By: Consul General Donna Blair, Reasons 1.4 (B,D) ¶1. (C) Summary: Militant leader Government Ekpompolo ("Tom Polo") may be on the verge of accepting amnesty under face-saving conditions, which, according to a source who claims recent contact with him, could prompt many other militant leaders to follow suit. The lengthening list of paid-off "repentant" militants aside, the continuing lack of a coherent GON post-amnesty plan is behind the widespread skepticism here of the militants' long-term intentions and whether the Delta is really poised for an end to violence. End Summary. ¶2. (C) Joel Bisina, head of the NGO "Niger Delta Professionals for Development" and an Ijaw from the Gbaramatu Kingdom, told Poloff on September 3 that he spoke with Tom Polo about amnesty earlier in the week. He believes that Tom Polo will ultimately accept the amnesty because he has no good alternative. Bisina claimed that the militants know they cannot defeat the military Joint Task Force, and have recognized that in the long run economic disruption hurts them as much as the government. He predicted that roughly 60 percent of the militants in the region would follow Tom Polo's lead, so that if Tom Polo accepts amnesty it will - at least on the surface - be a major step forward. ¶3. (C) Tom Polo's dilemma, Bisina said, is that accepting amnesty looks like surrender. While he can live well in Abuja on his payoff, he would have a hard time coming home and "looking into the eyes" of his people. Furthermore, according to Bisina, Tom Polo perceives the current amnesty - and threats - as directed mostly at the Ijaws with no concerted efforts to get the Itsekiri to disarm on the same scale, a fact which worries him. Tom Polo is also concerned about what will become of his commanders and his "boys," the later who receive 50,000 naira monthly for "working" two weeks on and two weeks off "just like oil workers." However, if he does not accept the amnesty, the Joint Military Taskforce (JTF) would launch a new offensive against Tom Polo's home base, the Gbaramatu Kingdom. Bisina does not think Tom Polo is prepared to live with that consequence. ¶4. (C) Bisina speculated that Tom Polo will accept the amnesty "conditionally." He will try to tie his acceptance to promises by the Federal and State governments to invest in the Gbaramatu Kingdom and rehabilitate his "boys." The government has every reason to make these promises for the sake of declaring amnesty a success, Bisina noted, adding that unfortunately not even members of the President's Amnesty Committee seemed to have a clear idea what happened then. He claimed that the only vague post-amnesty plans he had been told about all focused on educational and training schemes for former militants rather than community and regional development. ¶5. (C) Bisina pointed out that, for many young men in the Niger Delta, carrying a gun is a "livelihood." Whether that gun was used to "protect" facilities, facilitate oil theft, kidnap people or engage in armed robberies, the gun was the only means of earning a living. He asked what these youth would do after they surrendered their guns, went through skills training and then could not find a job. He predicted they would revert to crime and violence. Bisina argued that any post-amnesty plan must therefore have the double aim of job creation through economic development and establishment of effective police forces. Bisina insisted that the JTF is ineffective in police work, and argued for a properly trained police force drawn from the communities in which it will be deployed. ¶6. (U) This cable was co-ordinated with Embassy Abuja. BLAIR