Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09KYIV99
2009-01-16 17:16:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kyiv
Cable title:
GAS CRISIS: WHO'S IN CHARGE?
Richard W Frost 01/20/2009 12:56:00 PM From DB/Inbox: Richard W Frost Cable Text: C O N F I D E N T I A L KYIV 00099 BRUSSECX: ACTION: UPOL POL INFO: UPAO UPRM ECON AMB ODC DAO PAO POLAD PR UAMB RSO UDCM DCM UECON DISSEMINATION: POL CHARGE: PROG VZCZCBSO717 OO RUEHBS DE RUEHKV #0099 0161716 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 161716Z JAN 09 FM AMEMBASSY KYIV TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7055 INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L KYIV 000099
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/16/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV ETRD UP RS
SUBJECT: GAS CRISIS: WHO'S IN CHARGE?
Classified By: DCM James Pettit. Reasons: 1.4 (b/d).
Summary
-------
C O N F I D E N T I A L KYIV 000099
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/16/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV ETRD UP RS
SUBJECT: GAS CRISIS: WHO'S IN CHARGE?
Classified By: DCM James Pettit. Reasons: 1.4 (b/d).
Summary
--------------
1. (C) Given the lack of clarity regarding executive
authority (and the personal animus) which characterizes the
relationship between President Yushchenko and PM Tymoshenko,
they have, on occasion, exhibited rare comity during the gas
crisis, including signing off on two joint letters reflecting
a shared GOU position. There have been important moments of
divergence, however. The most notable involves what
happened, or may have happened, during negotiations with the
Russians December 31, which some claim could have resulted in
a last minute deal. End Summary.
Yushchenko Pulls Back
--------------
2. (C) Yulia Mostova, the very well plugged in Deputy Editor
in Chief of the newsweekly Dzerkalo Tizhnya, told the
Ambassador that Tymoshenko told her that, because of
Tymoshenko's good working relations with Putin, she had been
able to get agreement December 31 with terms for purchase of
gas of $235 per tcm and $1.76 for transit. (Separately, PM
Advisor Vitaly Haidyuk told the Ambassador that anything
worse than $235 tcm and $2.10 for transit made no sense for
Ukraine.) The deal excluded the intermediary, RosUkrEnergo
(RUE). Tymoshenko ordered Naftogaz head Dubyna, in Moscow,
to prepare the necessary documents. However, Tymoshenko was
then unable to reach Dubyna for the next six hours. During
that time, Dubyna apparently received word from Yushchenko to
back away from the deal. Yushchenko was, Tymoshenko said,
seeking to prevent the exclusion of RosUkrEnero or wanted to
deprive Tymoshenko of a political victory. In a different
version, Dubyna told Mostova that Putin had backed away when
he heard December 31 that Tymoshenko was going to fly to
Moscow to seal the deal. As a result of these conflicting
versions Mostova said it was not clear what happened.
RUE Interests
--------------
3. (SBU) Tymoshenko publicly blamed oligarch and RUE head
Firtash, Party of Regions leaders linked to Firtash, and
Yushchenko for scuttling the December 31 negotiations.
Yushchenko has categorically and publicly denied any such
involvement. Firtash and Regions leaders linked to him,
joined by Deputy Chief of the Presidential Secretariat
Bezsmertniy, countered that Tymoshenko -- backed by Kuchma's
former Chief of Staff (and presumed intermediary to the
Kremlin) Medvedchuk -- instead seeks to insert an
intermediary linked to her into the gas trade to replace
RosUkrEnergo.
Uneasy Division of Labor
--------------
4. (C) In a meeting with the Ambassador January 15,
Bezsmertniy -- a relentless critic of Tymoshenko --
acknowledged that coordination between the President and PM
in approaching Russia on the gas crisis, such as negotiating
the two joint letters, had indeed been difficult. Regarding
who is in charge, Bezsmertniy said that the PM had primary
action on the gas crisis but that the President intervened as
necessary because of his mandate to protect national
security. Bezsmertniy observed that perhaps Yushchenko had
"made a mistake" by not assuming the lead on gas
negotiations. Ambassador emphasized the importance of a
unified Ukrainian position. Bezsmertniy agreed that was a
worthy goal, but hard to achieve.
5. (C) Mostova observed to the Ambassador that it was unclear
who had the lead in negotiations. When it is convenient for
Yushchenko, he takes responsibility. When there is a
serious problem, he says Tymoshenko should handle it, and
then criticizes her.
Comment
--------------
6. (C) Tymoshenko's version of the December 31 events, as
relayed by Mostova, is widely repeated among Rada members and
the political elite. However, since the crisis escalated
with Russia's cut-off of gas, coordination between the PM and
President appears, despite continued mutual recriminations,
to have improved. That said, the ambiguity regarding who is
in charge remains. Yushchenko asserts veto power on the gas
negotiations, while Tymoshenko is operationally the lead.
Embassy will continue to reinforce the importance of a
unified GOU position to resolution of the crisis.
TAYLOR
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/16/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV ETRD UP RS
SUBJECT: GAS CRISIS: WHO'S IN CHARGE?
Classified By: DCM James Pettit. Reasons: 1.4 (b/d).
Summary
--------------
1. (C) Given the lack of clarity regarding executive
authority (and the personal animus) which characterizes the
relationship between President Yushchenko and PM Tymoshenko,
they have, on occasion, exhibited rare comity during the gas
crisis, including signing off on two joint letters reflecting
a shared GOU position. There have been important moments of
divergence, however. The most notable involves what
happened, or may have happened, during negotiations with the
Russians December 31, which some claim could have resulted in
a last minute deal. End Summary.
Yushchenko Pulls Back
--------------
2. (C) Yulia Mostova, the very well plugged in Deputy Editor
in Chief of the newsweekly Dzerkalo Tizhnya, told the
Ambassador that Tymoshenko told her that, because of
Tymoshenko's good working relations with Putin, she had been
able to get agreement December 31 with terms for purchase of
gas of $235 per tcm and $1.76 for transit. (Separately, PM
Advisor Vitaly Haidyuk told the Ambassador that anything
worse than $235 tcm and $2.10 for transit made no sense for
Ukraine.) The deal excluded the intermediary, RosUkrEnergo
(RUE). Tymoshenko ordered Naftogaz head Dubyna, in Moscow,
to prepare the necessary documents. However, Tymoshenko was
then unable to reach Dubyna for the next six hours. During
that time, Dubyna apparently received word from Yushchenko to
back away from the deal. Yushchenko was, Tymoshenko said,
seeking to prevent the exclusion of RosUkrEnero or wanted to
deprive Tymoshenko of a political victory. In a different
version, Dubyna told Mostova that Putin had backed away when
he heard December 31 that Tymoshenko was going to fly to
Moscow to seal the deal. As a result of these conflicting
versions Mostova said it was not clear what happened.
RUE Interests
--------------
3. (SBU) Tymoshenko publicly blamed oligarch and RUE head
Firtash, Party of Regions leaders linked to Firtash, and
Yushchenko for scuttling the December 31 negotiations.
Yushchenko has categorically and publicly denied any such
involvement. Firtash and Regions leaders linked to him,
joined by Deputy Chief of the Presidential Secretariat
Bezsmertniy, countered that Tymoshenko -- backed by Kuchma's
former Chief of Staff (and presumed intermediary to the
Kremlin) Medvedchuk -- instead seeks to insert an
intermediary linked to her into the gas trade to replace
RosUkrEnergo.
Uneasy Division of Labor
--------------
4. (C) In a meeting with the Ambassador January 15,
Bezsmertniy -- a relentless critic of Tymoshenko --
acknowledged that coordination between the President and PM
in approaching Russia on the gas crisis, such as negotiating
the two joint letters, had indeed been difficult. Regarding
who is in charge, Bezsmertniy said that the PM had primary
action on the gas crisis but that the President intervened as
necessary because of his mandate to protect national
security. Bezsmertniy observed that perhaps Yushchenko had
"made a mistake" by not assuming the lead on gas
negotiations. Ambassador emphasized the importance of a
unified Ukrainian position. Bezsmertniy agreed that was a
worthy goal, but hard to achieve.
5. (C) Mostova observed to the Ambassador that it was unclear
who had the lead in negotiations. When it is convenient for
Yushchenko, he takes responsibility. When there is a
serious problem, he says Tymoshenko should handle it, and
then criticizes her.
Comment
--------------
6. (C) Tymoshenko's version of the December 31 events, as
relayed by Mostova, is widely repeated among Rada members and
the political elite. However, since the crisis escalated
with Russia's cut-off of gas, coordination between the PM and
President appears, despite continued mutual recriminations,
to have improved. That said, the ambiguity regarding who is
in charge remains. Yushchenko asserts veto power on the gas
negotiations, while Tymoshenko is operationally the lead.
Embassy will continue to reinforce the importance of a
unified GOU position to resolution of the crisis.
TAYLOR